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CONTENTS

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REPUBLIC PARTY AND STATE AFFAIRS

Georgian Raykoms Elect New First Secretaries [ZARYA VOSTOKA, 17 Dec 89]	1
Jurist Comments on Changes, Additions to Kazakh SSR Constitution [V.A. Kim; KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA, 3 Oct 89]	1
Kirghiz Candidate Registration Begins [G. Shipitko; IZVESTIYA, 4 Jan 90]	3
New Turkmen Council of Ministers Chairman Interviewed [TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, 21 Dec 89]	4
Turkmen Republic Electoral Commission Session [TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA, 17 Dec 89]	5
CP Central Committee Member on Function in Party Organization [Yu. Muslimov; PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 24 Nov 89]	6
Study Reveals Perception of Reform in Uzbek CP Organizations [I. Chizhenok; PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN, Dec 89]	7

NATIONALITY ISSUES

Economist Sheynis Views First Armenian National Movement Congress [V. Sheynis; KOMMUNIST, 23 Nov 89]	11
Interregional Group, Azerbaijan People's Front On Armenian Blockade [V.A. Chelyshev; KOMMUNIST, 4 Oct 89]	13
Goal of Sovereignty Raised at Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Session [B. Vahabzade; ADABIYYAT VA INJASANAT, 13 Oct 89]	15
Armenian Highways, Internal Affairs Officials on Blockade Effects [G. Melkumyan; KOMMUNIST, 30 Nov 89]	18
Evolution of Dialogue Viewed in Context of Armenian Events [G. Ter-Gabrielyan; KOMSOMOLET, 16 Dec 89]	19
MVD Troops Stationed in NKAO Face Hardship, Hostility [V. Belykh; TRUD, 29 Dec 89]	25
Conference of All Georgian Parties Scheduled [S. Khutsishvili et al; AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI, 7 Dec 89]	26
'Society of Internationalists' Formed in Abkhazia [Yu.N. Voronov; MOLODEZH GRUZII, 14 Dec 89]	27
Georgian National Democrats Issue Appeal to Republic's Non-Georgians [MOLODEZH GRUZII, 19 Dec 89]	29
Georgian Demography Society Demands Control of Immigration Policy [KOMUNISTI, 5 Dec 89]	29
Mid-December Georgian Attacks on South Ossetians Described [G. Zorin; LITERATURNAYA GAZETA No 52, 27 Dec 89]	30

LAW AND ORDER

USSR Supreme Court Chairman Discusses Reforms [Ye. Smolentsev; NEDEL'YA No 52, 25-31 Dec 89]	32
Rise in Youth Crime Linked to Unemployment [O. Nosareva; LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA, 12 Dec 89]	34
Ukrainian CP Commission on Increase in Crime [PRAVDA UKRAINY, 9 Dec 89]	35
Uzbek Supreme Court Chairman on 'Cotton' Crime Commission Progress [B. Malikov; PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 5 Dec 89]	36
Tashkent Corruption Trial of Former Navoi Oblast Chief Yesin Reviewed [G. Figlin; PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 15 Dec 89]	38
Trial of Former Uzbek Central Committee Secretary Abdullayeva Analyzed [Yu. Feofanov; IZVESTIYA, 19 Jan 90]	41

MEDIA AND JOURNALISM

Sociologist Claims Continuing Dearth of NKAO Crisis Media Coverage [L. Bagdasaryan; <i>KOMMUNIST</i> , 15 Dec 89]	45
Uzbek CP Announces More Changes in Republic Periodicals [PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 15 Dec 89]	48

HISTORY AND IDEOLOGY

Azerbaijani CC Ideology Commission Meets [BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, 15 Dec 89]	51
UzSSR: Reasons for Spate of Party Resignations in Almalyk Explored [R. Gaydarova; PRAVDA VOSTOKA, 5 Dec 89]	51

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ISSUES

ArSSR: Spitak Raykom First Secretary on Quake Reconstruction Progress [N. Muradyan; PRAVDA, 21 Dec 89]	55
High Central Asian Infant Mortality Rate Examined [M. Ripinskaya; RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA, 10 Jan 90]	55
Significance Of Baku Religious School for Azeri Muslims Outlined [H.S. Hasanov; ADABIYYAT VA INJASANAT, 20 Oct 89]	58
Interview with Ratbek-Khadzhi, Qadi of Kazakhstan [Ratbek-Khadzi; TRUD, 7 Dec 89]	60
Turkmen Self-Immolation Victims Include Supreme Soviet Deputy [Ye. Prihodko & Yu. Tokarenko; SOYUZ, 1-7 Jan 90]	61
Turkmen Regional-Studies Association Revived [A. Yennik; KOMSOMOLETS TURKMENISTANA, 12 Dec 89]	64
'Informal' Groups: Role of Komsomol in Military [P. Ishchenko; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 21 Nov 89]	66

Georgian Raykoms Elect New First Secretaries

90US0375A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
17 Dec 89 p 3

[GRUZINFORM Report: "Plenums Were Held"]

[Text] The plenum of the Georgian CP Aspindzskiy Rayon committee discussed an organizational issue.

The plenum relieved T.Sh.Mosiashvili of his duties as first secretary and member of the Aspindzskiy Rayon party buro due to his election as first secretary of the Georgian CP Akhaltsikhskiy Rayon committee.

Participants of the plenum discussed two candidacies to the post of first secretary. In a secret vote, Dzh.P.Mar-uashvili, formerly chairman of the Aspindzskiy Rayon soviet ispolkom, was elected first secretary of the Georgian CP Aspindzskiy Rayon committee.

N.R.Sadzhaya, chairman of the department of organizational and party and cadre work of the Georgian CP Central Committee, participated in the work of the plenum and spoke there.

The plenum of the Georgian CP Akhaltsikhskiy Rayon committee discussed an organizational issue.

The plenum relieved G.Sh.Shanidze of his duties as first secretary and member of the rayon party buro due to his assuming other duties.

Two candidacies for the post of first secretary were discussed. In a secret vote T.Sh.Mosiashvili, former first secretary of the Aspindzskiy Rayon party buro, was elected first secretary of the Georgian CP Akhaltsikhskiy Rayon committee and member of the rayon party buro.

N.R.Sadzhaya, chairman of the department of organizational and party and cadre work of the Georgian CP Central Committee, participated in the work of the plenum and spoke there.

The plenum of the Georgian CP Samtredskiy Rayon committee discussed an organizational issue.

The plenum relieved T.K.Mikadze of his duties as first secretary and member of the Samtredskiy Rayon party buro due to his assuming other responsibilities.

Three candidacies for the post of first secretary were discussed. As a result of a secret vote, A.G.Dzhanelidze, former deputy chairman of the department of organizational and party and cadre work of the Georgian CP Central Committee, was chosen first secretary of the Georgian CP Samtredskiy Rayon committee and member of the rayon party buro.

N.A.Chitanava, Chairman of the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers, participated in the work of the plenum and spoke there.

**Jurist Comments on Changes, Additions to
Kazakh SSR Constitution**

90US0074A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 3 Oct 89 p 1

[Article by Professor Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kim, doctor of law: "The Basic Law of the Republic"; first five paragraphs are KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA introduction]

[text] On 22 September 1989, the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet adopted the "Law on Changes and Amendments of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Kazakh SSR."

It was adopted "for the purpose of the development of socialist democracy, self-government of the people, the improvement of the election system, and the structure and activity of the Soviets of People's Deputies" in accordance with the "Law on Changes and Amendments of the Constitution (Basic Law) of the USSR" of 1 December 1988 after nation-wide discussion.

Three chapters of the Kazakh SSR Constitution have been radically changed: "System and Principles of the Activity of the Soviets of People's Deputies"; "Election System"; "Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR".

Some changes have been introduced in other chapters and articles of the republic's Constitution.

The commentary on the law adopted by the session of the republic Supreme Soviet is by Professor Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kim, doctor of law.

The process of the further law creation, changes and amendments to the republic's Constitution will continue. But already the changes that have been produced are exerting an influence on its ideas and principles of today, they fill them with new content, they require thorough reading.

First of all, about the changes and amendments introduced in the chapter "Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR."

The law, which was adopted on 22 September 1989, proclaimed that the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet is the highest organ of state power of the republic (Art. 97).

It is a well-known fact that the highest organ of state power of the USSR is the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. In a number of union republics congresses of people's deputies have also been created. The question arises—why in our republic our variant has been adopted, how much it is justified and whether it does not contradict the principles of the USSR Constitution?

The creation of a "bifurcated", but within the framework of unity higher echelon of state authority of the USSR in the person of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet was dictated by the fact that it is necessary to significantly expand the representation of the workers in the Soviet parliament

and at the same time have a continuously working legislative, administrative and control organ.

The creation of the 2-link structure of the organization of supreme power is conditioned not by some kind of "conception of obligatory bifurcation" and inevitability—precisely and only—of such a variant in the conditions of the socialist state. The point is simply that at the present time, on the union level, it proved impossible to unify, in one supreme organ, two qualities—the necessity of really broad representation in parliament and the possibility of continuous legislative activity for a prolonged period of time.

In examining the proclamation of the Supreme Soviet as the supreme organ of state power of the Kazakh SSR, the following should be noted.

K. Marx and V. I. Lenin repeatedly emphasized that the chief meaning of representation consists not so much in the fact that someone is elected by someone, but in the fact that the person elected as representative knows the interests of the represented well. Karl Marx wrote: "Representation which exists in isolation from the consciousness of the represented is not representation."

Not regarding as the chief condition the quantitative increase of the deputy corps (although this is also important), but its qualitative improvement, which makes possible the more precise expression of the interest of the people, we think that in the conditions of the republic one can permit a certain reduction in the number of the members of the parliament. You see, the highest link of the state power of the republic, which actively comes into contact with the local Soviets and other organizations, is in the position to supply that which—at first glance—narrows the channels of the study of the interests of the population.

The supreme organ of state power in the republic, consisting of a smaller number of deputies (it is not a matter of names) is capable of functioning in a regime of continuous work. This makes it possible, by not creating two links in the system of supreme state power, to unite the competencies of the people's deputies, in one organ. Such an organization possesses a number of advantages: The legislative activity is concentrated in the conduct of one organ, absent is the division of people's deputies into groups that are or are not members of the Supreme Soviet, the equality in the rights of deputies is secured, and their participation in the realization of the functions of the supreme organ of power is the same.

Moreover, all this does not contradict the basic ideas and principles contained in the USSR Constitution, which comes to the fact that this supreme organ must be elected on democratic principles and, concentrating the entire fullness of state power, must realize the sovereignty of the republic within the framework of a strong federation.

However, Article 137 of the USSR Constitution reads: "The supreme organ of state power of the union republic

is the Congress of People's Deputies of the union republic." Is there not here a substantial contradiction? No. The Supreme Soviet of the republic in the new variant is essentially different from the Supreme Soviet which functioned up to now. Having combined the powers which should have been attributed to the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet, it acts as a qualitatively new instrument of supreme state power. Its present form cannot be regarded as contradicting the content of Article 137 of the USSR Constitution, for the point is the essence of the structure created by the law. Of course, if it would withdraw from the system of Soviets the actual powers of the people's deputies, then this would contradict the sovereignty of the republic and the principles of the USSR Constitution. But this is precisely what has not happened.

The platform of the CPSU "The Nationality Policy of the Party in Present-Day Conditions" provides: "To the union republics belong all the rights which correspond to their status of sovereign socialist states and federation members. They have the power to solve all questions of state and public life, with the exception of those which are voluntarily transferred by them to the jurisdiction of the Union."

If we regard the structure of the highest link of the state power of the Kazakh SSR from this position, we can become convinced that, within the framework of the federative principles and unity of the Soviet system, the republic itself decided the question of some concrete elements of the system of the organs of power.

The provisions characterizing the competence of the Supreme Soviet in integral form have been contained in the republic's Constitution already since 1978. But in actual fact, up to the present time, the Supreme Soviet examined and decided a comparatively narrow range of questions among those which constitute subjects of the jurisdiction of the republic. Moreover, they were decided basically by the administrative apparatus. This was one of the manifestations of the defect in the interrelationship between the Soviets and their executive organs, of the weakening of the sovereignty of the Soviets.

Now the role of the republic Supreme Soviet is changing radically and the provisions of the Constitution are really becoming the Basic Law.

The law attaches paramount significance to those questions which constitute the subjects of the exclusive competence of the Supreme Soviet, i. e., which may be solved only by the Supreme Soviet, at its sessions. The following, above all, pertain to them: The determination of the directions of the domestic policy and foreign policy activity of the republic; the adoption of decisions in regard to the questions of national-state structure pertaining to the jurisdiction of the republic; the confirmation of the long-term and annual plans of economic and social development and the state budget; and the formation of the organs accountable to it. If these questions are compared with the exclusive competence

of the Supreme Soviet which existed before the present time, (it becomes clear that) their range has significantly expanded. This took place for the reason that the questions, which should have been referred to the Congress of People's Deputies, had it been created, are referred to the competence of the Supreme Soviet. To a certain extent, the expansion of the exclusive competence of the Supreme Soviet is connected with the fact that a part of the questions has been transferred from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet itself to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Soviet itself: The scheduling of the elections of people's deputies, the interpretation of laws, the promulgation of acts of amnesty, the ratification and denouncement of international agreements of the Kazakh SSR.

The Supreme Soviet, in its renewed quality and appearance possesses the possibility for the thorough and qualified consideration and solution of the widest range of questions.

If up to now a session of the Supreme Soviet lasted for a few days, they will henceforth be held no less than twice a year for the duration of up to 2 months. This expands many times over the possibility of a profound discussion of the problems that arise.

In so doing, the deputies of the Kazakh SSR are granted real possibilities for broad participation in the work of the Supreme Soviet. They are released from office and production obligations for a certain time period to fulfill their duties in the Supreme Soviet and even can even be released for the entire period of their term of office in the Supreme Soviet.

Important changes have been introduced in the election system. In so doing, its democratic principles—of universal, equal, and direct election suffrage in secret voting—which have been proved by life remain. Essential will be the fact that the elections of people's deputies from public organizations are not carried out to the detriment of the territorial elections, not at their expense. It is well known that, in the election of the people's deputies of the USSR from public organizations to 1,500 mandates, which existed before this, 750 mandates were allotted in addition. If one takes the number of mandates of the people's deputies of the Kazakh SSR, 90 of them, which are being allotted to public organizations, also are not taken at the expense of territorial elections. The system of the election of people's deputies being proposed by the law does not damage the interests of the people; on the contrary, it serves as a new, additional channel for the study of the problems that arise.

The election of people's deputies from public organizations is conducive to the strengthening of the interrelation and the unification of the various links of the political system for the formation of the genuine power of the Soviets and the increase of their role in the life of society and in the solution of the tasks confronting the Soviet state.

In spite of the seeming undemocratic nature of the elections from public organizations, many people's deputies who were elected precisely from them, have demonstrated the ability and resolution to express the interests of the people. And for socialist democracy, not only the procedure for the formation of representation itself is important, but also the ability to express the interests of the people.

Now, when by the will of the Supreme Soviet laws have been adopted and a corresponding procedure for elections has been established, we have to carry it out precisely and make every effort to create a highly-qualified and active deputy corps, capable of working constructively in the interests of Soviet society.

When a broad experiment is under way and deep transformations occur in the conditions of restructuring, it is impossible to regard any law as unshakeable forever, as the only possible variant—that is the point of view of the legislator. But it is also impossible to consider as only reasonable an alternative point of view which does not approve the indicated procedure. Historical practice shows that how to develop the position of the Constitution further, improving it and the morality of the principles on which it is based. But for the time being, a law has been adopted, and it has established a procedure for elections; its consistent application is the obligation of all.

Kirghiz Candidate Registration Begins

90US0378B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Jan 90
Morning Edition p 1

[Article by G. Shipitko, IZVESTIYA correspondent:
"Candidate Registration Has Begun"]

[Text] Frunze—The first stage of the election campaign is over—the nomination of candidates for deputy has been completed.

Elections to the republic Supreme Soviet and the local soviets of people's deputies will be held in Kirghizia on 25 February. Some 13,234 deputies are to be elected at one time to the local soviets, and 350 to the highest legislative authority of the republic. The body of deputies will be replaced completely for the first time.

As is known, the new law on elections to the republic and local soviets preserves such a form of nomination as okrug conferences of the representatives of the working people. The minuses of this form were revealed distinctly during the last election campaign. And on this occasion also, to be blunt, it was difficult for aspirants awkward for the apparatus to fight their way through the administrative "sieve". The results of the nominating process speak for themselves: The okrug conferences led to the electorate in just under 40 percent of electoral okrugs of local soviets being left without a choice.

I asked V. Duyunov, head of the legal group of the republic electoral commission, to comment on the current situation.

"According to the electoral commission regulations," he said, "we do not have the right to interfere in the decision of the okrug commissions for elections to the local soviets. They are free to determine themselves the forms and methods of their activity, based on the provisions of the law. But it should be noted that its imperfection has been ascertained in the course of the election campaign. Commissions were formed from representatives of the labor outfits, and these were confirmed by the soviet which formed them. At this stage, not to mention subsequent stages, it will not always be possible to avoid the influence of the apparatus on the activity of the members of the commission.

"To the republic commission's credit, such conferences were held in only 10 electoral okrugs of the 350 for elections to the Kirghiz Supreme Soviet. For this reason the largest number of aspirants to a nomination was precisely for the republic Supreme Soviet—three candidates each on average. However, even here there was only one candidate in one out of every six okrugs."

But what is the social portrait of the future deputy corps? Workers and kolkhoz [collective farm] members constitute only one-third of the candidates for the Supreme Soviet—less than for the rayon soviets by a factor of almost two. They include representatives of all large national groups living in the republic. And one further notable feature: Many public organizations have put up candidates for deputy, but they will be competing on a par with everyone else.

The election campaign is entering the culminating phase. As M. Ibrayev, chairman of the republic Electoral Commission, believes, it has been held in a more democratic atmosphere. Unfortunately, he affirmed, it has not been without violations of election law.

That they have occurred is corroborated by numerous telephone calls to the IZVESTIYA correspondents' center. In the present quite complex political situation, however, all this was, evidently, to have been expected. Whatever, the electorate will have the final, decisive say. And I would like to believe that people's wishes will prove stronger than the armchair aspirations to control the masses in accordance with the old stereotypes.

New Turkmen Council of Ministers Chairman Interviewed

90US0390A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 21 Dec 89 p 2

[Turkmeninform interview with Kh. Akhmedov, Turkmen SSR Council of Ministers chairman: "Priority Tasks for the Government"; date and place not specified]

[Text] For the first time an appointment to the post of chairman of the Turkmen SSR Council of Ministers was made at a recent session of the Supreme Soviet on an alternative basis. As is known, following a secret ballot Kh. Akhmedov was named as the new head of the republic government. Today we publish an interview that he gave to a Turkmeninform correspondent.

[Correspondent] Khan Akhmedov, during your work as first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers you had an opportunity to study well the state of affairs in various spheres of the republic's life. How did you start your activity in the post of head of government?

[Akhmedov] By meeting with members of government and the leaders of republic ministries and departments. At the last two sessions of the republic Supreme Soviet the activity of the government was justifiably criticized. Accordingly, the first order of business was serious analysis of mistakes and shortcomings and a thorough exchange of opinions on how to restructure the work, improve efficiency, and strengthen the organizational base of the highest executive organ of power without taking over the functions of the sector ministries and without depriving them of their independence in reaching particularly decisions. And these were the kinds of candid and sometimes impartial talks that took place. I think that it will be useful for everyone. Unfortunately, we frequently encounter the kind of situation in which there are no direct contacts even between the leaders of two interconnected ministries. Instead there are years of correspondence sent from one side of the street to the other. A great deal of time and energy are wasted on this kind of red tape that are needed to solve urgent problems.

In this connection I would like to note the following. Many essential and timely resolutions have recently been adopted by the Turkmen Council of Ministers on a whole range of issues. But because of lack of control over compliance even the most urgent of them have not been fully realized. The question of strengthening executive discipline and increasing the responsibility of ministry and department leaders is therefore becoming acute. I am convinced that only then will this process spread into the labor collectives and down to every shop and brigade and every worker. I do not think that there is any need to say that along with new management methods, strengthening organization and discipline is one of the main reserves for improving labor productivity and production efficiency. This matter will undoubtedly be discussed at future meetings in the Council of Ministers and at meetings with members of the government.

[Correspondent] But in this case will the activity of the government not become just a round of meetings and conferences?

[Akhmedov] No, I can assure you of this. From my previous work experience, first and foremost party work, I know how much depends on meetings with people and

dealing directly with the collectives in industrial and agricultural enterprises, and with the creative and scientific intelligentsia.

[Correspondent] In your program, published in the press on the eve of the 11th session of the Supreme Soviet, the government's priority task stated to be eliminating social tension in the republic. How do you think you will start to realize this?

[Akhmedov] By resolving those problems that do not require major material resources or manpower but that can rapidly bring tangible results. In particular, in the agroindustrial complex. We are gathering in not bad harvests of vegetables and fruit and melon crops, but a large proportion of this is not reaching the stores but is being lost in the harvesting and when it is being transported, and because of improper storage. It is therefore essential to establish strict control over the storage of everything grown in the fields. This will make it possible to accelerate significantly the solution of the food problem. In the years immediately ahead it will also be necessary to implement land reclamation measures to improve irrigated land and effect their comprehensive reconstruction.

[Correspondent] There are now quite a number of controversies over the construction and operation of the Karakum Canal. One opinion is that it has done more harm than good. What do you think about this?

[Akhmedov] I think that life has already confirmed the correctness of the decision to build this major hydrotechnical installation. The canal is the basis of development today and tomorrow in Turkmenistan. Today two-thirds of the republic's republic live within the canal zone and dozens of large agricultural enterprises have been set up. It is another matter that water seepage from the canal be kept to a minimum.

We shall also be working on this. And continued construction of the Karakum Canal will make it possible not only to increase farming and livestock produce in the western region and improve water supplies for the inhabitants of cities and settlements, but also create a considerable number of new work places. Incidentally, the employment problem is one of the most acute problems in our republic. The program already published deals with this. Today I would like to deal with the following directions in the the activity of the government. The Council of Ministers must interact more vigorously with the all-union ministries and departments that have enterprises on republic territory in planning output volumes and new kinds of goods. These enterprises must allocated funding for the construction of housing, municipal projects, and sociocultural and nature conservation projects. There must also be delineation of powers between all-union and republic organs.

Matters pertaining to social justice in interethnic relations must be given special attention. The government will do everything possible to achieve a situation in

which along with the other nationalities, the representatives of numerically small peoples living on the territory of Turkmenistan will enjoy a sense of well-being.

A great deal must be done to strengthen the material base for public health, particularly in the countryside. The public health organs face the task of making more efficient use of medical services and raising the level of medical care, and of strengthening sanitation-enlightenment work. A whole range of problems in the field of culture, associated with satisfying the spiritual needs of the workers, needs to be resolved. The government will strive for a situation in which each rayon has its own Palace of Culture that meets today's requirements.

We shall be unable to achieve progress without a buildup in the scientific and technical support for production, and training for highly skilled specialists in all sectors of the national economy.

[Correspondent] Obviously all these problems will be reflected in the republic's switch to regional cost accounting and self-management now in progress, will they not?

[Akhmedov] Yes. And the main purpose of this document is to eliminate the disproportions that have taken shape in the economy of Turkmenistan, first and foremost the area of raw materials. For example, we have at our disposal a large quantity of the various components used in drugs, but they are still being inadequately used. Even though we have set up a specialized sovkhos to grow medical grasses and there are several serpentaria used to obtain snake venom, and enterprises producing iodine bromide are in operation, and an association that recovers and does preliminary processing on licorice root, they are all isolated and subordinate to different all-union and republic ministries. As a result many kinds of drugs have to be imported into the republic. And there are many such examples. Obviously, we need our own enterprises, producing finished output. We are now reviewing the question of building such enterprises on a joint basis both with similar such enterprises and with other all-union republics, and with countries abroad.

Turkmen Republic Electoral Commission Session
90US0390B Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 17 Dec 89 p 1

[Turkmeninform report: "A Meeting of the Republic Electoral Commission"]

[Text] A regular meeting of the republic electoral commission for the elections of people's deputies in the Turkmen SSR has taken place.

It was chaired by the deputy chairman of the election commission Kh. Atayev.

The meeting heard a report on the number of polling stations and electoral okrugs, and on the results of the

registration and makeup of candidates for the posts of people's deputies in the Turkmen SSR according to electoral okrugs.

One of the most important stages of the election campaign—the registration of candidates for the post of Turkmen SSR people's deputies—is now complete.

It was noted at the meeting that one special feature of the present election campaign is its broad democratization. In contrast to past years, religious figures were registered for the first time as candidates for the post of Turkmen SSR people's deputies. Another distinguishing feature is that 78.9 percent of the candidates nominated members and candidate members of the CPSU. This figure is proof of the high trust that the people place in the party of Lenin, and recognition of its vanguard role. A total of 565 candidates for the posts of people's deputies were nominated at the election meetings. Of these, 482 were nominated by the labor collectives, 70 by public organizations, and 35 by meetings held at places of residence and the collectives of educational establishments and meetings of servicemen. In accordance with the law on the elections the okrug electoral commissions for 175 electoral okrugs registered 522 candidates for the posts of Turkmen SSR people's deputies. They include 456 people who were not previously deputies, 93 women, 412 members and candidate members of the CPSU, 22 members of the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League, and 254 workers and kolkhoz farmers. Of the candidates nominated, for various reasons 43 were rejected by the okrug electoral commissions.

A total of 1,373 polling stations and sector electoral commissions have been set up to conduct the elections of Turkmen SSR people's deputies. The commissions include more than 14,000 representatives of the labor collectives and their councils, the organs of public organizations, voters' meetings and places of residence, and servicemen from military units.

The chairman of the Geok-Tepinskiy rayon and Bezmeniyé ispolkoms, B. Kurreyev and I. Bayramov, presented reports at the meeting on the preparations for the elections. It was noted that the course of the electoral campaign is still being inadequately covered in the local press and on radio and television. The commission recommended that more meetings be held between candidates for the posts of Turkmen SSR people's deputies and voters at places of residence. Similar recommendations were made to all okrug commissions in the republic.

A report was heard from the Turkmen SSR minister of communications Sh.O. Muradov on the progress in the installation of telephones in all sector commissions. During the election campaign use will be made of the Turkmen SSR Ministry of Communications radio station, and also several national economic enterprises, helicopters of the civil aviation, and other communications facilities.

First deputy chairman of the State Committee for Publishing Z.Z. Valitov and director of the Turkmen branch of the "Soyuzblankizdat" republic industrial production association A.S. Sisekin reported that all election documentation is being printed "at top priority." [original illegible—ed] printing presses have been brought on line. In accordance with article 12 of the election law, spending connected with preparations for and the holding of elections for the posts of Turkmen SSR people's deputies is funded from the okrug electoral commissions. Candidates for the posts of Turkmen SSR people's deputies and their agents and electors do not pay for expenditures connected with the preparations for and holding of elections. Statements and appeals from citizens concerning violations of the election law in electoral okrugs Nos 3, 4, 112, 68, 104, 168 and some others were considered.

Commission members G.A. Muradova, G.Z. Khalmuradov, Zh. K-B. Charyyeva, L.V. Bartnovskaya, and M.D. Khummedov spoke on the matters reviewed.

Appropriate resolutions were passed.

Deputy chairman of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium G.S. Yezhov attended the commission meeting.

CP Central Committee Member on Function in Party Organization

90US0349A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 24 Nov 89 p 1

[Interview with Yuldash Muslimov, TashGRES worker and Uzbekistan CP Central Committee member, by M. Sadvakasov, PRAVDA VOSTOKA special correspondent: "A Member of the Central Committee"]

[Text] Calm and even-tempered, he pronounces the words as if he is weighing each one.

Our conversation with Yuldash Muslimov, a worker at the TashGRES [Tashkent State Regional Power Plant] and a member of the Uzbekistan CP Central Committee, centers around the most important thing.

"What kind of a person must a Central Committee member be?", he repeats the question. "I would phrase the question more broadly. It is true that the party is judged by the party committee. As a communist, I am deeply concerned about the difficult political situation which is taking place both in the party and in the country. I do not accept the attacks on the party. It is doing much for us today. You and I are witnesses of and participants in that process in which a new understanding of socialism and of our life is being formulated and specified within all segments of the party, and moreover, in which these notions are being manifested in deed. In this sense, I too am a participant in that process which is taking place in the purified, if we may say so, membership of our republic Central Committee. We are preparing for our plenum, where we will discuss

also the platform of the communists in connection with the electoral campaign. Through its content it is easy to see also the political line directed at educating the people, affirming discipline and order, ensuring a normal political situation in the republic, and activating the human factor. In short, so that man, with all his worries, is in the forefront."

[Correspondent] And in connection with this, what role is reserved for the rank-and-file communist?

[Muslimov] Under these conditions, it is easier for each communist to influence through his opinion and his position not only the work of his party organization, but also the development of the entire party policy and the formulation of all of its elected organs. We are standing at the threshold of an extensive campaign of reporting and elections, and are making preparations for the CPSU Congress which, as you know, will be held under the slogan of "For a Renewed Society—A Renewed Party". I am a worker and I can say that I am very unhappy about how matters are developing in my primary party organization, even though there have been some changes both in the formulation of the problems at party meetings and in strengthening the role of the party committee. Still, I preach the old truth: Things go well for the party members when their words do not diverge from their deeds. This is true of the Central Committee, the primary organization of the party committee, and the work of each communist individually. Then we will have authority, respect, and trust.

[Correspondent] What keeps you from working in such a way so as to ensure that your words do not diverge from your deeds?

[Muslimov] I was lucky. I have worked for many years at an enterprise where one cannot socialize, where the ultimate cool-headedness of the people and their responsibility the task at hand is the essence of their character and their behavior. The people in power engineering are disciplined. Here they come to work before schedule. A single unit of the GRES produces 160,000 kilowatts per hour. Just think: How greatly could the work of one enterprise or another be delayed if we were to under-supply this power. An honest and conscientious attitude toward the work, multiplied by the system of economic responsibility and interest—that is the guarantee of success. That is what we teach people.

[Correspondent] I heard that, aside from all else, you are also a member of the Ordzhonikidze party raykom buro. How are you able to combine these responsibilities with your primary work?

[Muslimov] You may add to this also: A member of the Uzsovprom [Uzbekistan Council of Trade Unions] presidium and a member of the power engineers trade union obkom... I barely have time to go to the meetings, and I have to fulfill my assignments. It is an incorrect practice to hang so much on one person. It is time to move away from such a style of selection and promotion of people. I

believe all this is from the arsenal of the unpleasant memory of the stagnant period.

[Correspondent] You have been awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor. Why do you not wear your badge of distinction?

[Muslimov] I was awarded the Hero in 1985. I do not wear it not out of some sense of false modesty, although it is not without annoyance that I recall how, in times past, prestigious titles were handed out right and left. I simply believe that this is not solely my award, but that a huge portion of it is due to the labor of my comrades and the entire collective. That is how I perceived it. And that is why...

[Correspondent] One last question. I know that there are people from ten different nationalities working at the TashGRES. Do conflict situations arise on international grounds? How, in your opinion, should these problems be resolved on a citywide and republic scale?

[Muslimov] There has not been a single conflict within the collective. And the questions must be resolved on the basis of the party platform on the national question. That is the field of activity of communists—from the Central Committee member down to the CPSU candidate member. Simply speaking—let us live as friends. People of labor have nothing to share but their honest wage from labor. Everything else must be equal for all, regardless of national affiliation, skin color, or other peculiarities.

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Study Reveals Perception of Reform in Uzbek CP Organizations

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[Article by I. Chizhenok, graduate student in the department of party construction, Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee: "In the Mirror of Self-Appraisal; Sociological Studies Before the Elections to the Soviets"]

[Text] Under current conditions of growth in the social and political activity of the masses, the increased role of the party as the political vanguard of society and its integrating and consolidating activity is assuming decisive importance. This is particularly acute in connection with the implementation of the second stage of political reform and with the active preparations for the elections to the republic and local Soviets. The effectiveness of party influence, in turn, depends on restructuring the activity of the party organizations and committees. In August of this year, the course of these processes in the Uzbek republic party organization became the subject of a sociological study conducted by the CP Central Committee and the department of political construction of the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central

Committee. The republic's CP Central Committee felt it was necessary to perform such an analysis also because, as we know, in the recent past there have been serious shortcomings allowed in the work of party committees at various levels. These are having a negative impact even at the present time. Party workers representing all 11 oblasts of the republic were surveyed. The questionnaires were filled out by secretaries of party obkoms, including first secretaries, secretaries of party gorkoms and raykoms, retired secretaries of partkoms at enterprises and organizations in industry, construction, transport and communications, and the agro-industrial complex, as well as workers of the party committee apparatus (around half of them were section chiefs and assistant chiefs).

An analysis of the materials obtained and processed by computer shows that they clearly exhibit, on one hand, tendencies which are common for all the oblasts and, on the other—that there are significant differences on a number of directions of activity of the party committees. Specifically, the responses of the party workers in Fergansk Oblast show that the processes of perestroyka in the oblast party organization are significantly lagging behind the all-republic level. This once again confirms the conclusion made by the Uzbekistan CP Central Committee Buro that the tragic events in the oblast were largely a consequence of the unsatisfactory state of the party-political, cadre, and ideological work.

The first priority task of the study was to determine how the party cadres evaluate the activity of the party committees which they represent. It turned out that 11.1 percent of those questioned believed that the restructuring in the work of their party committees is outstripping the reorganization in society; 47.2 percent indicated that the levels of restructuring of the party committee and of society are practically the same; 37.0 percent hold the opinion that the restructuring of the party committee is lagging behind, while the others could not answer.

However, these evaluations of the activity of the party committees contradict some of the other responses to survey questions. This, in our opinion, testifies to the complexity of the problem of self-evaluating the role of the party committee in the social life of the region and the collective. Thus, in answer to the survey question which asked: "In which direction has the authority of the party committee in which you work changed since the 19th All-Union Party Conference?", 34.7 percent of the respondents noted that it had increased, while 18.1 percent said that it had declined. Consequently, a significant portion of the party committee workers does not see any connection between the lagging behind of reorganization processes in society and the decline in the authority of the partkom (37 percent in the first case and 18.1 in the second). This is an alarming symptom. It indicates that a number of party workers, and this was confirmed by our conversations with them, understand the authority of the party committee merely as the possibility of manifesting authoritarian function. How can we not recall here the advice of V. I. Lenin, who

warned that the party must implement its leadership influence **not by force of power, but... by force of energy, great experience, great variation, and great talent.**

We must remember that the problem of authority of the party committee among the workers and the population is closely tied with their role in the preparations for and the implementation of the elections to the republic and local Soviets of People's Deputies, and with exertion of party influence on the results of these elections.

The electoral campaign, undoubtedly, will be distinguished by its acute pitch of political struggle. Its course and outcome will have exceptional importance for the continued renovation of our society. The party committees are called upon to do everything possible to strengthen the organs of people's power with competent and initiative-filled people who have authority among the masses.

Yet first of all, it seems, we must draw some serious conclusions from the elections of USSR people's deputies. We must not allow the mistakes which were allowed there to be repeated, when the party committees entered into the pre-electoral struggle with great delay, and subsequently often exhibited indecisiveness or took a wait-and-see position.

At the meeting held in September of this year in the CPSU Central Committee with workers and kolkhoz farmers who are members of the party's central electoral organs, V. S. Chicherov, brigade leader at the "Leningradskiy Metallicheskiy Zavod" turbine building plant, quite justifiably posed the question of the need for the party organizations to give effective aid candidates for deputy from among the workers. After all, it is largely due to the absence of such aid and support that there are only about half as many workers among the USSR People's Deputies as compared with the country's supreme organ of authority from the preceding convocation. The number of peasants has also declined significantly.

We cannot overlook the fact that the manifestations of administrative-command style in the pre-electoral activity of the party organs were far from singular occurrences, such as the efforts to exert pressure on individual candidates for deputy, on the electoral commissions, and on the informal and amateur organizations. The desire by a number of party workers to ensure for themselves the possibility of running unopposed evoked an extremely negative reaction among the broad strata of the population.

We also must mention what we believe to be the unprincipled position of certain party committees, which instead of openly exposing in a rational and well-founded manner the cases of distortions of the truth allowed in the course of the electoral campaign, the totally unsubstantiated actions and comments which were even offensive to the party and its candidates for deputy, preferred not to notice them.

We must remember that under current conditions, work at the place of residence is becoming one of the most important spheres of activity, particularly in connection with such political campaigns as elections to the Soviets, as well as in accordance with the party line toward development of self-government and initiative of the broad popular masses. Many republic party committees, however, are seriously losing ground because, as in former years, they are concentrating their primary efforts only on the labor and educational collectives, while their work with the population at their place of residence often takes a back seat.

The performed study allowed us to familiarize ourselves with the views of Uzbekistan party workers about the upcoming elections and to learn their opinion of their chances for victory. On the whole, 40.3 percent of those surveyed believe that, among opposed candidacies, the voters will choose them; 33.1 percent are not quite convinced of this fact; 11.8 percent believe that they will not be able to win in the elections, while 14.4 percent had difficulty in answering this question.

Of those surveyed, 61.8 percent of the party gorkom and raykom secretaries are sure that the voters will support their candidacy; 61.3 percent of the partkom secretaries in the agro-industrial complex; 38.7 percent of the party obkom secretaries, and only 23.1 percent of the partkom secretaries at enterprises in industry, construction, transport and communications. In short, we are not without defeatist attitudes.

Of great interest is the opinion of the party workers on the measures which must be taken for the successful preparation and implementation of elections to the Soviets. Of the 12 possible directions of organizational and political activities proposed in the questionnaires, most of the survey participants specified three directions: 62.3 percent—to give an immediate and decisive rebuff to any extremist attacks on the party or efforts to discredit its candidates for deputy; 62.0 percent—to set the example of democratism and openness at all stages of the electoral campaign; 52.5 percent—to outline and implement in time for the elections a set of measures to ensure changes in the resolution of questions of providing food products, consumer goods, and housing construction which would be really tangible for the population, and to reduce the acuteness of ecological problems.

At the same time, judging by the results of the survey, for now we are still underestimating such current directions of activity of the party committees as the need for: Strengthening ties with editorial offices of newspapers, radio and television, and with journalists (this measure was supported by 19.9 percent of those surveyed); supporting supporting candidates for deputy from among the workers and kolkhoz farmers (25.7 percent); giving them aid in developing their personal electoral programs (21.3 percent); attracting the best intellectual forces to agitation-propaganda work (24.2 percent); holding an active dialogue and cooperating with all public and

amateur organizations (28.0 percent). Furthermore, we would not need to express concern regarding these answers if such work were already being performed on a sufficiently high level. Unfortunately, this is still far from being the case.

The upcoming elections to the republic and local Soviets will on the whole be a serious test of the authority of party committees and their leaders not only among the communists, but also among non-party members. In connection with this, we believe that in the socio-political situation which has currently been created (with consideration for the need for improving the qualitative make-up of the cadre corps of the party), it is important that the secretaries of the party committees necessarily participate in the electoral struggle and strive to obtain the support of their candidacies among the voters. Those of them who will not be able to obtain the voted trust of the masses must evidently leave their party posts. This measure, undoubtedly, is extraordinary. However, it will allow us to achieve the much-needed position in society, when the party committees will be headed up to leaders who enjoy the trust not only of communists, but also of the entire population.

In the course of the sociological study we also analyzed the activity of the party committee apparatus under current conditions. Most of its participants—from 59.1 to 77.8 percent—believe that the reorganization of the apparatus has had an insignificant effect or no effect at all in overcoming the change in functions of the Soviet and economic management organs, in rejecting the administrative-command style of operation, and in increasing the effectiveness of activity of the electoral party organs and their independence. It is indicative that greater independence in the work is being ensured by the reorganization of the party committee apparatus, involving 47.5 percent of the partkom secretaries, 32.6 percent of the raykom and gorkom secretaries, and only 25.8 percent of the party obkom secretaries.

Thus, the results of the study indicate the persistent need to seek ways of intensifying the reorganization of the party apparatus activity.

This question is one of the most complex in party work. There are many problems intertwined here: The interaction of members of the electoral organ and the apparatus workers, the burden of conservative traditions and approaches, the methods of cadre selection to the apparatus, and their authority and ability to act in the current situation and to render effective aid to the primary party organizations. In connection with this, we believe, in the period of the reporting-electoral campaign prior to the 28th CPSU Congress we could in certain cases, in electing the new membership of the party committees, present the question of "retiring" the entire party apparatus subordinate to them and formulating it anew.

This, undoubtedly, should be done in an atmosphere of broad openness, on an alternative and competitive basis, and with consideration for the recommendations of the

primary party organizations and labor collectives, as well as for public opinion. Obviously, party workers who have worthily fulfilled their duties will continue to work in the renewed membership of the apparatus. On the whole, it is our deep conviction that such a measure will make it possible to seriously strengthen the party apparatus with workers who have received the "mandate of trust" from the masses, to increase its authority, and to remove any questions which arise regarding the insufficient authority of the party cadres.

One of the primary factors in improving political leadership by the party committees is to ensure the greatest possible consideration for the interests of the workers and the population of these territories, the implementation of effective influence on their interests, and management by them and through them. The results of the performed study show that party workers—the representatives of various oblast party organizations and various levels of management—adhere largely to coinciding (and relatively low) evaluations of the differentiation of work with the social groups of society. Thus, only 46.1 percent of the workers believe that the party committee which they represent takes the interests of communists into full consideration in its activity, while 27.3 percent of those surveyed believe that it also considers the interests of non-party members.

It is notable that while the consideration of interests of the workers was noted by 50.5 percent of those surveyed, only 39.4 percent noted this about the interests of the peasants, 30.1 percent—of engineering-technical workers, 24.5 percent—of the creative intelligentsia and scientists, 34.3 percent—of pensioners, and 26.4 percent—of the youth. In the opinion of the survey participants, their party committees practically identically express the interests of representatives of the native nationality—55.3 percent, as well as the non-native nationalities—49.8 percent.

All this indicates that the party committees must seriously restructure their work with the masses, perform an in-depth study of the needs of various social and national groups of workers and of the population, and orient their activities toward consideration of these needs.

The results of the performed sociological study, of course, along with the general tendencies, reflect the specific conditions in which the party organizations of Uzbekistan operate. At the present time, the results of the survey are being actively utilized in practical activity on restructuring the work of the party committees.

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Economist Sheynis Views First Armenian National Movement Congress

90US0360A Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
23 Nov 89 p 4

[Interview with Viktor Sheynis, doctor of economic sciences, conducted by V. Sarkisyan: "I Wish You Peace and Good Will..."]

[Text] The article by Doctor of Economic Sciences Viktor Sheynis, "Peace in the House. Lessons of the Karabakh Crisis" (monthly bulletin VEK XX I MIR, No 10, 1988) appeared during one of the most gloomy periods of the unique informational blockade on the Artsakh problem. The publication, which was reprinted by practically all the republic newspapers, was distinguished by its clear conceptual position on untying the Karabakh knot. Since that time, the name of the Moscow scientist has become widely known in Armenia.

Recently Viktor Leonidovich was a guest at the Armenian National Movement (ANM) Congress. At the forum he represented the progressive social organization "Moskovskaya tribuna" [Moscow tribune], which is well-known throughout the country. Meeting by ourselves in one of the rooms of the House of Political Enlightenment, we began our conversation, naturally, with his impressions about the first ANM Constituent Congress.

[Sheynis] I believe that the Congress was a stage in the political democratization of Armenia. Yesterday one of the speakers compared the Congress with an "outstanding battle for certain ideals of the Armenian people". In my opinion, there is some exaggeration here. More precisely, we are talking not about victory, but about "mobilization and a show of force". It is difficult to say to what degree this army is ready for victories.

[Correspondent] The Congress was not without "verbal" incidents and omissions which to a certain degree bore a natural but undesirable character. It seems to me that the number of informal organizations in Armenia, which now exceeds 70, leads to chaos in the cohesion of social forces. The formula for unification of patriotic forces has not yet been found.

[Sheynis] You have an advantage. You live here and are able to observe this process. I, on the other hand, know practically nothing about it. My conclusions can rest only on what I have seen and heard during these 3 days, and on the outcomes of meetings with my Armenian friends. It is possible that events which I am not qualified to judge have remained unexposed. In the last few years I have had occasion to participate in a large number of congresses and conferences, including the meetings of the inter-regional deputy group, with which I associate great hopes in the process of democratization of the country. Yet they took place in a no more organized manner, no more precisely, and exhibited no less divergence of opinion. From my point of view, I believe the problem does not come down to bringing

everyone to a common denominator. The primary task is to define that which unites the people.

[Correspondent] Viktor Leonidovich, more than a year has passed since your article was published and which, by the way, was also reprinted by our newspaper.

[Sheynis] Excuse me, let me interject. You know, perhaps, that the most pleasing gift for me was the following: They sent me that issue of *KOMMUNIST* from one Yerevan scientific institution with warm words and signatures of all the co-workers.

[Correspondent] So, what has changed since that time? The problem raised by the people of Artsakh remains, or more precisely, it has become even more acute. Have your personal conceptions on this problem undergone any changes?

[Sheynis] Of course, there are cases when a scientific associate re-evaluates his position. However, this is not such a case. In principle I cannot reject even a single word of that article, since I am firmly convinced not only of my own rightness, but also of the righteousness of the people, who have justly raised this question.

The situation has changed since that time and, unfortunately, for the worse. Even the most necessary measures were not taken in time, and this placed the problem more and more into a dead end. That is very distressing. We must note that decisions have been late in coming not only on the Karabakh situation, but also on a number of important questions of perestroika. For example, on the decision to create a separate rayon in Artsakh. Perhaps it would have been rational and constructive to have adopted this decision in February-March of last year. Therefore, I do not intend to propose some specific variant for the current situation.

[Correspondent] That article spoke of the synonymity of the situation and the need for a corresponding reaction to the problem of Artsakh.

[Sheynis] Those evaluations which were given to the Armenian National Movement, the policy of the central authorities, the desires of the Artsakh people, and the behavior of certain officials in the center as well as within the Azerbaijan leadership, remain firm. I, of course, do not reject them. However, I cannot hide the fact that since this article was written and 3-4 months after it was published, the situation has worsened and the resolution of the question today is more difficult than it was then.

[Correspondent] What should we do? I am of the opinion that dragging out the Karabakh problem will lead to even more serious consequences.

[Sheynis] You see, the opinions on this vary. Recently, the newspaper *SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA* published, and if I am not mistaken *KOMMUNIST* reprinted, a conversation with A. Sakharov, G. Starovoytova and S. Stankevich. Thus, Andrey

Dmitriyevich said that he does not see a satisfactory resolution to this question in the foreseeable future.

I had occasion to participate in the work of the Karabakh section (within the framework of the ANM Conference), where I talked with Robert Kocharyan, whom I respect very much. In my opinion, he is a true public leader. He sees this solution as being more simple and obvious: The question must be resolved synonymously—on the basis of an agreement between Nagorny Karabakh and Armenia.

As for my conception, I will say the following: Nagorno Karabakh must join with Armenia. That is my firm conviction. I think that the right of a nation to self determination is immeasurably higher than all other notions, including the sovereignty of a state over a territory inhabited by a compact minority of another nationality, the inviolability of boundaries, etc. My principle positions, as you can see, have not changed in the least. But within what time frame and by what means this may be accomplished, that, alas, I do not know.

The situation is complicated by the unpredictable "logic" in the thinking and behavior of the opposing side. In Moscow I talked with 5 representatives of the Azerbaijan Popular Front. This conversation left me with a very distressing impression. We were not able to achieve rapprochement of our positions on even a single question. The only question on which we for some reason were in accord was the attitude toward the Khomeni regime. We must assume this was because this regime oppresses the Azerbaijanis.

Probably in the foreseeable period the resolution of the Karabakh question is associated with some form of retention of the status quo, followed by a legalization of the latter.

[Correspondent] Doesn't it seem to you that the weakness of the center is expressed in certain measure in this, already extremely complex situation? After all, it does not hold in its hands a more or less clear-cut program or line on this problem. Even the Plenum on National Questions did not give any clear answers to numerous questions.

[Sheynis] Of course.

[Correspondent] For a long time it seemed to many that the economic burden—that most heavy legacy of the Stalinist, stagnant periods—was more important than national problems. However, now it is clear that without solution of the latter, without clear criteria or principles on the national questions, continued democratization of society and its forward movement is practically impossible.

[Sheynis] We will not contrapose one to the other. Our economic position is desperate. We need very energetic actions to prevent a breakdown in the economy. However, let us return to the topic of our conversation.

Yes, the national problems are extremely complex. I agree that the Plenum did not provide any solutions to these questions. It formulated a certain number of principles. Part of them are prudent and correct, part of them do not correspond to the situation, and part are simply incorrect. Evidently, if we distract ourselves from the specific situation and speak of the national question as a whole, then it seems to me that there are two different facets of the problem here. One side is the principle resolution of the question. This, by the way, is discussed in the documents of the inter-regional deputy group. We are speaking here of the fact that we must conclude a new union agreement. After all, not only the declaration on the creation of the USSR has become outdated. Undoubtedly, the agreement itself has become outdated. All the peoples must participate in it, and not just the 15 privileged nations which have their own union republics.

How should we organize this new national-state structure? There are different viewpoints on this. Scientists, politicians and social organizations propose their own variants. It is quite evident that this must be a union of equal peoples, a union guaranteeing the interests of all peoples, a union concluded on the basis of a consensus. Evidently, we must begin this reorganization already now, although this is a lengthy process which will require a number of years. At the same time, there is a large number of very urgent, burning problems which cannot be put off. One of them is Karabakh.

At the time the article was being written, I thought that the resolutions of the supreme state organs, as for example the Supreme Soviet, in favor of the legitimate demands of the people of Artsakh could solve the problem. Today, however, one gets the impression that the center does not have a grasp on the situation, and that even if it adopts such a resolution, it cannot implement it.

I do not know who organized the blockade of Armenia and Karabakh: The Azerbaijan government or the Popular Front? There was a blockade. What to do? My Armenian friends say remove it by force. Of course, we cannot allow such a lengthy blockade. Decisions which were more unexpected and non-trivial were needed. When Stalin tried to cut off West Berlin by blocking the road in 1948, the allies organized an airlift and brought even coal there. The distances are different, the infrastructure is different, and all this was much easier to organize. Yet the aviation was different too. That is, it was necessary to show the blockading side the ineffectiveness of its actions, to break the blockade not by force, but to opt for considerable expenditures and to demonstrate the absurdity of the blockade effort. We could also make use of the readiness to engage in dialogue and arguments on bearing certain expenditures in connection with the organization of such an airlift. The center must find the means to defend those whose cause is just.

[Correspondent] And how do you view the idea of economic sanctions? After all, it is clear that the guilty party must bear the responsibility, in this case financial.

Or does the economic-legal mechanism which is in effect prohibit us from speaking about this?

[Sheynis] The fact that the mechanism does not regulate such processes is an indisputable fact. We could try to correct the structure. Of course, we must fight against blackmail. We cannot yield to blackmailers, but there is a varied arsenal of means which may be used to curtail their end goals, or at least make them inaccessible. I would call together a commission of experts, including specialists, i.e., a broad inter-professional commission. I would give them time, isolating them from their duties, to work out an optimal variant of the decision.

[Correspondent] Do you think the parliamentary debates on the problem which concerns us will yield positive results?

[Sheynis] I do not know. I think that the center holds the key to solving the problem of Karabakh to the degree to which it is free in its actions. The parliament may adopt a resolution which does not depend on the center, but the nature of that resolution in such questions nevertheless depends on the good will of the leadership. I am monitoring the work of our parliament most attentively. There have been cases when the position of the leadership inclined in one direction, but after evaluating the situation, it changed its position.

Making use of the opportunity, I would like to explain the thesis which resounded in my speech at the ANM Congress. I hold no enmity toward the reformers in the party leadership. We must vote for active cooperation with the reformist forces within the party. This potential is far from exhausted. Here is an example for you—33 percent of the delegates to the current ANM Congress are CPSU members.

[Correspondent] Our readers would undoubtedly be interested in knowing your attitude toward the conception of Andranik Migranyan, and not only his, regarding the need for a "strong hand", a "democratic dictator".

[Sheynis] You know, I am acquainted with Andranik, and there emerges such a black-and-white opposition here. I am on good terms with him. As a person he is very pleasant. However, as concerns these ideas, to me they seem scholastic. Andranik is a very educated man. I admire his erudition. He knows very well how things were with the American constitution, and with the ratification of the British parliamentary system. Yet this train has departed, and we will not catch it. We do not have and will not have 200 years. If we exist under an authoritarian regime for another 200 years, not only we, but all mankind will not last that long.

I am much more impressed by the parliamentary means of transformations. Migranyan's scheme is very tempting: Totalitarianism—authoritarianism—democratism. That is really how it was in Europe. But where are we? From his point of view, we are making the transition to authoritarianism, and should not be in a hurry to get to democracy. In my opinion, the position of

our society is much more complex. We have still not rejected the imprint of totalitarianism, yet at the same time, while having an authoritarian regime, we are already making the transition to democracy. The ANM Congress in Yerevan was one of the manifestations of this transition. We cannot limit this forward movement. For some time, all three of the above-mentioned types of political institutions will be retained, but the democrats, to which Andranik himself undoubtedly belongs, must strive toward moving forward. The question might arise here: Will the democratic orders not weaken the state structures which are already not too sound. Such a danger exists. The development of the basic uncontrollable democratic processes may push us in this direction. I believe that by inhibiting these processes we are driving the illness inward, and this danger will be all the more visible.

[Correspondent] Viktor Leonidovich, I am not a proponent of "traditional" questions, but the situation in Armenia and Artsakh is such that I turn to you with the following request: What do you wish for the Armenian people?

[Sheynis] For the people of Armenia—and I do not want to separate the population of Artsakh from it, this ancient and chosen land, I wish most of all peace and good will. I wish for the reunification of Karabakh with Armenia. At the same time, I think that this is not the only problem that the Armenian people have. I am convinced that you will have enough intellectual potential and decisiveness in practical matters to bring the republic out of this difficult situation.

Interregional Group, Azerbaijan People's Front On Armenian Blockade

18310042D Baku KOMMUNIST in Azeri 4 Oct 89 p 3

[Conversation between USSR Peoples Deputy Vitali Alekseyevich Chelyshev and member of the Azerbaijan People's Front Ispolkom Isa Gambarov: "There Is A Basis For Discontent"]

[Text][Editorial Introduction] At the meeting held on Sunday, 1 October, at Lenin Square in Baku the podium was turned over to a guest from Zaporozhye, USSR People's Deputy Vitali Alekseyevich Chelyshev. The speaker discussed the power of the people's movement and expressed his attitude on the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, the situation of the Azeri refugees who were compelled to leave their homes in Armenia, and other important questions.

We met with him the next day. We came together at the appointed time and found our guest conversing with Isa Gambarov, member of the Azerbaijan People's Front Ispolkom. We turned to both of them with questions of the greatest interest to our readers.

[Interviewer] Vitali Alekseyevich, we heard that you are a journalist and that you are chief correspondent for the

newspaper INDUSTRIALNOYE ZAPOROZH'YE. Normally you interview others; now, however, you are giving an interview as a peoples deputy. Are you used to it?

[Chelyshev] No. Sometimes there are very difficult questions. It is especially difficult to find correct answers on interethnic relations. You have to constantly consider every word, every phrase and be completely objective, attentive, sensitive and correct.

[Interviewer] In this context, readers in our republic are dissatisfied with most of the material in the central press.

[Chelyshev] I am dissatisfied myself. Sometimes one gets the impression that the journalists who are seeking to explain the events occurring in Nagorno-Karabakh itself or in other places which are related to the situation in this oblast or relations between the two republics are in a hurry, and are not going to the root of the problem, or they are approaching the question onesidedly...As a consequence, they displease not only certain individuals or groups, but peoples, and are further inflaming passions.

[Interviewer] You explain this by the journalists' trying to write in haste without studying the core of the problem; as for the people, they evaluate the position and actions of these journalists in another way—we will not conceal it, they call it hostility. For example, let me bring up the article in PRAVDA about the event which occurred in the vicinity of the village of Giyasly in Aghdam.... [Chelyshev] Oh yes, I read it. In general it is well known that PRAVDA has held a mistaken position when writing about a number of important events. The exchange of opinions and pluralism of ideas does not mean that facts should be distorted or that black should be called white and vice versa.

[Interviewer] Your speech at the meeting was well received. What was your impression of the meeting itself?

[Chelyshev] Do you mean did I especially like certain parts? The large crowd, the competence of the meeting's organizers, the politeness of those gathered there? In the course of a short period of time I have taken part in mass gatherings and meetings in Moscow and in other cities and I found the Baku meeting—if it is possible to say this—especially orderly.

[Interviewer] We do not usually ask guests this, but under the present circumstances we feel compelled to ask: What was your purpose in coming to Baku?

[Chelyshev] I am a member of the interregional group of USSR People's Deputies. I do not think there is any need to talk at length about this group's activities. Deputies who are part of our group, by broadening exchanges of opinion, glasnost, and democracy in general, by putting forth alternative proposals during discussions of the most important decrees, and by fighting against the abhorrent rules which took deep root in the administrative-command period and which still reveal themselves

at every step, are actively helping perestroika. I am completely sure that it is impossible to fulfill the commitments of our great duties under the current leadership methods. Some people are trying to accuse our group of working in opposition to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. A false idea! The goal is uniting the healthy forces in the whole region and pulling the country out of the serious crisis situation. This time all possibilities have to be used, and no opportunities must escape our grasp.

Let me continue to answer your question. Now there is not one USSR People's Deputy who does not understand and is not disturbed by the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, the relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, or more correctly, the intensification of the situation and the danger that it could explode at any moment. The party and government have passed various decrees on this question and issued countless commands. But the desired result has still not been attained. We have to try not only the official measures, but also nontraditional approaches.

We have given a lot of thought to this. Viktor Palm, who is one of the chairmen of the interregional deputies' group, and other leaders are making the following proposal: in a situation in which people's fronts have turned into the most active participants in the events, their observations and proposals must be studied in depth and only then should important decrees be passed. We invited representatives of the Azerbaijan People's Front to Moscow, to a meeting of our group. They came. It would be better if Isa Gambarov, member of the front's ispolkom, spoke about it.

[Gambarov] First, we have to express our gratitude to members of the interregional deputies' group. I would note that there are deputies in this group from almost all regions and of various nationalities with the exception of Azeris. In other words, there is no deputy who represents our interests. After saying this, the importance of our being invited there is clearer.

First, we explained our position at the general meeting, then later at the council for relations. I do not think there is any need to talk about this position, which has been repeatedly discussed at meetings in Baku.

[Chelyshev] The speeches of the representatives from Azerbaijan were very useful for us. I would say openly that we had not been informed about certain questions, and we had misconceptions about some measures. Now many things are clear to us.

[Interviewer] Excuse me, now let us hear what Isa has to say.

[Gambarov] Later we met with Rafiq Nishanov, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet. During the talk we discussed the reasons for the economic measures we took with regard to the neighbor republic, and based the necessity for this harsh decision on facts and proofs.

[Interviewer] Recently this measure has been at the center of attention at various levels. Some have given it heartfelt praise, and others are evaluating it as pressure inappropriate to the program of the Azerbaijan People's Front. Thus, we would ask you to explain to our readers the position of the ispolkom.

[Gambarov] Some people are calling our economic measure against our neighbor republic a blockade. A mistake! First, Armenia is not surrounded on every side by Azerbaijan in such a way that we could blockade it entirely. Second, during this period countless trainloads of construction materials, pharmaceutical supplies, medical equipment, newspaper paper and food went from our republic's territory into Armenia.

That is to say, the talk is not about a blockade, but about economic response measures. It is necessary to look at the root of the issue. For close to two years the neighbor republic has been making territorial claims against us and blatantly intervening in Azerbaijan's internal affairs. The Azeri population of Armenia has been driven out of there. For a significant period of time the Nakhichevan ASSR has been in a state of siege. In other border rayons Armenian extremists have been making constant attacks on our territory. The number of dead and injured is growing. Great material damage is being done to our economy. Beginning in the autumn of last year, unofficial armed bands have been formed in Armenia. In other words, a kind of war has begun against us. Under such circumstances we are fully justified in taking economic measures against the neighbor republic. I am quite sure that this measure has been effective in preventing a military clash.

[Interviewer] Although it sounds paradoxical, we do not dispute it. Soon it will be known who is right.

[Gambarov] Certainly. Now let me continue. One must not forget that there have been countless attacks on the Azerbaijan railroad on Armenia's territory, and our railroadmen have been insulted and attacked, and a thousand and one tricks have been played on the passengers. Efforts were made to blow up the railroad and the track. Under such conditions, when the Azerbaijan People's Front took these economic steps against the neighbor republic, railroadmen of our republic expressed their heartfelt gratitude for these measures.

Coming to the "siege" of Nagorno-Karabakh, I have to say that more than a year ago Armenian extremists began a blockade of villages and areas inhabited by Azeris in the oblast. Sooner or later countermeasures had to be taken.

[Interviewer] How long will this go on and under what circumstances will it cease?

[Gambarov] There are two simple, logical conditions. First, it must be stated categorically at the leadership level of the country that the Nagorno-Karabakh problem is an internal problem of the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic and that only our higher state organs can resolve it.

Second, the special administrative form in Nagorno-Karabakh must be abolished; in other words, it must be stated that the decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet dated 12 January 1989 following the decree on this by the republic Supreme Soviet session is no longer in force. Only after this can the situation on the railroad be put in order and a dialogue can begin. During the talks the most important question must be resolved—the causes behind the economic measures must be investigated in a multifaceted manner, ways must be found to eliminate them so that they can never occur again.

[Interviewer] Vitali Alekseyevich, to put it diplomatically, it appears that you came to Baku to look for answers. What questions interest you?

[Chelyshev] First, the refugee problem. I have seen the serious conditions in which the Azeris driven from Armenia live. In my opinion, the refugee problem must be at the forefront during the talks.

[Interviewer] And the Nagorno-Karabakh problem?

[Chelyshev] This problem can only be resolved in the framework of the USSR Constitution, according to the principle of the sovereignty of the republics. In my opinion, there is no other way.

[Interviewer] You met with the leaders of the Azerbaijan People's Front both in Moscow and Baku. What would you say about the growing people's movement in our country?

[Chelyshev] The constant growth of the social activism of the broad people's masses and its powerful influence on the speeding up of the democratization process going on in the country is one of the greatest successes of perestroika. The Azerbaijan People's Front is also an offspring of perestroika.

It strikes me that every social movement goes through three stages in its development—the romantic stage, the crisis stage and the stage of active work. Now the Azerbaijan People's Front is in the romantic stage...

[Gamarov] No, Vitali Alekseyevich, for us the romantic stage was over in December of last year. On 5 December we left the world of fantasy behind. Then our days of serious crisis began, and this trying phase lasted until spring. Now is the time of the people's front's active and concrete work.

[Chelyshev] Fine. I wish you great successes now and in the future.

Goal of Sovereignty Raised at Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet Session

18310042E Baku ADABIYYAT VA INJASANAT in Azeri 13 Oct 89 p 2

[Article by Bakhtiyar Vahabzade: "We Must Close Together Like A Fist"]

[Text] Today are are living in an extremely complex, contradictory and dangerous period of history. If today Russian writers are saying: "The Fatherland is in danger. Think about it!"; then we should be saying: "Our Fatherland, people, national existence and honor, reputation and endeavors are in danger!" We have to think about this and understand it. We must also understand that this danger has a global character. It is not by chance that in recent times the Turkic language peoples have been toyed with. The question is deeper than we thought. If we do not understand this danger, if we do not search for and find its deep roots, if we are naive and shortsighted instead of taking countermeasures, we will be ashamed before the future and history.

Today I congratulate our people for the recognition of the Azerbaijan People's Front by official organs and express my gratitude to the organs of authority for responding to the demand of the people.

The Azerbaijan People's Front has proven that it is a force representing the wishes and desires, will and power of the people. Because the People's Front supports only the people, the people believe in it and stand behind it. The slanders cast upon members of the People's Front by those who do not wish to give up their warm offices, beautiful ways of life and great possibilities are devoid of meaning. The people have begun to recognize who their true friends and enemies are.

Today there is but one goal and one line before us: the success of the people's unity in the name of the entirety and sovereignty of the Fatherland. Today I call on our entire people—from the worker to the intellectual, from the villager to the bureaucrat, from the most minor clerk to party and state worker—to close together like a fist and, forgetting all else, and concentrate on one objective.

In these difficult days I express my deep gratitude to the representatives of the Georgian, Russian, Talysh, Udi, Jewish, Lezgian, Lahy and other peoples living in our republic who have expressed their solidarity with our people because in these dark times they have joined their voices with ours and supported us in our struggle for the truth.

The guaranteeing of the political-legal and economic-spiritual sovereignty of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic has now turned into the most important question of our entire public life. During the cult of personality and time of stagnation the Azeris were one of the peoples whose national rights were most trampled on. Of the 15 peoples represented by union republics, only the Azeris were subjected to a policy of mass deportation. Mass deportation was applied to peoples who did not have a union republic (Chechens, Karachays, Crimean Tatars, Germans). But Stalin and his henchmen added the Azeris to this category. When they deported close to 80,000 Southern Azeris to Iran in the 1930s they dealt a serious blow to Azerbaijan's working class. Between 1948 and 1953, by forcibly deporting more than 100,000 Azeris from the Armenian SSR, they trampled on the

rights of this people as a whole people and insulted its national pride. In 1988, the fourth year of perestroika, the blatant violation of the patriotic, political, spiritual, and civil rights of 200,000 Azeris and their expulsion from this same republic brought the question of the sovereignty of the Azerbaijan SSR to the fore in all its urgency, and the wellknown decree accepted recently confirms this.

The matter has reached such a point that Azeris on the territory of the Azerbaijan SSR are being subjected to pressure, are forced to leave their homes and jobs, escape to other places, and live with the longing for the millennium-old lands of their ancestors in their own fatherland. For close to two years this abomination has been taking place in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. The Armenian nationalists have set themselves one goal: to remove the oblast from its subordination to the Azerbaijan SSR, to destroy all administrative, economic and cultural ties with the republic and, through the Special Administrative Committee, to subordinate it to their own center! All these provocations are being carried out in front of the eyes of republic, party, state and government organs.

As is well known, the Azerbaijan SSR, as one of the union republics under the USSR Constitution, turned over a very valuable part of its state rights and authority to higher all-union organs; as for these, they committed themselves to the defense of the state sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of the Azerbaijan SSR. Now the events in Nagorno-Karabakh have shown with great clarity that this commitment of the higher union organs as specified in the USSR Constitution is nothing more than empty words. On the contrary, the incomprehensible hypocritical behavior of the central all-union organs has led to the blatant violation of the normal security of the Azeri population of Nagorno-Karabakh, and units of internal troops are acting under their influence.

The political scope of the issue is quite broad. As an example, I only want to dwell on one question. Under the 1975 Helsinki and 1989 Vienna Accords on the rights of individuals, families which had been separated and were living in different countries were guaranteed conditions in which they could meet and reunite. It is now clear that the country in which the most Azeris live is Turkey; in other words, a consulate should be opened for conducting business relevant to this in Ankara and Baku. The question is: will the right to resolve such questions be given to a republic in which sovereignty is being discussed, or will we still be compelled to knock on the doors of innumerable Moscow administrations in years to come?

Coming to the economic side of sovereignty, I do not wish to interfere in the work of economists. I only wish to say that the economic lack of rights of the republic is completely unfair. For example, we raise cotton which is grown at the cost of the health of our women, injury to our children, and mass sacrifice. Only 12 percent of the

cotton is turned into end products in our republic; the remainder is transported to textile centers in other republics, and they make millions from it.

At this point I should explain that we are not the basic owners of our own land, natural resources, or state. They have deprived us of these rights. They have turned us into indentured servants in the true meaning of the word. Why do 93 percent of the industrial institutions in Azerbaijan have to be subordinated to the union? Why is oil given an artificial weight in the national income balance?

Why has Azerbaijan been turned into the union's raw materials base? Our scholars have calculated that in exporting raw goods in the cotton sector alone the republic loses more than two billion rubles a year, and approximately three billion rubles a year in wine products. And the situation is the same with tobacco, wool, vegetables, and other agricultural products. I cannot imagine why we should gather our wool and turn it over to Armenia so that they produce the end product. Do we not have the capability to process our own wool and make clothing from it? Maybe our labor force is not large enough? No! On the contrary, there are close to 400,000 unemployed in the republic now. And I am not talking about those hundreds of thousands who plant, cultivate and pick cotton in the summer and are jobless in the winter. They have made it so that a significant portion of the republic's youth is compelled to leave the republic due to unemployment. Every year the number of those leaving the republic passes 5-6,000. A very powerful opposition to turning Azerbaijan into an economic and scientific technical powerhouse in the Transcaucasus is being demonstrated. The strategic goals are concealed. One does not have to be a genius to know that those looking at our soil have prepared plans to drive us out of our native lands and to know the goals of the schemes they are trying to implement with someone's help.

Our national income is two times as great as Armenia's, and our population 2.1 times greater. And what is our budget? Or the scope of production, size of population and territory in our republic is greater, larger than Georgia's. But funds allocated to us from the Union budget are always less than those for Georgia.

By basically changing the structure of the economy in the republic we can gain economic independence. Only in this way can we stop our republic from being a raw materials base for other republics. It is known to all that an economy having a raw materials character is a colonial economy. At what price do we sell oil, which is our basic source of income? At 35 rubles a ton (the average price of oil per ton in the world market is around 140 dollars a ton). The 13 million tons of oil extracted in 1987 brought the republic a sum of 455 million rubles. This equals only 3.9 percent of our national income. We are selling a golden resource for the price of garbage and buying products made with our own resources from others for the price of gold.

The Dashnaks have long wished to drive close to 200,000 Azeris from their native homes and make Armenia a monorepublic. They have achieved this wish. While they were doing this, the army stationed in Armenia did nothing to prevent it; on the contrary, they helped them. After the last Azeri was driven from Armenia, Armenian intellectuals called for an immediate extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet and raised the issue of protecting the security of Armenians living in "Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh." In other words, they consider driving the Azeris from Armenia to be a legal situation, but they think that the voluntary departure of Armenians from Azerbaijan is illegal and grounds to intervene in our internal affairs. It is frightening. Who gave them this right? We resisted this. Why did not Moscow, which has taken on the mission to restore truth and justice among us, say to them: Are not the Azeris you drove from Armenia human, too? Do they not have rights? Why do you think it just to drive them from their native lands? If this is justice, why do you not consider it just when the Armenians migrate from Azerbaijan voluntarily?! You are still sticking your fingers into the affairs of a sovereign Azerbaijan republic in this business. Why is Moscow silent on these questions?! Putting this to one side, how can Moscow newspapers find it necessary to write that these actions of theirs are their right?

I cannot imagine how long we will have to stand for the biased position of the central newspapers. How long will they write that we are wrong when we are right, and they are right when they are wrong, and how long will they remain silent about our just demands?

A few words on the cultural framework of sovereignty. Here the primary thing is guaranteeing our language state language status not in word, but in deed. The document prepared by our Central Committee does not meet present demands. The Azeri language must be guaranteed true state language rights; all state and public administrations must conduct their office work in this language; and Russian, along with Azeri, must retain influence as channels of interethnic communication. The Latin script which from the scientific point of view is completely appropriate to the laws of our language and which would give back our people's revolutionary-cultural past, must be returned to the people through a document on the state language.

I wish to end with the words of the great patriotic journalist Omar Faig Ne'manzade which he wrote in the 18 January 1918 issue of the newspaper ACHYG SOZ: "Among us, in our character, there has been a long-standing custom to not think of our own interests, to not think that we ourselves are in danger, for the sake of steadfastness in friendship with others."

"This character has been rooted and strengthened not only in the minds of certain individuals, but in the spirit of our nation, in our public morality."

"The courage to be wounded by the knife of friendship and not feel the bitterness of that wound has long held a place in our national morality."

"The damage of this bad habit and character has so increased, and the fury of the axe descending on our national interests by way of friendship has become so strong that to not feel it, not understand it, clearly expresses our stupidity, our arid ignorance..."

"It is time that we show we are worthy to understand these truths, that we demonstrate the honor of our nation not through self-conceit, but through our actions and our help!"

[Editorial Comment] The article is based on a speech at the tenth extraordinary session of the eleventh convocation of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet.

Armenian Highways, Internal Affairs Officials on Blockade Effects

90US0361 Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian 30 Nov 89 p 2

[Interview with Armenian Republic Minister of Highway Construction and Maintenance Georgiy Arshakovich Melkumyan, and Armenian SSR Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Grigor Gareginovich Grigoryan by KOMMUNIST correspondent A. Bagdasaryan: "Timely Interview; Blocking the Highway"]

[Text] In the heat of the struggle with the economic consequences of the railroad blockade, we somehow lost sight of yet another, no less important blockade: that of the highways linking Armenia with the country's national economic complex. This situation indeed is becoming critical. Of the republic's five main highways, only two are functioning normally today: Yerevan to Leninakan to Batumi, and Kirovakan to Kalinino to Marneuli. On the remaining three (Yerevan to Artashat to Nakhichevan, Yerevan to Sevan to Kazakh, and Yekhegnadzor to Goris to Stepanakert), driving, which already has been made extremely complicated by the unprecedented actions of the Azerbaijanis who are really harassing motor vehicle transport drivers, has become extraordinarily dangerous and, in recent months, has even been stopped completely. Of course, believing them to be reliable and secure, although at great effort, we could pin our hopes for safe automotive service on the working routes which pass through Georgian territory. Yet we must not forget that both these roads go through passes and under the approaching winter conditions there is a real danger of avalanches and the beginning of obstructions. We must consider that, once again, we risk being cut off from the outside world. So what if there is another blockade? Are we really doomed to pay each time for our own lack of concern? The economy of the republic is threatened with millions in new losses.

In connection with the situation which has arisen, KOMMUNIST correspondent A. Bagdasaryan met with the

republic's Minister of Highway Construction and Maintenance, Georgiy Arshakovich Melkumyan, and the Armenian SSR Deputy Minister for Internal Affairs, Grigor Gareginovich Grigoryan, and asked them to answer a few questions.

[Correspondent] Georgiy Arshakovich, is there a real danger of closure of the main highways? Could it happen that we suddenly find ourselves without motor vehicle service?

[Melkumyan] Actually, such a threat exists, and we are approaching this with full responsibility and understanding of the matter.

Historically and geographically it has turned out that Armenia's highway network was developed in full mutual dependence with neighboring republics. This integration had its positive aspects, of course. Through joint efforts, we significantly improved the functional capabilities of our roads. We planned and built them together in convenient, more advantageous directions and regulated motor vehicle transport traffic. Specifically because of this, Armenia, like all of the Transcaucasus, has one of the country's leading highway networks according to average statistical indicators.

Today it is becoming clear that, because of its unfavorable geographic position, Armenia finds itself in a critical situation, and we must find a way out of this crisis now. This must become for us an issue of paramount importance. Hundreds of thousands of rubles worth of economic goods traverse the highways daily. Thus, a possible blockade will not simply stop transport but will strike a serious blow to the republic's economy.

[Correspondent] But there must be some kind of countermeasures? There must be a way to rebuff such flagrant coercion?

[Melkumyan] Yes, such a tactic emerged as early as 1988 (frankly speaking, highway blockades began much earlier than rail blockades) when a section of the national highway from Yerevan to Kazakh was closed. Then we were forced to lay four kilometers of asphalt paving to route traffic through to Berd via Aygeovit to Vazashen. The very same thing happened with the Goris to Kafan road. It passes along the border with Azerbaijan but in the Kafanskiy Rayon five or six villages near Agarak generally were cut off from the rayon center because a three-kilometer section passes through the territory of the neighboring republic. The latter forced us to build a new six-kilometer stretch of road to Agarak.

Even long before these events, we built several roads to by-pass Azerbaijani territory, including Berd to Krasnoselsk and Goris to Shinuayr.

Unfortunately, this tactic is not a panacea for all our troubles. For instance, the road to Megri through the Nakhichevanskaya ASSR has been blockaded since August. As a result, a links with this outlying region must be maintained along the Goris to Kafan to Kadzharan

by-pass road; and this is 110 kilometers longer than the Nakhichevan route. And we simply do not know what will happen with the Goris to Stepanakert road which is completely blocked along its entire Azerbaijan section.

[Correspondent] If we clear up somewhat the situation with the blockaded roads, then the fate of the working roads is still uncertain. Will they be able to operate normally in winter?

[Melkumyan] We already are finishing repairs and putting in order 85 specialized support points for winter maintenance. Over the course of the next five months a sufficient number of graders, snow plows, bulldozers, sand spreaders, loaders and other equipment will be operating around the clock here. We are completing the installation of more than 100 thousand snow retention fences. For the efficient transmission of information and to organize cooperation between the subunits, we have acquired and installed 75 radios, 45 of which are on highway patrol vehicles.

[Correspondent] Georgiy Arshakovich, we know that you recently met with your colleagues from the Georgian Minavtodor regarding the construction of new roads linking us with our fraternal republic.

[Melkumyan] Let me say more on that. On this issue, we asked the USSR Council of Ministers to permit us to build these highways and we hope for a favorable decision. We already have prepared all the necessary materials to reconstruct and improve the carrying capacity of various sections of the main highway exits out of Armenia. These routes will go via Leninakan, Guksyan, Akhalkalaki and further on to Batumi, via Kirovakan, Kalinino, Bolnisi and Marneuli, and via Kirovakan, Alaverdi, Ayrum and Marneuli.

[Correspondent] Up to now, we have looked at the highway blockade as an economic phenomenon. Grigor Gareginovich, just how does this problem look from the viewpoint of the organs of law and order? After all, besides the material loss, many things have been perpetrated which fall under the articles of the criminal code?

[Grigoryan] Indeed, things are not easy here for workers in the organs of law and order. Since the beginning of these notorious events, crime on the roads linking Armenia and Azerbaijan has risen several times over. As has been noted in the press, there have been numerous cases of attacks on vehicles, including the use of firearms, illegal searches, damage to freight bound for Armenia, and the unmerciful beating of drivers and passengers. The situation is particularly grave on the Goris to Lachin to Stepanakert road where, since the beginning of the year, a little more than one hundred vehicles have managed to get through under escort by USSR MVD troops and the majority of them arrived at their destination damaged.

Time and again, we have had working meetings with representatives from the most diverse levels of the Azerbaijan Ministry of Internal Affairs, down to participation in the staffing of government commissions. With the goal of preventing illegal actions in Armenia, we have planned and implemented a distribution of forces and means to strengthen service along the march route of the Azerbaijani nationals. In particular, two subunits of Gosavtoinspektsiya, working at five permanent posts and conducting patrols in 30 radio-equipped vehicles, are on duty daily on five routes.

All this enables me to assure your readers that the republic's internal affairs organs are guaranteeing the free flow of motor vehicle transport throughout the territory of Armenia.

[Correspondent] But can the Azerbaijan Ministry of Internal Affairs give the same guarantees?

[Grigoryan] That is a complicated question. It seems to me that the unprecedented actions of the Azerbaijan Popular Front in blockading our republic are the main obstacle to resolving this problem.

[Correspondent] Grigor Gareginovich, does the Armenian SSR MVD, and Gosavtoinspektsiya in particular, intend to help the road workers?

[Grigoryan] Yes. For more than a year now we have been working in close cooperation with Minavtodor. The forces of Gosavtoinspektsiya recently conducted a check of the operational status of the roads and presented to Minavtodor a list of routes which, in our opinion, must be reconstructed or built.

Evolution of Dialogue Viewed in Context of Armenian Events

90US0386A Yerevan KOMSOMOLETS in Russian
16 Dec 89 p 3

[Article by Gevork Ter-Gabrielyan: "Polemic Notes: Phenomena of Dialog Awareness (Survey of Soviet Social Commentary)]

[Text] "Mankind is entering the Age of Dialog," Vladimir Bibler asserts in issue No. 7 of the bulletin VEK XX I MIR. However, despite the information boom that is crashing down onto us readers torrents of information that is not printed, not expressed, or insufficiently stated in time, it cannot be said that any dialog awareness has yet formed in our society. According to the concept of the great twentieth-century philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin, the dialogism of awareness is characterized by an openness with regard to principles, by nonexclusivity to oneself, by the imperfection of the individual's opinion with regard to a particular problem. And yet, even after the proclamation of pluralism as a political principle, the authoritarian, monolog type of awareness continues to prevail in our society. Putting it more simply, we do not know how to listen. We do not accept objections. We prefer to pretend that we do not

hear the opinions that differ from our opinion. What is happening with us is not a dialog, but a collective monolog that is simply developing into noise. It seems to the author of each individual monolog that he is a "voice crying in the wilderness," and sometimes that he is "the voice of the people." Authors make policy, and they say that they are building a "common house." Minor differences of opinion give rise to the appearance of pluralism and the polarization of public thought. However, that polarization is by no means one that is based on principles. For example, in the principle "Do not allow perestroika!" both the "leftist" and "rightist" commentators are united. Many of them are also united (possibly unconsciously) in their equating of patriotism with blind loyalty. This confusion can be unraveled, it seems to me, by a "glance from without"—a glance that is independent but at the same time one conducive to a dialog, one that rests upon the stream of social commentary. This article should be viewed as an attempt to grab onto the very end of the string in the ball of perestroika conceptions.

Out of the republic items published recently, I especially remember two items written by V. Sarkisyan: one about a session of the Coordination Council of the Interregional Deputy Group (IDG [in Cyrillic MDG]) on the problem of a blockade (KOMMUNIST, 25 October), and one about the level of preparedness of our deputy corps (KOMMUNIST, 21 October). These articles teach us a lesson of actual, rather than stereotypic, political enlightenment.

Let us attempt to ascertain exactly what occurred at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet during the discussion of the situation that had developed as a result of the blockade. In response to the demand of the Armenian and other deputies concerning the immediate use of force to break the blockade, a "knight's move" was made: by the very "internationalization" of the formulation of the problem, by the fact that the proposal was made to discuss the situation that had developed not in one specific region, but in rail transportation in general, the deputies were pushed to making the choice: either use extraordinary measures everywhere throughout the country, or nowhere. It was a simple calculation: drive a wedge between the most progressive [...typesetting problem in original]. In my opinion, our representatives did not display sufficient flexibility to realize this in time and to figure out the counteractions. As a result, our most consistent supporters in the IDG in the person of Academician A. Sakharov, G. Starovoytova, and G. Igityan proved to be between two fires: the pressure of Armenian public opinion, on the one hand, and the chilling attitude that was taken to their proposals in the IDG, on the other. It would seem that it is this complicated, dual role that explains the dryness of the tone that appeals only to facts and to legally substantiated formulations in the interview given to SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA by A. Sakharov, G. Starovoytova, and S. Stankevich, and also in the stenographic record of the IDG session. How dissimilar that

tone is to the tone of the well-known "messages to the Armenian nation" from G. Starovoytova! It must be admitted that the Armenian side went much too far with respect to emotions, which, as everyone knows, cannot break an axe handle, and therefore it is more fitting now for our representatives to display restraint. But we shall speak about emotionality at another time.

As for now, let us discuss the position of the IDG Coordination Council.

Recently one could hear over the "enemy" radio "dissident" Eduard Oganessian ranting away: in America, Yeltsin was being asked about his attitude to the attempts of the Baltic republics to secede from the Union. His answer: it is their sovereign right; if they want to, let them secede. He was asked about national schools in the Ukraine. His answer: it is their right; if they want to develop the language, they must have that opportunity. They asked him about Karabakh and he answered: that is a very, very complicated problem.

So it turns out that Karabakh is the stumbling block. The litmus paper. The indicator... Of what? Of adherence to principles. Of humanitarianism. Of progressiveness. Of "pluralism" and "internationalism."

Why, in order to understand the problem of Karabakh, is it necessary to cross over an age-old stereotype: "we won't give up what is ours!" It is not the poor attitude toward the Armenian nation, it is not deafness to the appeal issued by the people of Karabakh, but it is precisely that ancient instinct, which is typical both of conquerors and of the "conquered" ("they won't give back what isn't theirs!"), that forces many political experts both in our country and abroad to reformulate unconsciously the Karabakh problem into "Armenia's territorial claims on Azerbaijan..." This complex serves as a natural ally for Azerbaijan because it is so widespread throughout the world!

In order to understand "Karabakh," it is also necessary to cross over the lack of desire to consider the historical facts as an argument during self-determination. Once, in a spoken statement, the famous Turkologist Academician D. Yermeyev said, "Stop bringing up history as an argument! You will not be understood by those who possess conquered territories!"

But if one does not take history as the basis, if one follows that appeal to Mankurtism, then, for example, in any region where any nationality is living compactly (even on the scale of an individual village), that nationality could announce its separation and secession from the state.

It is also necessary to step across our Lumpen lack of desire to link the freedom of the individual with the freedom of the homeland, to step across the formula that is so dear to our hearts—"if you don't like it, go off in all four directions." And so we go off... But who will remain here? Only the wolves? Until they have chewed one another's throats? It is necessary, finally, to realize the

truth: the freedom of the civilized individual is unattainable until the motherland is free.

And so, in this context, one is simply astonished by Yu. Afanasyev's opinion on the question of the blockade, which was expressed in the stenographic record of the IDG session. His opinion is astonishing since this is the very same Yu. Afanasyev, rector of the Moscow Historical Archives Institute, who stated in Japan that he considers it to be just to return to it the territories belonging to it that were annexed by the USSR.

Something else, of course, that is astonishing is the phrase of Academician Leonid Abalkin in OGONEK: "I do not know in history a situation when a government proved to be in a more complicated situation. It cannot stop a strike, it cannot send trains through Azerbaijan to Armenia, or vice versa" (OGONEK, No 41). I would like very much for someone to explain to me what this is: "a blockade and... vice versa?" The same as "...and around it"?

It is astonishing when Boris Oleynik, a poet...—A poet!—stands in front of the Gandzasar Monastery and, in reply to the question of whether he now understands whose monastery this is, the Armenians' or the Albanians, "I have not yet had time to become deeply aware, to understand all this, and I cannot say definitely..." All that he has left to add is, "The commission has not yet formed a definite opinion as to whether this is an Armenian monastery or an Albanian one, and therefore, for the time being, I also have that lack" (we were told about this by Shushanik Kazaryan in her splendid series of reports in four issues of AVANGARD magazine).

And, finally, one is astonished by the words of economist G. Popov: "If they want to twist our arms by force, it won't happen. We must act with the maximum amount of caution. I agree with the censuring of the blockade. But I must have exhaustive information about two blockades. Incidentally, I receive letters and telegrams from Russians living in Azerbaijan. They censure the Karabakh movement." Well, of course, dear G. Popov! The authors of these letters are indisputable authorities and the highest arbiters in national problems, wherever they live.

In OGONEK (No 42) G. Popov published an interesting article about the Khrushchev phenomenon. In it the views of the author himself are expressed with the greatest clarity. I would like to draw the reader's attention to two aspects of the article.

The first. Speaking about the evil deeds in Novochoerkassk, his hometown, G. Popov retains his calm and his restrained emotionless style. Analyzing in detail these events that marked the end of the thaw, the author comes to the conclusion that in this historic situation the shooting of innocent people and children was a completely natural result of N. S. Khrushchev's instabilities.

Of course, it must be taken into consideration that this is the first time that the events in Novochoerkassk have been described in such detail in our press. And that which is published for the first time in our press is, as a rule, offered in the style of "well, everyone knows this and it is completely obvious." Nevertheless, it seems to me that this capability—the capability of subjecting someone else's inhuman acts to cold-blooded, almost impassive analysis—is a typical feature of the present-day political figure—the perestroyka man. The event that was at one time to reason for the beginning of the first Russian revolution—the shooting of peaceful demonstrators—would not have had any significant social impact if it had happened after the era of Stalinist terror and the Khrushchev thaw. It would seem that one sees here the effect specifically of the acquired insensitivity of our country's dissident public. The sensation that you cannot do anything personally against specific bloody inhumanity gives rise to the illusion of the possibility of the objective analysis of inhumanity. Isn't this kind of analysis immoral? Or, rather, it is also outside the realm of morality. Because one of the postulates of vulgar Marxism is formulated in this manner: politics and economics are outside the category of morality; or, more simply, life is not spiritual experiences; or, even more simply, life is not a book... Naturally, a person with charred nerves, such as G. Popov, will approach Karabakh or the blockade not "emotionally," that is, not from the point of view of humanity, of human participation, but from a "political" point of view, that is, from the point of view of "reason": was it desirable to begin the Karabakh movement, and was it begun at the proper time? Or aren't the Armenians themselves guilty of "Sumgait," the blockade?...

Here, I think, one sees the manifestation of the conflict between types of mental processes: the "national," "individual," and the "non-national," "systems" type that looks "down from the top." Two types of people correspond to them: the person who suffers, who experiences, who lives his life and his fate, and the person who, by the grace of God, does not suffer, but observes, generalizes, studies, and, finally—administers... Personally I, for example, whether it be by virtue of circumstances or my nature, am incapable of this kind of "objectivism." A phrase such as "The genocide of the Armenians was the completely natural result of the crisis in the Ottoman Empire" is for me false—both scientifically and morally. Because genocide cannot be completely natural. Could this property—of checking science by one's own personal feelings—be the result of an excessive temperament? Maybe. As everyone knows, temperament is the manifestation of the soul's properties. Is this good or bad—the inability to abstract oneself from the pain of history's victims? I do not know. It was probably for this reason that I lack that type of mental process that is considered to be the state type. Certainly the ability to abstract oneself from the moral aspect when making a political-economic analysis is the state type of thinking, isn't it? If this is so, then I agree: I hope that I never master that means of scientific analysis. One has to pay too high a

price for that method. Yes, it is necessary to analyze. But in the end it is necessary to restore the rights of human pain, so that the object of analysis acquires its true scale, is coordinated on the humanometric axes.

And now the second factor that I have taken from the same article by G. Popov. This is how the author describes the situation after Stalin's death: "The party preserved the system of alternative elections of all collective agencies, beginning with the low-level party buros...", "The apparatus was not accustomed at that time to considerable privileges; it was proud of its 'populist' origin...", "...we had in many areas science and technology that yielded only little to the world level." Is that the complete story? The reader has the right to ask the author: what kind of party organization was that that you have in mind? Apparatus members in what specific region? All science and technology in general, or only nuclear and missile?

For some reason H. Popov speaks about the *entire* party, the *entire* apparatus, and about the level of the country's science and technology as a *whole*, and this nullifies the value of his judgments, since, in his abstract structures he omits a very important element—the *nonhomogeneity* of our society's structure, and it not a vertical, but a horizontal nonhomogeneity of the types of society throughout the country, the peculiarities of the local psychology, the nationally refracted forms of world perception, and, in particular, the perception of the system. If somewhere, possibly, there actually were an "honest" apparatus and "intraparty democracy," it is specifically "somewhere," rather than everywhere and in general.

The question arises: if even such a sharp mind, such an author of the famous review of A. Bek's novel "Novoye naznacheniye" [New Assignment] as G. Popov, looking from the center, deprives his glance of natural love of mankind and the heterogeneous essence of life, replacing them with homogeneous meager abstractions, then is it possible that a mind, or even a collective of minds, is insufficient for the realistic, objective reflection of the situation throughout our vast country? Life becomes more complicated, and is it possible that the size of our country is actually greater than a person's ability to generalize?

I might be accused of being intolerant of another person's opinion and the lack of pluralism. But I want only to point out that there has not yet been any discussion of any kind of dialogism. And we have begun to forget this, drunken with the verbal pluralism of the writing fraternity. But this is dangerous—will people suddenly become so drunk that they do not feel the thirst for true democracy? Will it suddenly happen that the country's intelligentsia has become so degenerate that it can no longer differentiate between words and deeds? Or will our pharisaism, a pharisaism that sets people's teeth on edge, once again speak for us—eke out a slave's existence and pretend that this gives you a sense of "profound satisfaction"?

The crux of the matter is that the mass media are issuing the appeal for democracy and pluralism to those who do not imagine life without them!

We are being shamed: just look, Azerbaijan keeps lifting the blockade, but during that time a large number of trains have been accumulating on the tracks... But you do not display a healthy sense of internationalism. You do absolutely nothing to equip, on your part, the brigades of railroad workers to help your Azerbaijani associates who have proven to be in a difficult situation.

The Azerbaijanis are exhorted by being told, yes, we understand that you are very angry. Nevertheless, be tolerant, because the Armenians are really children. Not ours, true, but nevertheless... Big children. It is they who do not understand that "perestroyka is not perekroyka [recutting]" and they absolutely do not want to grasp what people have been trying to knock into their heads since the 1920's.

It is sad, but one cannot fail to realize that glasnost and the "access" of the free word were frequently used by the press as a weapon for aggravating the interethnic conflict. It is no secret that even our local mass media did not receive a definite amount of freedom until after it became obvious that the escalation of the conflict makes it possible to undertake anything realistic, and this is justified by the complexity of the situation: "Some say that we won't give it back! Others say that we will not refuse!" But between the lines in the newspapers and magazines one can hear: "Let them gnaw themselves to pieces!"

I sense a feeling of bitterness when I observe the repetition of the same scheme: "divide and..."—in the literary squabble on the pages of the press. We cannot wave this squabble aside. It deserves the most careful consideration, because the conceptual structures of present-day literary figures, which often are chimerical and hazy, are shadows from Plato's cave: they are shadows of ideas which at one time were alive and burning, but which long ago departed from life, ideas that were leveled and repeatedly dissipated for a pittance. At one time, great Russian literature fed on them. All the best ideas of today's period of perestroyka—both the political and the spiritual ones—have their beginning in Russian literature. Thanks to its previous great force, the nation's attention to this day is directed toward it and its living successors: what will they say? However, things are becoming difficult for it today. Can it be because many of these successors, for some reason, have imposed upon themselves the duty of judging not only about their own language, but also about "every existing language"? And they do not have any strength for esthetic generalization?

LITERATURNAYA GAZETA attempts to convert the literary squabble into a dialog by publishing, from issue to issue, discussions with critics from "opposite camps." In these "dialogs of the week" one observes clearly the

basic quality of the persons participating in the discussions: the complete lack of any clear-cut moral conception. The critics participating in the discussions frequently do not even bother to differentiate that "this is good, and that is bad." Some of them continue to observe decorum, and others are completely uninhibited. Mikhail Lobanov, for example, states that Pasternak may have been a Jew, but he overcame his "Jewishness" and "Doktor Zhivago" is good. But Babel's literature is Jewish literature and it is very bad because "his physiologism and cynicism with respect to those who are 'not his kind of people' have absolutely nothing in common with the spirit of Russian literature" (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 27 September).

However, the spectrum of opinions in the "rightist" camp is just as broad as in the "leftist" camp, say, in the IDG (from Yeltsin to Sakharov). Dmitriy Urnov obviously disagrees with his association Lobanov. He repeatedly spoke out against Boris Pasternak, both in the past and in the present, and finally determined his own position and determined that he did not have anything personally against the nationality of the author of "Doktor Zhivago," but it was simply that, in his opinion, the novel was artistically weak.

Incidentally, D. Urnov does not have a special opinion only concerning Pasternak, but also about Dostoyevskiy. He states, "It seems to me that Dostoyevskiy in general spent a large part of his life, as it were, in an uncomfortable pose. Because he had the fate of an apostate who had renounced the ideals of youth... He was really afraid of revolution, afraid of the carrying out of the socialist Utopia on the basis that, heaven forbid, along with the social reforms one unfortunate old man might be destroyed or one tear might be shed by a child. He spoke about this when there was more than an ample supply of tears" (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 14 June).

How is this not the model of rightful dialectical logic? If Urbanov were to be a vulgar Marxist, he was born much too late. If he were to be some kind of minor literary commentator who shocks the public for the sake of shock itself, then he is too honored by age. Literary critics in the center love to speak in the name of the entire country. But obviously they are poorly aware that that the entire country reads them. And they are not embarrassed, on the pages of the central press, to display great-age demonism.

Whatever ideas become victorious in Russian social thought, I shall remain true to my respect for Russian literature, and it is not a matter of indifference to me how its great truths are being defamed and devalued by the collective efforts of present-day literary commentators. There are two principles that were engendered by that literature, that are equivalent to Biblical behests: the principle of the child's tear, and the one about the non-use of violence against evil. And D. Urnov chooses as his target specifically one of these sacred principles.

And, strange as it seems, he does not sense the suppressed breathing of the rank-and-file reader behind his shoulder when he practices witchcraft over the new shadow of vulgarization.

All one needs to add is that, during the perestroyka period, D. Urnov was given the assignment of editor in chief of our country's leading critical publication—VOPROSY LITERATURY magazine—on the pages of which, with his typical spiritual breadth and pluralism, he provides a forum for critics who adhere to views that oppose his own. This is very nice of him, don't you agree?

Does the literary public display any concern about this assignment? Only mildly. Poel Karp showed this concern and he was immediately "worked over" on the pages of DRUZHBA NARODOV magazine (No 6), which attempts to reconcile and unite the "warring clans" (incidentally, this is the only mention of Poel Karp's activity as a commentator, the only opinion concerning the position of the Leningrad writer that I have found on the pages of the central press).

Public opinion is engaged with moral problems of another kind: for example, the vigilant I. Shafarevich, a very important mathematician and practically a dissident, accused OKTYABR magazine, and also personally citizens Andrey Sinyavskiy and Vasilii Grossman, for "anti-Russian moods." This is completely like General Rodionov.

Everyone who is familiar with V. Grossman's short story "Everything Flows" (OKTYABR, No 6, 1989) can confirm that Grossman is not mocking the image of Russia, as I. Shafarevich and his ilk assert. Grossman's lines about the "slavery of the Russian soul" are full of pain and suffering. The genuineness of these words is so penetrating that they cease to pertain to Russians only. They already pertain to all the people among whom the fate of the Russians is only an individual case... By publishing and reading these lines, we, as it were, get rid of the slave psychology: we cease experiencing the mystical fear of any leadership, of dark forces and dark crows. We understand that freedom is a struggle, and that the person who struggles, alas, has something to lose other than his goals: he draws into the maelstrom the fate of those close to him. He is not free, and it much more difficult for him to withstand, not to bow down, when it is not only the enemy, but even a friend, who can cast the stern accusation at him: "Why did you immolate me?"

Another reason why we cannot be indifferent about V. Grossman is that he is one of those authors who have chosen Armenia was the place for their voluntary-enforced exile. In the nineteenth century, writers were exiled to Georgia, but in the twentieth century the places of exile were shifted farther to the south, to less abundant places. And so a number of works devoted to Armenia were created. Among their authors—O. Mandelshtam, A. Belyy, B. Chichibabin, A. Bitov, and others—V. Grossman stands out by the fact that he arrived in

Armenia knowing almost nothing about it. Here he discovered for himself this stern land and wrote his last, very sad short story "I Wish You Well!". He attempted to understand the Armenians and... did he succeed? I am not convinced. However, his thoughts were clean. We Armenians understood him. And that is quite a bit, don't you agree? His short story "Everything Flows" is the same drop, the Russian drop, the Chekhovian drop, by which we all squeeze the slave out of ourselves.

And so our pluralism is all the more remarkable in that, in its name, people fight not with just anyone, but with V. Grossman or, say, with Yu. Trifonov. They fight, actually, with a talented literature, with the freedom of creativity, with the right to self-determination, the right to have one's own opinion, the right to initiative, the right to "push yourself forward," that is, with every manifestation of the freedom of spirit and actions—that is, with human nature. The "pluralistic nature" of this struggle certainly manifests itself in the fact that the person who fights for his independence is simultaneously fighting to his utmost against the independence of the person next to him... This is not pluralism, but simply lack of principles. And it is not important which means are being used to fight: whether they be commercial, ideological, or other coercion.

Almost the entire issue No. 6 of the VEK XX I MIR bulletin is devoted to the Tbilisi events. Here the central press provides for the first time the correct sequence in the armed attacks on perestroika: Moscow, "Zvartnots," Minsk, Tbilisi. But people in the country do not know anything about "Zvartnots." Of all the topics that were devoted to the violence, this one, for some reason, remains the most concealed.

The blockade of Armenia and Artsakh pertains to the same series. Even if one believes (with difficulty!) that the blockade was entirely organized by the Azerbaijani Popular Front. Are we really supposed to believe that there is no paradox in the fact that a great country, and practically the entire world, when rushing to help Armenia, became dependent upon a "public organization"?

But I am talking here not about the actions of the system that operated by administrative fiat, which strives for regeneration and therefore takes a risk and "supports" perestroika. I am speaking about the individual's position. Whether or not people want this, Karabakh has already made its self-determination. Sooner or later it will be necessary to recognize that fact. And, in any instance, there will be no return to the old way. But the position of a number of members of the IDG coordinating council for the Karabakh problem, about which we spoke previously, will have long-reaching consequences: because they have taken their step away from the principle of humanitarianism. The silence after Sumgait was half a step. It was as though they said: this is no affair of ours. Now they have said: it is our affair. We are against self-determination. Neutrality coupled with the need for moral choice is equal to an immoral choice.

In the same issue of the VEK XX I MIR bulletin, it was clearly shown how the concepts of "leftist" and "rightist" are intertwined in our society. The "leftists" in our country are in general "rightists," since they are striving for a society that is similar to the countries of bourgeois democracy. And our "rightists" are their "leftists," as well as their "ultrarightists"—extremist groupings and "hawks" that are striving for an orthodox total dictatorship. Thus, our "leftists" actually are only centrists. Our life has shifted strongly "to the right," and that is why we do not have any true "leftists." The bulletin publishes very sharp things. It is a pity that the reader has only just begun reading it, and immediately the end is coming. It is as though only article beginnings are being published—only "leads," to whet the reader's appetite. Only a hint is printed, and then it immediately breaks off... Sometimes you begin to read about secret departments—then the sentence suddenly breaks off in the middle, and it ends in a series of dots. In general it can be asserted that this very thin bulletin—the only official agency in the country—in its relationships with censorship has achieved the level of glasnost of the Pushkin era. One might recall that Pushkin's verses were peppered with dots, and that Gogol's "Story About Captain Kopeykin" is entirely strewn with dots...

So let's not be naive: we must not yet dance away from the stove of democracy and pluralism; one does not leap immediately from behind the iron curtain into democracy. And the terminology of perestroika is still being thrown around by the monopolists, to whom squabbling is beneficial, but not dialog, wherever and however it might occur between the "leftists" and the "rightists," between two republics, or between the native-language and foreign-language population "in one separately taken" republic. We do not yet have "rightists" and "leftists": we have rightists and nonrightists. There is no MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA or MOSCOW NEWS: there is only true and—half-truth.

So it is with regret that it must be noted that even many advanced commentators think in categories—either an empire (that is to say, a federation in the old sense), or the breakdown of the country into petty principalities and internecine struggles. And there are few who will get it into their head that the most terrible thing for the country is not the interethnic conflicts that are constantly inflated, but the strictly moral problem. Those who separate politics from morality are not averse to waving that problem aside. Historically it would seem to have a religious coloration, but today it has already become unimportant who you are by religion: a Muslim following the faith of his ancestors, Gamzatov, or a Christian by origin, Ovcharenko. There is something else that is more important: who you are by your actions. What will be victorious in your soul? Will it be the commandment "Thou shalt not kill," or the call to a "jihad"—a "holy war"? The fate of the people inhabiting our vast country depends on which of these principles will find more followers. It must also be kept in mind that, in and of themselves, the totalitarian strivings of

the code of Muslim morality are not as terrifying as that morality's unification with our still viable, proud "knock 'em dead" attitude, which was described so well by M. Zhvanetskiy: "We have a soldier's life. Even our wives are soldiers. And our chiefs are generals. And their wives are generals' wives..."

MVD Troops Stationed in NKAO Face Hardship, Hostility

90US0372 Moscow TRUD in Russian 29 Dec 89 p 4

[Article by Special Correspondent V. Belykh: "Boys in the 'Hot Spots'"]

[Text] Emitting a cloud of grayish-blue smoke, the armored infantry vehicle rumbled along the broken asphalt of the winding highway. From the shaking armored vehicle one could readily see the vehicles that were coming in the opposite direction being squeezed toward the shoulder, and the solid column of trucks stretching out behind under the guard of soldiers wielding assault-weapons. It was like scenes from a film about a real war: the gun barrel on the turret peering toward the sky, my wary fellow travelers wearing helmets and bulletproof vests, the serrated wall of an ancient fortress in the distance. Alas, in order to see all this it was not necessary to journey far away. My traveling documents said Nagornyy Karabakh.

Crossroads with fortifications and armored troop carriers in the middle, soldiers patrolling city streets with assault rifles on the ready, crowds of people throwing stones and bottles full of flammable liquid and storming administrative buildings, bomb explosions, trails of tear gas, shields, clubs, shots, and casualties—alas, all these things are distressing realities of our time. And now the words "refugees," "terrorist act," "extremists" and "curfew" have become part of our everyday language. Sumgait, Tbilisi, Fergana, Novyy Uzen, Sukhumi, Nagornyy Karabakh. And in this whole tide of mutual hatred, amid bitter clashes and the raging of passions, are thousands of soldiers and officers of the internal forces, showered with stones and curses and more often (let's not be deceptive) hearing words of condemnation than words of gratitude.

Trucks carrying bread, clothing, fuel and people—they all move along roads in the NKAO in the same fashion: armored personnel carriers in the front, and a truck carrying assault-wielding soldiers in the rear. Even an ambulance carrying the body of a dead little girl had to be accompanied to the cemetery by an armored personnel carrier.

The convoy makes no distinctions. One and the same soldiers "conduct" trucks carrying all the necessities to both Armenian and Azerbaijani villages and, accordingly, become targets, in turn, for both one side and the other.

FROM OPERATIONAL REPORTS: A column consisting of four trucks accompanied by an armored

infantry vehicle and a platoon of soldiers, which were carrying school supplies and fuel to the Azerbaijani village of Umudlu, left Mir-Bashir. As it entered Markertskiy Rayon, at the State Automotive Inspectorate station a group of about a hundred people started throwing stones at the trucks. In Leninavan, some 300 people set up roadblocks and started throwing stones at the column. The column came up to the village of Magavuz, where the road was blocked by a crowd of as many as 1,000 people (with women and children in the front) and roadblocks had been created. It had to turn back. All four trucks were badly damaged, and one driver was slightly wounded.

One case from hundreds of similar ones. The only difference is in the names of the places and the nationalities of the attackers.

"Unfortunately, as of today, we are probably the only restraining force in the NKAO that is capable of preventing any further tragic development of events. We are protecting USSR citizens here, and not either Armenians or Azerbaijanis separately," said Col Skorobogatov, the deputy commander of the special rayon. "Evidently that is precisely why we experience the enmity of both one side and the other."

FROM OPERATIONAL REPORTS: Near the village of Aryn, Fizulinskiy Rayon, from the direction of the village of Bolutan, Gadrutskiy Rayon, a ZIL-131 truck carrying 11 servicemen was fired on with shotguns. Two of the men were slightly wounded.

In an internal forces unit that is quartered in Agdam, I heard the following story. At the village of Cherektar, a heavy truck carrying 12 soldiers and an officer that was transporting refugees' things was shoved into the river from a height of 10 meters. One soldier died, and four were severely wounded. A wind was howling in the mountains, and sleet was lashing down. The soldiers dragged their dead and wounded comrades and the things from the river. None of the inhabitants who had gathered on the bank came to their aid. On the other hand, in the general confusion two assault rifles disappeared. They were searched for for two days, with no luck. Finally an appeal was made to the local aksakal, and a day later "unknown" persons returned the weapons—left them surreptitiously.

Wounded, killed, operations, convoys, ambushes—these are the present day for the boys wearing the internal forces' stripes. Crippled in Fergana, killed in Sukhumi, stoned in Nagornyy Karabakh—there are a good many of them, very young men.

Today we talk a lot about the problems of the veterans of Afghanistan. About their psychological adaptation to normal life, and about their unhealed physical and psychological wounds. But yet another generation of "veterans" is emerging who have never once crossed our borders and never clashed with the "external enemy," so to speak. Who will claim that the psychological wounds of many soldiers who have passed through the fires of

"internationality conflicts" are less painful? And it is certainly all the same to any mother where and from whose hands her beloved son has become an invalid or died. Unquestionably, there should be people who are capable of protecting the defenseless from pogroms and extinguishing the flames of feuds that flare up all of a sudden. But even an ordinary fire is extinguished by professionals who have volunteered and have undergone special training. And what about the fires of some internationality conflicts? After all, by no means all of these 18-to-20-year-olds are capable of seriously analyzing the events taking place. Especially since they are observing them from behind the shields of a line of troops, from an armored personnel carrier, or from behind the concrete columns of checkpoints. And for many of them the vaguely designated "extremists" have very specific nationalities.

Volunteer military personnel would hardly reconcile themselves to the sort of gear with which internal forces soldiers have to operate. In the unit that was temporarily quartered in Agdam, most of the soldiers were equipped with homemade heavy shields that were unable to protect them against stones. For all of them—both soldiers and officers—there was only a single helmet, outfitted with a transparent visor to protect the face.

At the gates of the Agdam children's home where the internal troop units were bivouacked, a huge Ikarus stood full of Azerbaijani militiamen. They were supposed to go to the NKAO, to the city of Shusha, but they were afraid of possible incidents and requested a convoy. Soon the long-awaited guard came out—15 extremely young, skinny soldiers wearing absurd fur armored vests and carrying assault rifles, clubs and homemade shields.

FROM OPERATIONAL REPORTS: In the village of Tug an inhabitant tried to stab a soldier. He was arrested, but was released at the demand of a large crowd.

What can be said about ordinary units, when even in special-purpose units the situation is far from ideal.

"At present our situation with regard to all the necessary gear is extremely grave," said Oleg Korzhikov, the commander of a special-purpose company that had already been in the NKAO for several months. "Soon after the creation of our 'anti-terrorism' unit, all of my soldiers were left without trousers! The army jodhpurs they had been issued fell to pieces. We had to 'wangle' green work overalls and refashion them ourselves. Now we have just received border troops' camouflage uniforms. Only from afar have we seen special outfits, and the same thing is true of spherical helmets made of titanium and light-weight and reliable bulletproof vests. Our army-style armored vests are very heavy and inconvenient. Operating inside a building, jumping through closed windows, or storming buildings held by terrorists while wearing those vests is nearly impossible. We make other protective gear out of hockey equipment and whatever materials we have at hand.

A difficult situation, but what can be done? That same Capt Korzhikov receives 300 rubles a month for his daily risks, and gets no apartment. If his reflexes let him down one time, or (god forbid, as they say) he finds himself exposed to a bandit's bullet because of flawed gear, his wife and three children will be left on the street practically without any means of support. The situation is no better for other officers.

One cannot even speak of the soldiers. They fight terrorism for the seven rubles' wages of a private conscript, although it would seem that only professionals should serve in such units. The responsibility is too great, and too many lives depend on their skills.

But there is nothing to keep a soldier beyond his required term of service, even in these "elite" and prestigious units. Not the 112 rubles' salary for a life filled with dangers and risk.

And so, you think: aren't "cheap" internal troops staffed by conscription costing us too dearly? Isn't it terrible when a young boy, pulled from civilian life, is armed and, poorly protected and not seriously trained, is thrown into a bitter slaughter with a shield and a "rubber stick"? Without being asked whether he wants to or not.

Indisputably, the peacemaker should not hold shield and truncheon in hand, but our present-day life, unfortunately, is such that we cannot yet get by without internal troops. They have saved thousands of people from destruction and prevented terrible conflicts from developing further. But these troops should be professionals, made up of trained, educated and well-equipped people. And they will produce far greater results than regiments of yesterday's 10th-graders. But most likely there is a lot that people must work to correct (and work energetically!) in this business right now.

My neighbor does not dye her hair, and therefore it's easy to tell how much she has grayed over the past year. After a report on the latest "hot spot" in our country, the ambulance usually pays her a visit. Her 19-year-old Pavlik is serving in the internal forces. How many more years will our mothers be seeing their sons off to war?

Conference of All Georgian Parties Scheduled

18130032A Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA KOMUNISTI in Georgian 7 Dec 89 p 5

[Announcement by Solomon Khutsishvili et al. for "Initiative Group": "To All Political Parties, Social Associations and Organizations"]

[Text] The situation in Georgia today demands consolidation of all Georgia's spiritual and intellectual potential, the unification of national forces. Definite steps have already been taken toward unity, the manifestation of which we perceive in the national parties' joining in the Main Committee for National Salvation.

In working out a unified national platform and program, in our opinion, great importance will attach to a joint conference of all Georgia's political parties, social associations, and organizations, the convening of which has been planned by the Initiative Group attached to the People's Front of Tbilisi University.

Political parties, social associations, and organizations desiring to participate in the conference are requested to submit to the Initiative Group the total number of the members of their parties and organizations by 15 December of this year, so that it can be decided on this basis how many delegates from each of them will take part in the conference. The Initiative Group will determine the number of delegates and will notify the applicable parties and organizations not later than 20 December. These must submit a complete list of delegates to the Organizing Committee of the Initiative Group by 30 December. Ten rubles must be paid for each delegate.

Persons desiring to speak must submit to the Initiative Group by 15 January 1990 the titles of their papers and a brief abstract in Georgian, Russian, and English, so that a working program and agenda can be drawn up.

Provisionally, the following questions will be discussed at the conference: Georgia's domestic political situation; questions related to autonomous formations on Georgian territory; ways to resolve ethnic conflicts; Georgia's foreign policy at present and under conditions of independence; the question of a national army; the question of Georgian neutrality and declaring it a nuclear-free zone; Georgia's economic situation and paths of development; the working out of a pre-election platform; etc.

Provisionally, 30 seats will be reserved for journalists at the conference. Journalists must submit applications by 30 December. The organization fee for them will also be 10 rubles. A briefing will be held at the close of the conference, during which journalists will receive answers to questions of interest to them.

We hope that deputies to the Georgian Supreme Soviet and Presidium members will take part in the work of the conference. Procedures for their participation will be the same. We also plan to invite representatives from other republics.

The conference is scheduled to be held on 22-25 January 1990, in the assembly hall of Tbilisi University.

You can contact the Initiative Group at the address of the editorial board:

380028, No 3 Chavchavadze Prospekt, Tbilisi University, Korpus II, room 104, telephone 22-96-49.

INITIATIVE GROUP: Solomon Khutsishvili Gigla Lakiashvili Andro Korotadze

TBILISI UNIVERSITETI, 1 December. Leaflet No 1, Georgian People's Front Primary Organization, Ivane Dzhavakhishvili State University.

'Society of Internationalists' Formed in Abkhazia
90US0405A Tbilisi MOLODEZH GRUZII in Russian
14 Dec 89 p 4

[Interview with Yuriy Nikolayevich Voronov, doctor of historical sciences, by T. Pachkoriya, correspondent: "Our Goal Is To Affirm Internationalism: The Sukhumi Society of Internationalists"]

[Text] On 25 October 1989 the ispolkom of the Sukhumi City Soviet of People's Deputies officially registered a new sociopolitical organization—the Sukhumi Society of Internationalists.

Our correspondent in Sukhumi interviewed one of the initiators of founding this Society, Yuriy Nikolayevich Voronov, doctor of historical sciences. Biographical Data:

Yuriy Nikolayevich Voronov was born in 1941 in the village of Tsebelda, Gulripshskiy Rayon.

In 1966 he graduated from the School of Oriental Studies, Leningrad State University.

In 1971 he defended his candidate's dissertation on the topic: "The History of Abkhazia from the Most Ancient Period to the Early Middle Ages." And in 1986 he defended his doctoral dissertation on the topic: "The Eastern Black Sea Region During the Iron Age." He is the author of more than 200 scholarly works.

Voronov is a leading scientific associate of the Abkhazian Institute of Language, Literature, and History imeni Gulia and one of the co-chairmen of the Sukhumi Society of Internationalists.

[Correspondent] How did your Society come into being, and what kind of a structure does it have?

[Yu.N. Voronov] The Sukhumi Society of Internationalists was born under the conditions of the increasingly complex inter-ethnic relations in this region. The Society has been joined by representatives of the principal ethnic groups which live in Sukhumi and in Abkhazia as a whole; they are people who are interested in stabilizing the situation, in humanizing the processes of perestroika, in developing an inter-ethnic dialogue and peace, as well as in preserving the environment where they live. The Society's structure comprises seven co-chairpersons who represent the Abkhazian, Georgian, Russian, Armenian, Greek, Baltic, and Jewish communities. It has the following eight committees: organizational, economic, sociological, cultural, ideological, legal, foreign and domestic ties. Its press organ will be the weekly SUKHUMSKIY VESTNIK, the first issue of which is scheduled to appear as early as December 1989. The Society's principal organ is the Conference, and among the other sub-divisions I should note the Auditing Commission, branches in the localities, working groups, commissions of experts, cooperatives, etc.

[Correspondent] Specifically who has joined the Society? What is its numerical strength?

[Yu.N. Voronov] The activist group includes scarcely more than 50 persons, including primarily the city's intelligentsia. The Society's leadership body was elected at its first, expanded session. We abandoned the commonly accepted election of a chairman and his deputy; and at this session we designated a council of co-chairpersons comprised of 7 persons, each of whom is allotted equal rights. In addition to myself, this council includes Yuriy Chkadua, the city of Sukhumi's principal artist, Malkhaz Patsatsiya, senior lecturer at the Abkhazian State University imeni Gorkiy and candidate of juridical sciences, Nikolay Ioanidi, deputy chief of the Archive Administration under the Abkhazian ASSR Council of Ministers, and Ida Bishkevius, pedagogue at Sukhumi's Secondary School No 4 (they represent, respectively, the Abkhazian, Georgian, Greek, and Baltic parts of the population). A few days ago the Armenian Sergey Arutyunov also became a co-chairperson. He is an important official of the Abkhazian ASSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

We have not set as our goal the active recruitment of a large number of members. After all, you know, the strength of an organization is not determined by the number of its members, but rather by its actual influence in life. According to our Charter, any citizen can be a member of the Society of Internationalists regardless of nationality, social origin, religious or party affiliation. He must acknowledge the Charter and not engage in any activity which would be incommensurate with the Society's goals.

[Correspondent] I would like to hear more details about the goals, tasks, and the activity program of your Society.

[Yu.N. Voronov] Our goal is to affirm and develop the traditions of internationalism among the inhabitants of Abkhazia and its capital in the interests of this region's economic and cultural development; it is also to facilitate democratization, glasnost, and perestroika. The Society's tasks consist of decisively countering any manifestations of nationalism, chauvinism, and violent tactics in resolving socioeconomic, cultural, and other problems. They also include the struggle for each person's equal rights and equal opportunities regardless of his national, religious, party, or other affiliation, the affirmation of the new political thinking and common-human priorities, the dissemination of peacemaking and ecological knowledge and skills, as well as cultural-educational activity, etc. Our Society's program reflects the practical ways to implement the above-indicated goals and tasks; it is composed of the programs of its respective sub-divisions. Moreover, it takes into account the fact that nowadays all of us need to do a great deal so that the spirit of truth, although fettered by national or ethnic spite, may yet win its way through into the world. Every person should know that it is only under conditions of utter ignorance and corruption that a territory,

economy, language, culture, self-awareness, and ancestors can serve as a genuine basis for ethnic groups and peoples to clash and fight each other, peoples who, in point of fact, are inextricably related to each other genetically and culturally. The dissemination of the appropriate knowledge and examples comprises the most important component of our Society's program, which operates in accordance with the Constitutions of the USSR, the Georgian SSR, and the Abkhazian ASSR, as well as with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international agreements signed and ratified by the Soviet state.

[Correspondent] Do you maintain contacts with the Abkhazian Peoples' Forum known as Andgylara ("Unity") and the regional organization of the Georgian People's Front?

[Yu.N. Voronov] We do not yet maintain direct ties with either of these organizations inasmuch as the goals and tasks of our Society are on a somewhat different plane than those of the above-mentioned associations. We hope that, when and where a stabilization of inter-ethnic relations occurs in our autonomous republic, we will have many more points of contact and a basis for fruitful cooperation in areas such as cultural and natural ecology. Some members of our Society also belong to "Unity." We would also be glad to see in our ranks members of the regional organization of the Georgian People's Front.

[Correspondent] The name of your organization is associated with organizations of the internationalist movement in the Baltic region. Have you studied their program and borrowed some of their operating methods?

[Yu.N. Voronov] No, we have not made any special study of either the program or the methods of the internationalist movement in the Baltic region. Our Society is based on a fundamentally different foundation. The internationalist movement in the Baltic region emerged as organizations which were supposed to defend the interests of the non-indigenous population. We have no conflicts with this republic's indigenous population, and this is the primary distinction between our Society and the Internationalist Fronts in the Baltic region.

[Correspondent] Certain prominent Georgian scholars and cultural figures have recently subjected your scholarly views to sharp criticism in the mass media. What is your attitude toward this?

[Yu.N. Voronov] In the majority, these articles bear no relation to the essence of my views or to myself as an individual. They have created a certain mythological figure against whom they are actively fighting. I have provided the local press with replies to most of these publications and articles, but, unfortunately, my replies have not appeared in the republic-level press. The most lamentable thing in all this is that issues which should be solved in academic quarters have become the property of the street. Such actions hardly facilitate mutual understanding. I see the solution in the internationalization of our life, in greater openness, goodwill, a capacity to

proceed to a dialogue, in humanizing our relations, in tolerance, in creating the type of atmosphere in which it would be impossible to use violent tactics in solving any problems, including scholarly ones. And this is what the program and charter of our Society of Internationalists is aiming for.

[T. Pachkoriya] After my interview with Yu. Voronov I decided to shed some light on the attitude of Sukhumi's inhabitants toward the Society of Internationalists. It is diverse and, at times, contradictory. Some persons place definite hopes on this Society within the process of stabilizing life, while others manifest a cool indifference, considering that the founding of numerous societies and organizations is not the way to solve the urgent problems of the present day. They think that the decisive role in normalizing life must be played by the government, by the organs of state power. Some of this city's inhabitants also spoke about a certain lack of confidence in the Society as a whole as well as in its activists and leaders.

It seems that only time, along with the practical activity and operational effectiveness of the Society of Internationalists, will provide answers to all these assertions and suggestions.

Georgian National Democrats Issue Appeal to Republic's Non-Georgians

90US0405B Tbilisi MOLODEZH GRUZII in Russian
19 Dec 89 p 4

[Appeal: "An Appeal to Georgia's Non-Georgian Population"]

[Text] As already reported by our newspaper, the Second Congress of the Georgian National Democratic Party was held in Tbilisi on 25 and 26 November. It adopted an "Appeal to Georgia's Non-Georgian Population," which we are presenting below for your attention today without any cuts and preserving the style of the original.

Unfortunately, as a consequence of the existing Soviet regime in Georgia, we do not have the opportunity of speaking with you in Georgia's state language, which, along with your native languages, lacks the possibility of developing in the way it should.

We, the members of Georgia's National Democratic Party, appeal to you to always remember and fully recognize that we are just as much prisoners of this system as you are, that things are equally bad and painful for us, and that the main point is that the entity to blame for this is our common foe, against whom we must join forces and struggle; otherwise we will not conquer him. Our common foe is powerful with his crafty provocations, which, to our common misfortune, often hit the desired bullseye of the target. And this "bullseye" is to incite inter-ethnic hostility, i.e., to "divide and conquer." The central authorities are particularly skillful at playing upon the natural fear of Georgia's Non-Georgian

population—a fear that there would be no place for them in an independent Georgia, that they would be beaten up or even killed, or, at best, simply chased out of Georgia. It is also true, unfortunately, that the actions of those provoking the Non-Georgian population also find the desired response among a portion of the Georgian population. And, as a result of this two-sided game, peoples are gradually being set against each other, and this at a time when the sole solution for all of us is solidarity, consolidation, and brotherhood in the most direct meaning of these words. We cannot succeed without each other. Who if not us is to protect your legitimate interests, your ethnic rights and human rights?! So let's be sensible and prudent!...

The National Democratic Party calls upon Georgia's Non-Georgian population not to give in to the central authorities' provocateurs. This means—do not perceive the isolated tricks of Georgian and Non-Georgian provocateurs as the will of the entire nation, but, on the contrary, you yourselves, without any outside interference or meddling should respond to the provocateurs of any nationality, who are, first and foremost, enemies of their own people. The same thing, of course, applies to Georgians. Only in such a way will we succeed in attaining our sacred goal of independence, which is necessary for all, and which will bring the same easing, the same happiness to Georgia's Non-Georgian population as it will to the Georgians themselves. We must understand this and believe in this in order to struggle against evil and to conquer it!

The Georgian National Democratic Party

This appeal is supported by the Christian Democratic Association of Georgian Youth, as well as by the Georgian Christian Democratic Alliance.

Georgian Demography Society Demands Control of Immigration Policy

18130031A Tbilisi KOMUNISTI in Georgian
5 Dec 89 p 6

[Article by the Board of the Georgian Demography Society: "In the Opinion of the Georgian Demography Society...."]

[Text] A great many efforts have been made lately in Georgia to establish the legal foundations of a demographic policy. In particular, the Georgian Demography Society has drafted titles of honor like "Mother of Georgia" and "Parents' Glory" and published them in the press for discussion. It has also worked out a draft law on introducing a Georgian SSR "Demographic Passport."

It is the opinion of the Demography Society that such actions will serve to improve the republic's demographic situation and establish the legal foundations for this movement.

Recently the press published the Georgian SSR government draft "Law on Immigration." This is directly within the jurisdiction of the Georgian Demography Society's activities, which, therefore, has the right to express its attitude toward it.

Article 1 and Article 2 of the draft law are worded as follows:

"Article 1. Cadres shall be brought into the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic from outside the republic to work only in exceptional cases, on the basis of a special decree of the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers.

"Article 2. In the event that it is necessary to bring in cadres from other republics, every enterprise, organization, or institution (including cooperative and social organizations), regardless of their departmental affiliation, shall be obliged to deposit to the non-budgetary account of the rayon soviet of people's deputies or city soviet ispolkom an appropriate amount, set by the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers, for each worker brought in from outside the republic and for each member of his family desiring to settle with him."

We should explain here that the Georgian Demography Society is the organization which, in regard to both state and social organizations, is directly responsible for working out and implementing practical measures to improve the republic's demographic situation, and it is therefore accountable to its people for the demographic situation in the republic.

In our article titled "For a Unified Demographic Policy" (KOMUNISTI, 3 September 1988) we pointed out that "the Demography Society can successfully accomplish its task if we approach the job as one which is vitally important to the state and unite our spiritual and economic potential to accomplish that goal." We believe, moreover, that "the Board of the Demography Society must be invested with real power and be provided with the necessary material resources."

Hence, the Georgian Demography Society believes that the way to solve demographic problems is through the concerted actions of state and social organizations, united efforts, and the creation of a mechanism to implement a unified demographic policy.

Just such a unifying mechanism is embodied in the draft laws that have been worked out by the Georgian Demography Society and submitted to the republic's Supreme Soviet.

However, the draft "Law on Immigration" worked out by the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet Immigration Commission ignores the idea of state institutions' concerned collaboration with the social organization, which jeopardizes the working out and implementation of a unified demographic policy in the republic.

Another question: bringing cadres in from outside the republic to work will definitely exacerbate Georgia's demographic situation, and therefore, the appropriate

amount to be deposited by enterprises and organizations, as set by the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers, for each worker brought in from outside the republic to work and each member of his family desiring to settle with him, should be used to improve Georgia's demographic situation. Hence, this amount ought to be turned over to the Georgian Demography Society.

In light of the foregoing, the Georgian Demography Society considers it essential to make changes in the draft "Law on Immigration." In our opinion, the first two articles should be worded as follows:

Article 1. Cadres from outside the republic shall be brought into the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic to work only in exceptional cases, on the basis of a special decree of the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers and with the consent of the Georgian Demography Society.

Article 2. In the event that it is necessary to bring in cadres from other republics, all enterprises, organizations, and institutions (including cooperative and social organizations), regardless of their departmental affiliation, shall be obliged to deposit to the account of the Georgian Demography Society an appropriate amount, set by the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers, for each worker brought in from outside the republic to work and for each member of his family desiring to settle with him.

The Georgian Demography Society believes that the session of the Georgian Supreme Soviet will accept these amendments.

Mid-December Georgian Attacks on South Ossetians Described

90US0339A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 52, 27 Dec 89 p 2

[Article by G. Zorin: "How To Find a Way Out?—The Question That Worries Everyone in South Ossetia Autonomous Oblast"]

[Text] For more than a month South Ossetia has lived in an atmosphere of great tension the reasons for which have already been covered in press. For over a month shots were fired, blood was shed and the oblast hospital has received the wounded, some in very serious condition—more than 80. For more than a month the city of Tskhinvali, the oblast's administrative center, has been under economic siege; since November 23 the informal pickets stop the trucks that carry foodstuffs and other vital cargo. Enterprises and educational facilities cannot function; the local and republican administration are not in a position to take any corrective measures.

Here is the information provided by the UVD [Internal Affairs Administration] of South Ossetia:

On 15 December, at about 0300, a group of 15 to 20 Georgians attacked the village of Andisi, Tskhinvali rayon, where they raided houses. The attackers were

armed with automatic weapons, carbines, and hunting and small-caliber rifles. Several people were wounded and taken to the hospital.

On 16 December, at about 1600, single shots were heard on the road connecting Tskhinvali and Kekhvi. The investigation team of the South Ossetia UVD that went to the site of the incident found there a group of armed Georgians who opened fire at the approaching policemen. Six people were arrested.

On the same day, in the village of Kekhvi, Tskhinvali rayon, police details that had been sent from other regions of the republic were stopping public transportation vehicles. They ordered all the Ossetians out and handed them over to the extremists. Having seized 18 people they subjected them to severe torture. Under the threat of submachine gun fire the Ossetians were forced to stand or to lie in ice-cold water; were made to crawl naked in the snow; and were made to swallow their moustaches which had just been cut off by the torturers.

Among the investigators who gathered in the oblast administration of the KGB were the republic's Deputy Minister for Internal Affairs Roman Levonovich Gvent-sadze and retired Major General, doctor of philosophy, Kim Makedonovich Tsagolov. The latter is the only one who enjoys the respect of the informals, therefore he meets with them freely and without fear. Though a rather ordinary thing happened to him recently too: One of the picketing fellows who was dressed in a police uniform, as is often the case here, caught him under the chin with the barrel end of his submachine gun. With his finger on the trigger, the fellow asked Tsagolov: "Are you for the separation of Georgia or not?" The general kept his self-control: "First you stand back and then I will give you an answer."

In his imperturbable way Tsagolov stopped the shower of my questions.

"Everything is very complex and unpredictable. Emotions are running wild. Social hysteria is going out of control."

"Can I meet the informals?"

"Why not? If you want to become a "walrus" [lover of winter swimming]—you are welcome. I wouldn't recommend it. Even if you take a platoon of guards with you I still wouldn't recommend it."

But I kept insisting and Tsagolov said: "Let us go."

The 10 km of road between the city and the village of Kekhvi belong to the informals. However, this harmless verb can hardly be used when speaking of those we had a chance to face. The commander of the headquarters of

the city's self-defense rode in the same car with us which may be the only successful antidote against the pickets.

The car came to a stop and was immediately surrounded by a crowd, three or four people thick. How can one get away from this? You could feel by their voices that they were excited. The longer we kept talking the stronger the emotions became. Subdued talking was replaced by loud, angry speeches and yelling. What about?

We returned after a half an hour of talks between Tsagolov and the leader of the informals Tomaz Golisani. To prevent unpleasant stops and examinations we were given an escort: A "Volga" drove in front and an arm from its window gave a signal from time to time which meant that we were not to be harassed. The pickets were armed with AKS assault guns and PPS police guns, carbines, and pistols; some of them were foreign made.

The commander of the Tskhinvali ROVD [rayon department for internal affairs], Major Leonid Gagiev, told us that the Ossetians keep asking him to return all their registered weapons. The Ossetians' patience is wearing thin. But such an action would only mean a massacre, a bloody war which has not expanded yet.

What is there in the "peaceful" arsenal?

In theory, there exists a possibility of coming to an agreement, of finding some compromises suitable to both sides. Attempts at a reconciliation were made.

On 18 December negotiations took place between the representatives of the Georgians and Ossetians from South Ossetia. They tried to set up forms and means to solve the crucial problems in a nonviolent way. The final agreement that they adopted in the form of an address by the people of the South Ossetia Autonomous Oblast was read on the radio by Tsagolov many times. The informals immediately violated it.

On 19 December the chief of the political department of the UVD, Sergey Lipin, received some disturbing information. The pickets stopped trucks with food, there was indiscriminate shooting, villagers were in a panic. One Ossetian was not allowed through as he was carrying the body of his dead father from the hospital. They dumped the coffin on the ground and turned it over. Telephones were ringing incessantly, the MVD [Ministry for Internal Affairs] officials were getting through by their own special communication lines and asking for details.

Very few people slept during the night of 20 December. Tsagolov, hoarse and pale in the face from exhaustion, went several times to talk with the informals. He returned just before dawn, flopped on a chair and waved his hand in disgust: "Things are really bad, guys. What are we going to do?"

USSR Supreme Court Chairman Discusses Reforms*90UN0694A Moscow NEDELYA in Russian No 52, 25-31 Dec 89 p 8*

[Article by Yevgeniy Smolentsev, chairman, USSR Supreme Court: "Render Judgements in Accordance with the Law and Equity"]

[Text] The year 1989 became an important milestone in the history of Soviet jurisprudence. The court reform practically began with the adoption of the Law on the judicial system, the status of judges, and liability for contempt of court. "Laws are sacred," but the judicial system is headed by specific living persons—judges. How are they being treated?

Will the Soviet courts finally become truly independent?

What is the country's highest court engaged in?

Negative tendencies grew apace for many years in the court system. Judges gradually lost their independence; they were gradually relegated to a secondary role within the system of the law-enforcement organs. The laws adopted this past year [1989] are supposed to put an end to these tendencies. Together with the changes which were introduced into the USSR Constitution on 1 December 1988, they decisively enhance the role and importance of the courts in the system of state organs, strengthen the independence of the judges, and restore the judicial system to its suitable position. The judges were very pleased to receive a considerable raise in their salaries, as well as this law's reaffirmation of their right to obtain good housing no later than six months after being selected for a new post. But this is only a first step along the path to creating proper working conditions for judges.

Unfortunately, the extremely weak material base of the judicial organs exerts a negative influence on their authority. Judge for yourselves: out of 4,300 people's judges, more than a third are located in chambers which do not meet the elementary requirements for conducting court trials; approximately 800 of these chambers are admittedly in an accident-prone condition. Judges do not have transportation at their disposal; they do not have the necessary equipment or even enough typewriters. Naturally, all this fails to enhance the court's authority. Until fully normal working conditions are created in the courts, it is difficult to think that new jurists with good potential will want to don a "judge's robes." Moreover, there is a shortage of judges in the courts nowadays; a change of generations is taking place. Thus, the implementation of a judicial-legal reform in this area has now become an important task.

We understand that, under the conditions of financial difficulties which our country is experiencing, it is impossible to solve all financial problems right away, but I can say with complete certainty that they will be solved gradually.

At the same time, I would like to emphasize the fact that the court's prestige and authority depend primarily on how high the level of administering justice is. No innocent person should be convicted, whereas every truly guilty person should be punished justly, taking into consideration the gravity of the crime committed and information characterizing his personality, as well as circumstances aggravating or mitigating his guilt. This is a principle of the criminal court. Moreover, the court's authority undoubtedly also depends on the quality of trying civil cases, and millions of them come into the courts every year.

Independence is the most important principle of the court and its main goal. However, this matter has several aspects.

With regard to the prospects for developing the judicial system during the next decade, the enhancement of its activity in the population's eyes will be facilitated, above all, by the further legislative regulation of the courts' activities. But we likewise need to immediately solve some purely practical problems, the most important of which is that of personnel.

As the state based on the rule of law emerges, a broadening of the court's competence is inevitable; this may already be seen nowadays from the recently adopted laws and from the draft laws which have been published. The task of resolving an ever-greater number of disputed matters has been assigned to the courts. Suffice it to say that the adoption of laws concerning property ownership, land, leases, and state enterprises alone is bound to sharply increase the stream of cases flowing into the courts. Moreover, what is happening is not merely an expansion of competence (although this alone obliges us to do a great deal), but the nature of the cases to be decided by the courts is becoming more and more complex. Sometimes we even see a trend to load the courts with that which should not be part of their jurisdiction at all. Under the new operating conditions there needs to be a significant improvement in the qualitative make-up of judges and a considerable increase in their number.

Now let me say something about a question which has been raised on more than one occasion concerning the fact that the overwhelming majority of judges are CPSU members and must subordinate themselves to party discipline. I cannot understand why this should seriously bother anyone. Are we really talking about the same goals here? Is it some entity other than the CPSU which has put forth the idea of constructing a true state based on the rule of law in our country, a state in which it is specifically the judge who will be assigned a high position independent of anyone else?

I have worked in the courts for a long time. I know many judges, and I can say with full assurance that for an honest, professionally trained, high-principled judge,

membership in the CPSU in no way hinders the implementation of justice in precise accordance with the law and independently of anyone whatsoever.

We must not equate the CPSU with certain of its functionaries who sometimes try to meddle in the resolution of court cases. In recent times people have been fully justified in speaking and writing about various forms of interference in the court's activity, including even "law by telephone." While not disputing the actuality of such instances in the past, I would like to underscore the fact that it is not these facts which basically determined the low operational level of certain courts and the occurrence of serious juridical errors.

The lack of necessary attention to the judges, along with the poor working conditions, gradually led to a lowering of the prestige of judicial work, a worsening of the qualitative composition, and a high turnover rate among judicial personnel. During the five-year period between elections, for various reasons, as much as half of the people's and oblast-level judges were dismissed. The proportion of the most mature officials, from the viewpoint of practical and professional knowledge, was constantly being reduced.

Court personnel were recruited in accordance with the residual principle. Quite frequently poorly trained staff members performed judicial work; they were incapable of countering the pressure of the procurator in a trial, providing a critical appraisal of the materials of the preliminary investigation, and this sometimes would lead to an unfounded conviction of citizens, including some convictions for serious crimes. The loss of independence by certain judges was also manifested in the virtually complete disappearance from judicial practice of "not guilty" verdicts, instead of which the cases, for lack of evident proof of guilt, would be sent back for further investigation.

Thus, we must eliminate from our life not only instances of interference in judicial activity, but also create such a status for a judge in society that this may be an honored and respected profession, and judges with regard to their personal and practical qualities may have not only the formal but also the moral right to judge other persons. It is precisely in this direction that a first but quite impressive step has been taken. But this is not all; this is only a beginning. The judicial-legal reform must still solve quite a few more problems.

Let me say a few words about the work of the USSR Supreme Court. As the court of highest instance, it tries only cases of exceptional importance, but there are not many such cases.

In 1989 it tried three cases in such a procedure. The first one concerned N. Khudayberdiyev, former chairman of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers. He was found guilty of several instances of accepting bribes from various officials who worked in various republics, as well as giving his own bribes to a former USSR deputy

minister of internal affairs. He was sentenced to incarceration for a term of nine years with confiscation of his property.

In addition to this, I.B. Usmankhodzhayev, former first secretary of the Uzbek CP Central Committee, and K. Kamalov, former first secretary of the Uzbek CP Karakalpak Obkom, were sentenced to long terms of incarceration for receiving and giving bribes. More detailed information about the beginnings of these trials has recently been provided by the mass media.

Two more cases have been scheduled for trial in January 1990—concerning R.Kh. Abdullayeva, former secretary of the Uzbek CP Central Committee, and Ye. Aytmuratov, former secretary of the Uzbek CP Central Committee. These persons have also been charged with bribery.

AAs in past years, the USSR Supreme Court Plenum has adopted several decrees in which it has provided courts with guideline-type explanations in the various matters of applying the existing legislation; and it has worked very intensively as a supervisory court. By the way, the plenum, which includes all the judges of the USSR Supreme Court and the chairmen of the union-republic Supreme Courts, constitutes this country's highest judicial supervisory instance.

By its guideline-type explanations the plenum has responded to the most urgent problems of judicial practice. For example, the plenum which was held in late November examined the problem of juridically appraising the actions of the so-called "kidaly" [scam artists]—citizens who, upon concluding deals to purchase motor vehicles, hand over to the sellers considerable sums in excess of the commission and then, citing the illegality of this deal, take them back by force. Frequently manifested here are the hallmarks of organized crime: the "kidaly," as a rule, operate in groups and in accordance with a precisely worked-out plan. Unfortunately, the staff members of law-enforcement organs evaluated this phenomenon in various ways.

But the plenum explained that any illegal ownership—and, you know, at times it amounts to open banditry—must be characterized as an appropriate, property-type crime regardless of who committed it—the purchaser himself or his accomplice, i.e., it is to be tried in various cases as theft, robbery, banditry, extortion, or swindling.

In my brief presentation in the pages of your newspaper I cannot, naturally, comment in as much detail on the plenum's other guideline-type explanations. Therefore, let me simply list them by name. They comprise decrees on issues of protecting the rights and property of citizens and organizations, on cases concerning crimes committed in places of incarceration, on applying legislation concerning cases connected with fires, on problems arising in connection with violations of public order in the form of picketing, and on the concept of flight from a labor-treatment clinic. During the coming year we

intend to continue the line of adopting particularly specific decrees effectively responding to the needs of judicial practice.

But with regard to the plenum's activity as a juridical-supervisory instance, the year just ending was extremely difficult for us. In connection with some well-known decisions, a mass revision of cases is being conducted for persons who were subjected to unfounded repressions during the 1930's, 1940's, and the very early 1950's. There are very many cases coming into the courts, also including those to the USSR Supreme Court Plenum.

During the year just ending the plenum tried 5 civil cases and 800 criminal cases. The overwhelming majority of the latter are cases involving rehabilitation. By its decrees on these cases the plenum has restored the good names of slightly less than 1000 persons.

The old year is coming to an end, and the new year is beginning.... Many steps of the judicial reform have already been taken, but quite a bit still remains to be done. Here too, however, I am firmly convinced that the coming year will bring the Soviet people legal protection, stability, and will revive their faith in an equitable and law-abiding court.

Rise in Youth Crime Linked to Unemployment

904F0064A Leningrad LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 12 Dec 89 p 3

[Article by O. Nosareva: "Help Us Find Work—We'll Take Anything!"]

[Text] "Help us find work—we'll take anything!" This request is being heard from juveniles. But usually they are turned down.

This legal case, like many others, went unnoticed: seventeen-year-old Valeriy B. was detained with a group of young people for routine theft. Then he was convicted. What drove him to crime? In the course of clarifying the case, it came out that Valeriy had tried ten times to find work. Ten times he had gone to various enterprises in the Nevskiy rayon and was turned down. He had to live somehow, so he began to steal. So this youth, who had no previous record of breaking the law, became a criminal.

The problem of employing juveniles has never been as acute as it is now. As a result of the transition of enterprises to cost accounting, inexperienced juveniles who lack qualifications have become superfluous here.

Here is the data from the Leningrad procurator's office. Every third juvenile applying for a job for the first time has been turned down. Sixty percent of these rejections came without an explanation; 15 percent are attributed by those directly engaged in production to cost accounting; and the same number are attributed to the absence of openings. Incidentally, a follow-up did not corroborate the latter explanation.

Enterprises are directly violating the youths' constitutional right to work. And in the present year alone the number of eighth-graders who have decided not to continue their studies but to begin working instead has come to 54,000. Hundreds of tenth-graders are trying in vain to find work, and even graduates of vocational schools often find themselves unemployed.

I think it's no secret to anyone what such an irresponsible attitude towards the fate of these youths leads to. Without work, left to their own devices, young people begin to look for an application for their energies and resources in another sphere of activity. Let's take those very same dry figures from the procurator's report. Since 1987 the number of juveniles registered with the commission on the affairs of minors has increased five-fold (from 438 to 2,171). In the present year every fourth crime is committed by unemployed youths. The level of crime among them is nine times higher than among those who work. An examination of criminal cases has shown that these are the people committing the boldest and most serious crimes.

"The present system in our city for placing juveniles in jobs is largely responsible," claims S.P. Minina of the procurator's office in Leningrad, head of the department for overseeing the implementation of laws concerning minors. This system does not give young people the opportunity of finding work for themselves in the normal way. The city soviet of people's deputies is not interested in the fate of the young either. This year they did not even approve a plan for signing up graduates from secondary schools for work.

Within three months of the year's end the plan for signing up juveniles for work in the Petrogradskiy and Primorskiy rayon soviets was approved only after the intervention of the city procurator's office. Before that a decision had been reached in the Primorskiy rayon that such a plan, in light of the transition of enterprises to cost accounting, was inexpedient.

The situation is no better in the Frunzenskiy rayispolkom [rayon executive committee], where the plan was formally approved without specifically placing youths in jobs at enterprises. As a result, all seven of the leading factories and associations in the rayon refused to take them on. The crime rate among unemployed youths in the Frunzenskiy rayon more than doubled, and in the Primorskiy rayon it increased ten-fold. In 16 of the city's rayons the placement of minors in jobs does not correspond to real personnel needs. The reason for that is simple: the figures are calculated according to results of previous years, without regard for today's needs.

And in the meantime, for the past two years at all Leningrad enterprises there has been a reserve of young people without a profession. It appeared directly after cost accounting was introduced and many youths faced the real possibility of being unemployed. As you see, timely measures were taken. But how are they actually being translated into reality?

The reserve consists of 0.5-10 percent of the general number of working people in an organization. The ministries "release" the figure. But usually neither the enterprises themselves nor the rayispolkom planning commissions which control them know what the real figure is. And therefore the managers themselves decide whether or not to hire young people and in what numbers. And of course, they decide to their own advantage—in other words, under any pretext they decide not to hire juveniles. And so at 30 of the 47 enterprises the procurator's office checked up on, minors were neither being hired nor given a reason for the rejection.

An analysis of the rejections has shown that every second position among those reserved for youths remains unfilled. In this year in Leningrad one third of the jobs has gone unfilled. The rayon ispolkoms are not worried about the fate of minors either. Fifteen of them have failed altogether to discuss the issue of the employment of youths during the period of transition to cost accounting. The departments of labor and social problems of the Lengorispolkom [Leningrad city executive committee] have not been monitoring their activities either, although it is their direct responsibility.

How then is the hiring of minors to take place? According to existing procedures in our city, central and rayon employment bureaus are obliged to see to it. This is where graduates are supposed to turn. The employment bureaus are obliged to attentively hear the applicant out and help him select a suitable position.

But in reality, usually a commission on the affairs of minors is forced to attend to the job search for youths. In essence, the commissions substitute for employment bureaus. They find jobs for eighth-to-tenth-grade graduates and set them up in them.

The actual employment bureaus are mainly involved in finding only temporary work for young people. Only around half of the tenth-grade graduates are hired with their help. The others must do it themselves. And what's more, the job assignments they make rarely take into account the presence of a production reserve. And upon their arrival, the youths are once again turned down.

Tired of endless rejections and nervous strain, juveniles react in their own way to this indifference towards themselves and their fate. In this way Aleksey R., after five rejections, attempted to "settle matters" with the senior secretary of the commission on the affairs of minors by overturning his table and insulting him.

In the situation that has developed, juveniles with physical impairments and so-called "difficult" youths have a particularly hard time of it. Indeed, more often than not, jobs that are earmarked for difficult-to-place youths are given to "normal" cases. Juveniles that have been previously convicted of crimes or have returned from special schools or special PTUs [vocational schools] cannot find work at all.

This same Aleksey R. finished speech school. In other words, he has a speech defect. He was willing to take any job. But his physical impairment occasioned the refusal to hire him. And refusals on these grounds can be found all over.

It seems the commission on the affairs of minors in the Lengorsoviet ispolkom [Leningrad city soviet executive committee] is not interested in the problem of employing difficult juveniles either. Officially, it has the right to present a proposal to the ispolkom that special places be reserved for registered youths. But in the present year the commission has not used this right—it has left the young people on their own.

Says S.P. Minina, "Our follow-up has shown that policies of hiring minors are directly violating their constitutional rights. Not long ago at a large collegium which all high-level persons attended, including the directors of large enterprises, we raised this problem once again. Using the materials presented at the collegium, we informed the Lengorispolkom of our impression that the existing legislation was being violated. Almost two months have passed with no reply. And in the meantime the stream of unemployed youths is increasing. They all come to us with the same request: 'Help us find work—we'll take anything!'"

Ukrainian CP Commission on Increase in Crime

90UN0684A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
9 Dec 89 p 3

[Unattributed article: "In the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Commission on Questions of State Law"]

[Text] At its regular session the Ukrainian CP Central Committee Commission on Questions of State Law considered the extent to which the republic's party, soviet, and law-enforcement organs have fulfilled the decrees of the CPSU and Ukrainian CP central committees on strengthening socialist legality, law and order, and on increasing the role of public organizations and labor collectives in the struggle against violations of the law. N.G. Khomenko, a member of the commission and secretary of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, presented a report.

It was noted that in many oblasts of the republic a firm trend toward an increase in legal infractions is emerging. Serious crimes are being committed at an increasing rate, and many of them are of an organized nature. The number of encroachments against the life, health and dignity of individuals and against socialist and personal property is growing. The work of maintaining public order on the streets and in other public places is being carried out unsatisfactorily.

A situation of particular concern is developing in the Kirovograd, Kharkov, Voroshilovgrad, Lvov and Kherson Oblasts, and well as in the city of Kiev. The number of crimes recorded here during the first 10

months of the current year is 52-89 percent higher than during the same period last year. In a number of places additional tension is being created by the illegal actions of people with extremist and nationalistic leanings, who ignore the existing legislation concerning the conduct of rallies, demonstrations, and marches.

Despite the worsening situation, some party committees and ispolkoms of local soviets of people's deputies, it was emphasized at the session, have been slow to restructure their work: they are not analyzing with sufficient depth the state of crime at the local level; they are not taking effective measures to impose order; they are doing little to influence the state of production and public discipline; and they are not satisfactorily implementing measures to prevent legal infractions in the labor collectives and at places of residence. At many enterprises the voluntary public-order squads and the comrade courts have stopped functioning, and the public stations for the maintenance of order are not operating.

In a series of oblasts the incidence of theft, speculation and other abuses in the economic sphere has increased. Moreover, the soviets of people's deputies and their ispolkoms are not using in full measure the right granted to them to monitor the activities of enterprises, organizations and trade-purchase cooperatives. Persons who have been convicted previously of theft and job-related crimes have been hired for materially responsible positions. The auditing and inventorying of valuables is not being carried out within the established time periods. Some ministries and agencies, as well as some managers, are not devoting the necessary attention to the fulfillment of legislation concerning the protection of socialist property.

At the session sharp criticism was directed at the work of the following: the organs of internal affairs, the public prosecutor's office, and the republic's judicial organs and courts. They are still being slow to restructure their operations; they are not carrying out fully the tasks entrusted to them; often they are displaying a lack of resolve with regard to dangerous criminals and confusion in matters of stopping anti-social actions; they are making poor use of the strength and demands of the law in imposing order, and they are not sufficiently active in looking for support from the working people and the broad public.

It was emphasized that in the republic the rate at which crimes are being solved and the quality of investigative work have declined significantly. Frequently people who have committed serious crimes remain at liberty and violate the law again during that time. Many courts are excessively liberal with regard to criminals. Procuratorial supervision of the maintenance of legality in the activities of ministries and agencies, including the law-enforcement organs, has slackened. Now, as never before, the session participants said, it is important to combine the efforts of party, soviet, law-enforcement organs, labor collectives and public organizations in the struggle against crime, and to center preventive work in

the labor collectives, in educational institutions and at citizens' places of residence. There needs to be a decisive re-examination of the forms and methods of work in the struggle against alcoholism, the illegal distillation of spirits and drug addiction, as well as against people who follow an anti-social, parasitic way of life or who are engaged in vagrancy.

It is essential to carry out fundamental measures aimed at preventing legal infractions among minors and young people, to draw them into an active, socially useful life, while increasing the responsibility of the family, the school, the Komsomol and the labor collectives in this matter.

The commission came to the conclusion that it is necessary to work out a comprehensive, scientifically-based republic-wide program for the struggle against crime in the years 1990-1995.

The following people spoke at the session: V.G. Dikusarov, first secretary of the Khmel'nitskiy Party Obkom; P.G. Osipenko, Ukrainian SSR public prosecutor; I.D. Gladush, Ukrainian SSR minister of internal affairs; V.I. Zaychuk, Ukrainian SSR minister of justice; I.S. Plyushch, chairman of the Kiev Oblispokom; and G.A. Murashin, deputy director of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of the State and Law.

Uzbek Supreme Court Chairman on 'Cotton' Crime Commission Progress

*90US0395A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
5 Dec 89 p 4*

[Interview with B. M. Malikov, chairman of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Court, by UzTAG correspondent: "In the Name of Legal and Moral Justice"]

[Text] **B. M. Malikov, chairman of Uzbek SSR Supreme Court, discusses the operation of the commission under the Presidium of UzSSR Supreme Court with an UzTAG correspondent.**

[Correspondent] Bobir Madzhidovich, what caused the creation of a commission that is not completely ordinary in legal practice?

[B. Malikov] On 12 September the republic's Supreme Soviet formed this commission to study and prepare materials dealing with the so-called "cotton" cases. This was done in conformity with a decision of the Uzbek CP Central Committee Buro and in response to the numerous requests from citizens concerning the granting of clemency to the persons who had been sentenced in cases dealing with figure-padding in cotton production.

The best-qualified workers in the law-enforcement agencies were asked to be commission members. They carried out a large amount of scrupulous work to consider the citizens' requests and complaints and to study the court decisions and the materials pertaining to the criminal cases involving thefts, figure-padding, and other

abuses that occurred in the republic in the early 1980's during the procurement of raw cotton.

In 1984-1989 the Uzbek courts considered a large number of cases in this category and a rather large number of persons who had stolen socialist property and who had taken bribes were, completely deservedly, sentenced to stern measures of criminal punishment. The law-enforcement agencies took steps of a preventive nature, that were aimed at preventing crimes of this kind: so that these shameless situations would be completely eliminated from our life. Many of the "cotton" cases were considered by courts in an atmosphere of broad publicity, and the results of the trials were illuminated in the mass media.

At the same time, during the investigation and consideration of such cases in the courts, there had been serious distortions and violations of legality. There were instances—and they were not individual ones—of the incorrect legal qualification of the defendants' actions. Steps were not always taken—as the law requires—to ascertain the role and degree of the defendant's participation in the crimes that were committed, or the circumstances that are so important for making a correct determination of the measure of criminal punishment, such as the defendant's frank repentance, his voluntary compensation of the material loss that had been incurred, or his assistance to the investigative agencies and the court in establishing the actual truth and in identifying all the officials who had participated in the crime.

As a result, in many court cases unusually stern measures of punishment were meted out to secondary participants in the crimes—rank-and-file workers who had only fulfilled someone else's instructions, without pursuing at such time any goals of personal enrichment, but who had frankly repented what they had done. And that stern and immoderate punishment was meted out not only to them, but also to many dependents—minor children...

[Correspondent] The "cotton" trials began five years ago. The courts handled not even dozens, but hundreds, of identical criminal cases against thousands of defendants... The situation, which was obviously an extraordinary one in legal proceedings—both for the republic and for the entire country—from the beginning should have attracted the especially increased attention of the overview and other law-support agencies, shouldn't it?

[B. Malikov] I must say that as early as mid-1986 the administrators of the central law-enforcement agencies recognized the incorrect tendency that had manifested itself in the court practice dealing with the "cotton" cases. A decision was enacted, orienting the Uzbek court and procuracy agencies toward the need to take a very well thought-out approach when determining the measures of criminal punishment, and making a careful legal analysis of the defendants' actions with regard to qualifying them correctly and computing the material losses accurately.

At such time a completely unambiguous situation pertained: persons who had participated in thefts and bribery, but who had played a secondary role in these crimes, who had not personally misappropriated state money, and who confessed what they had done, should not, as a rule, be incarcerated.

Unfortunately, as transpired in the course of the commission's work, these completely correct and completely legal and humanitarian principles were by no means always taken into consideration. In certain court cases the investigative agencies, and then the courts, considerably overstated the value of the stolen property or the material losses that had been incurred, as compared with the actual value.

Because of the numerous court errors that had been committed when determining the punishment, the republic's Supreme Court in 1985-1989 was forced to reconsider the sentences meted out by the oblast courts, and to reduce the punishment with respect to approximately 1500 persons.

For example, according to a sentence meted out by the Andizhan Oblast Court on 18 March 1986, A. Abazov, who was assigned to turnover operations at the Kolkhoz imeni Kuybyshev, Balykchinskiy Rayon, for having been an accessory to thefts, bribery, and instances of figure-padding during the procurement of cotton, was sentenced to 11 years of incarceration. When the case was studied at the republic's Supreme Court, it was ascertained that he had been a secondary participant in the crime, had committed the illegal actions on instructions from his administrators, had not misappropriated for himself even a single kopeck, although he undoubtedly had a need for money—he was supporting 11 minor children. The legal injustice that had been shown to him is obvious, because the law demands that, when meting out the punishment, the court, guided by socialist awareness of the law, must mandatorily take into consideration the nature and degree of the social danger of the crime that was committed, the personality of the guilty person, and all the circumstances that mitigate or aggravate the responsibility.

Unfortunately, they were not taken into consideration until the case was reconsidered by the Supreme Court, which eliminated the crudest violation of legality: the punishment that had been meted out to Abazov was reduced to three years of incarceration conditionally, and he was released from custody. It would seem that the moral justice of this decision cannot elicit any doubts on anyone's part.

That is one example, but one could give a large number of similar ones. Serious professional errors, and in a number of instances the indiscriminate, prejudiced approach to the "cotton" cases had a negative effect on the overall moral and psychological climate in the republic, and evoked a large stream of citizens' complaints and censures against the law-enforcement, soviet, and party agencies.

In this regard the commission that has been created by the Presidium of the republic's Supreme Soviet, resting on the humanitarian principles of Soviet legislation and having carefully studied the data concerning the persons who had been sentenced, their family status, and their behavior during the period of serving their sentence, and with a consideration of the specific circumstances pertaining to each criminal case, has deemed it possible as of today to recommend for clemency 431 persons. The appropriate documents have been forwarded to the Presidium of UzSSR Supreme Soviet. Almost 240 persons have already been granted clemency on the basis of commission recommendations.

[Correspondent] What were the arguments that were given at such time?

[B. Malikov] When recommending persons for clemency, we proceeded from the assumption that persons who had been sentenced should be completely released from the serving of any future sentence if they had not personally misappropriated state or kolkhoz funds. In the remaining instances, the attempt was made to guarantee a strictly individual approach—consideration was taken, in particular, of the compensation of the loss that had been incurred, the frank repentance of what had been done, positive evaluations made during the person's serving of his sentence, and the health condition of the person who had been sentenced.

It must be especially noted that, when resolving the questions of the granting of clemency, consideration was always taken of the interests of the families of the sentenced individuals, many of who had proved to be in an extremely difficult material situation. For example, it was primarily for this reason that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet granted clemency to and released from the further serving of his sentence M. Khamidullayev, who had worked as the chairman of the board of a kolkhoz in Ishtykhanskiy Rayon; A. Rakhmanov, former bookkeeper at the Kolkhoz imeni Karl Marx, Bozskiy Rayon; R. Islamov, chief bookkeeper at the Sovkhoz imeni Yu. Kurbanov, Turtkul'skiy Rayon; N. Rakhmanov, grader at a cotton-acceptance station, Khatyrchinskiy Rayon; M. Allayarov, bookkeeper at a cotton-acceptance station, Kumkurganskiy Rayon; and a number of other persons who had been convicted.

[Correspondent] All this definitely reconfirms the humanitarian nature of our state and our social system. But, Bobir Madzhidovich, these "cotton" cases nevertheless did occur... And also the thefts, the abuses, and the losses inflicted on the nation—both material and moral. And those who committed these acts were not only secondary ones. Also, there exists the principle of the irreversibility of punishment for what one has done...

[B. Malikov] Obviously it does not follow from what has been previously stated that the right to receive clemency pertains to absolutely all the persons who have been convicted. The state's humanitarian act cannot be applied to persons who committed particularly heinous

crimes, who engaged in thefts and bribery on an especially large scale, or who consciously and with ill intentions took the path of illegal enrichment. For these reasons, in particular, the commission refused to recommend clemency for 110 persons. The Presidium of the republic's Supreme Soviet agreed with that position.

The commission, for example, refused to recommend clemency for convict G. Utanov, on the basis of the exceptional heinousness of the crime that he had committed. While working as a grader at a cotton-acceptance station in Shakhrisabzskiy Rayon, for a number of years he committed thefts and personally misappropriated 270,000 rubles. According to the findings of the republic's Supreme Court, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet refused clemency also for Kh. Narkobilov, who had worked as a kolkhoz chairman and had personally misappropriated 25,000 rubles.

In conclusion I would like once again to dwell on the court errors, a rather large number of which were revealed during the period when the commission was working. In this regard the presidium of the Supreme Court was forced to reconsider the "cotton" cases with respect to 82 persons. For 56 of them, the measure of punishment was changed, and those persons have been released from custody: 26 persons convicted had their punishment reduced.

The commission is continuing its work. I want to emphasize that that work is being carried out under the careful attention of the Uzbek CP leadership. Because this work is part of the single set of measures—including the introduction of additional payment for cotton, the providing of private plots to villagers—that are aimed at assuring the taking of decisive steps to improve the overall moral and political situation and the entire atmosphere of life in the republic and to create in people a confidence that they are receiving reliable social and legal protection and a confidence in our tomorrow.

Tashkent Corruption Trial of Former Navoi Oblast Chief Yesin Reviewed

90US0395B *Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian*
15 Dec 89 p 4

[Article by PRAVDA VOSTOKA correspondent G. Figlin: "What The Legal Proceedings Showed"]

[Text] On 29 November PRAVDA VOSTOKA published a report on the beginning of the court review of the criminal case with respect to V. P. Yesin. V. P. Yesin, who in the past had been First Secretary of the party's Navoi Oblast Committee, had been accused of bribery. The accusation made against him included the repeated receiving of bribes that totaled 68,000 rubles, and also the paying of a bribe in the amount of 30,960 rubles to Yu. M. Churbanov, former first deputy USSR Minister of Internal Affairs.

The Criminal Cases Board of Kazak SSR Supreme Court, consisting of Kazak SSR Supreme Court member D.

Dulatbekov and people's assessors B. D. Neverova and S. A. Telbayev, and with the participation of Kazak SSR assistant procurator S. K. Aybasov and Tashkent City Legal Consultation Office lawyer Yu. M. Muradyan, conducted legal proceedings in Tashkent. On 8 December the sentence was announced.

A discussion of the results of the trial will probably evoke the same kind of varied reader responses that occurred after other court reviews of cases in this "series." The readers asked questions like: "Why is it that the courts are currently reviewing only the cases involving bribery? What about the deliberately 'unraised' plans for cotton production? And how was their fulfillment 'supported' locally? How were people's rights and the protection of labor and people's health bypassed?" "The stagnation and shady economy prevailed throughout the country, but the only persons who are answering for everything are those whom the investigation managed to catch before it was stopped. Where is the justice here?" "The punishments are ridiculous. This is not bringing people to responsibility, but removing them from responsibility..." Those are only a few typical reader evaluations.

All else aside, they indicate the inner readiness of the letter writers to consider each specific criminal case in a general context. To consider the imposed sentence to be just, or to be made indignant by it, not so much on the basis of the materials pertaining to that specific case, as on the basis of their attitude on the whole to the situation that had developed. The law obliges the court to view the cases differently. By regulating in detail each stage of the legal proceedings, the legislation protects the trial from any emotional outbursts or the supremacy of "political motivations" when one should be guided only by legal prescriptions.

But this pertains to the letters dealing with general topics. What about the trial that was held?

The court deemed V. P. Yesin to be guilty of receiving one bribe—from I. Usmanov, former director of the Kyzyltepa Cotton-Ginning Plant, in the amount of 15,000 rubles. And of giving a bribe to Churbanov—30,000 rubles in money and also a gold-embroidered robe and cap with a total value of 960 rubles. For having committed all these crimes, V. P. Yesin was sentenced to six years of incarceration, with the punishment to be served at a hard-labor ITK [corrective labor camp] and the confiscation of his property. Inasmuch as the court deemed the other episodes to be unproven, it turned out that Yesin was guilty of receiving an amount of money that was one-half the amount that had been given to Churbanov.

Presiding judge S. D. Dulatbekov and the people's assessors stated that the trial had been a difficult one. The defendant had recanted his previous depositions and does not recognize himself as being guilty of any of the episodes. As was already noted in the previous report, it had been difficult to get witness to appear in court. And when they did appear in court they denied

what they had said during the course of the preliminary investigation and in other trials.

Well, then, the court investigation is independent. The defendant is not linked to the depositions that were made in the stage of the preliminary investigation. Unlike a witness who is warned both by the investigative agencies and the court about the criminal responsibility both for refusing or declining to give a deposition and for deliberately giving a false deposition. But the cases were handed over to the court in such a way that the witness in one trial had proven to be under investigation in another criminal case. And yet the cases in both instances dealt with the same episode, the giving and taking of the same bribe. Can one completely ignore that circumstance if the witnesses assert that the depositions were obtained under illegal pressure? It is also inadmissible for the judge simply to take them at their word. Statements such as this require careful checking. Not in a big pile, but each one separately. And they are checked by a specially created commission. But what is the court to do?

Guided by the principle of the presumption of innocence, and proceeding from the depositions of the witnesses in the court investigation, the court resolved the question of the defendant's guilt on the basis of the total amount of proof.

I. Usmanov reported in late October 1988 about the giving of a bribe to Yesin. He did so in a voluntary statement addressed to the USSR General Procurator. Voluntary action and sincerity in this instance were of great importance, inasmuch as they were circumstances that mitigated Usmanov's guilt, and consequently his punishment also. The investigation of the criminal case involving the accusation of the former director of the cotton factory for padding the figures, for stealing state property to an especially large extent, and in receiving and giving bribes was coming to an end. The investigation was being conducted by UzSSR Procuracy. The investigative agencies confiscated 220,000 rubles from Usmanov. That provided weighty confirmation of Usmanov's words to the effect that he had at his disposal large amounts of money that he had used for the paying of bribes, particularly to Yesin.

In conformity with the terms of honest repentance, Usmanov's statement addressed to the USSR General Procurator and his subsequent depositions are very detailed and consistent. He stated that in 1982-1983 a situation had developed when the plans for harvesting and processing raw cotton were mercilessly overstated. That gave rise to rampant figure-padding and then to thefts and bribery. In 1983 the cotton factory was assigned an additional plan for acceptance and processing of raw cotton. Usmanov discussed with Yesin the question of the possibility of fulfilling it. And Yesin had promised to help, to get some kind of understanding with the Ministry of the Cotton-Ginning Industry to reduce the volume of the processed output and of superior-quality cotton. Feeling that Yesin, on the basis of his

official position, could render assistance, Usmanov said in his deposition, he gave Yesin a bribe of 15,000 rubles.

The case against Yesin was conducted by USSR Procuracy. Interrogated for the first time about that bribe after Usmanov's October statement, Yesin gave depositions which coincided in a number of details with Usmanov's description. The place where the bribe was received—Yesin's office. The discussion about the cotton. Large denominations... The bundle containing the money which, according to Yesin's depositions, Usmanov had put on the desk at the end of the discussion. Yesin wanted to refuse, but Usmanov had insisted: Don't take offense, he had said, because you have expenses too. And he had kept insisting...

Subsequently Yesin and Usmanov repeated those depositions several times, including during the course of the legal investigation of the criminal case against Usmanov. Usmanov was also sentenced, in particular, for having given a bribe to Yesin.

In the current trial Usmanov stated that he had never given a bribe to Yesin. His previous depositions had been obtained from him under the influence exerted by the investigators. Yesin also recanted his depositions in the preliminary investigation, stating that illegal methods had been applied to him. The court, taking into consideration all the testimony pertaining to the case, ruled that Yesin was guilty of taking that bribe.

In the previous report it was noted that the court would have to consider the question of whether defendant Yesin was guilty of giving a bribe to Churbanov. The bribe for the receiving of which Churbanov had already been sentenced by the military board of USSR Supreme Court on 30 December 1988. We might recall that Churbanov had been deemed to be guilty of receiving three bribes totaling 90,960 rubles. Of this, 30,000 was in money and a gold-embroidered robe and cap with a total of 960 rubles, from Yesin.

Previously Yesin stated in the preliminary investigation and during the court session in the Churbanov case that he had given him a bribe.

What were the motives? Churbanov—the former first deputy USSR Minister of Internal Affairs, CPSU Central Committee Central Auditing Commission member, and son-in-law of Brezhnev—was an influential person. Personal acquaintance with him was, in and of itself, very important. But there arose in Navoi Oblast, which had recently been created, a large number of organizational questions, including those dealing with MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] matters. Yesin had indicated yet another reason: Rashidov had attached a large amount of importance to the impressions with which Churbanov would be leaving Uzbekistan. All Churbanov would have to do was to express his dissatisfaction, and that could have the most unpleasant effect on Yesin personally.

The giving of a bribe to Churbanov on 21 October 1982 is confirmed, the court felt, not only by Yesin's and Churbanov's previous depositions, but also by other materials pertaining to the case. Churbanov had been in Navoi on that day. That is attested to by the manifest for a flight made on 21 October 1982 that was made along the itinerary Tashkent-Navoi-Tashkent and the persons who accompanied him. The chief of the Navoi airport confirmed that Yesin had met and accompanied Churbanov. Photographs that were confiscated during a search of Yesin's home showed Churbanov's stay in Navoi.

Witness V. Vlasov, who was a close friend of Churbanov's, stated in a deposition that in the autumn of 1986 Churbanov, after being told to come to the procuracy, had set fire to albums and other objects at his dacha. There had been an Uzbek robe and cap there. At Vlasov's request, Churbanov had given the robe and cap to him. Subsequently Vlasov handed them over to the investigative agencies. A hand-made violet, gold-embroidered robe, the retail price of which, according to the finding of a board of commodity experts, was 900 rubles, and a 60-ruble cap, were introduced as material evidence in the case.

After examining the robe, Yesin stated during the preliminary investigation that it was the same one that he had given to Churbanov.

But now, during the trial, both Yesin and Churbanov asserted that there had not been any bribe of 30,000 rubles in money. And the robe was not the one that had been given as a gift. They had implicated one another under the influence of the investigators.

But whereas, during the period of the court consideration of the Churbanov case, Yesin had been under investigation, Churbanov had the court behind him. And you might recall that the trial had been a "loud one," and had been defended very actively. In response to the question as to why, while in the court, he had admitted receiving the money, robe, and cap from Yesin, Churbanov replied that he thought that the court would not believe him if he recanted his previous depositions with regard to this matter. To the current makeup of the court, that explanation seemed to be not very convincing, and Churbanov's changing of his depositions was viewed as his attempt to avoid responsibility for what he had done.

Other decisions were made by the court with regard to two more episodes. The preliminary investigation agencies had accused Yesin of obtaining bribes in the amount of 50,000 rubles on two occasions from A. Sadanov and 3000 from Kh. Zayniyev, who also were seeking protection and support. However, inasmuch as Sadanov, Zayniyev, and Yesin had recanted their previous depositions (which had been given under pressure from the investigative agencies), the question of other proof arose. But, as the court established, the investigation had not collected any other proof. In the course of the court

investigation, it also proved to be impossible to obtain any new proof. Not only the defense, but Procurator S. Aybasov, refusing to make an accusation with regard to those episodes, officially requested the court to use them to vindicate Yesin as a result of the fact that the commission of the crimes had not been proven. And the court agreed to that. The court also complied with another official request of Aybasov's.

Under the other witnesses in this trial, Kh. Zayniyev, former first secretary of the party's Navoi Raykom, and currently director of the Narpay Sovkhoz, had never been incarcerated. He was been released from criminal responsibility for giving a bribe to Yesin because he had made a statement about that voluntarily. And he had repeatedly confirmed his statement by subsequent depositions. He had recanted them only in court. And the court had excluded the episode from the accusation. But now does this mean that Kh. Zayniyev had implicated the incarcerated Yesin during the entire long period of the preliminary investigation, worsening his situation? Or had he acted against his conscience in the current trial? At the procurator's request, the court made a determination about instigating criminal action against Kh. Zayniyev in accordance with Article 161 of the Uzbek SSR UK [Criminal Code], which deals with the responsibility for perjury.

Giving Yesin a comparatively mild punishment, the court was guided by many considerations. Under Yesin's leadership—as people in Navoi certainly remember—much had been done in the developing oblast. And his qualities as an effective and initiatory leader are reflected in his personal appraisals. Yesin is of advanced age. And he is seriously ill. During his confinement while under custody, he had had an operation.

These, then, I would say, are the most essential facts about the sentence that was given. The sentence cannot be appealed. But what is possible is that it may be appealed at an oversight level.

But the overall problems—both the economic ones that are linked with the elimination of the previous negative situations in cotton production, and the legal ones that appeared during the period of the production-line handling of the "cotton" cases—are, of course, of concern to the republic. But that is a topic to be dealt with in separate articles, and definitely not a single one. All the problems do not come together in the fate of just one person—a former administrator on the oblast level.

Trial of Former Uzbek Central Committee Secretary Abdullayeva Analyzed

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p 3

[Article by Yu. Feofanov: "The Case of Rano Abdullayeva—Conjectures, Facts, Conclusions"]

[Text] Among other legal proceedings in the so-called "Uzbek affair" (whether we like it or not, right or wrong,

an epithet that is circulating which is insulting to the people and about which nothing can be done), the case against Rano Khabibovna Abdullayeva, who holds the post of secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, has assumed a special place. Many from among the past prominent managers were convicted, and some were found innocent when the cases of the public prosecutor were dropped. But, it seems, that it is the first time that a defendant of such a rank was acquitted by the USSR Supreme Court in an open court session before the public and under the gaze of the mass media.

This could not have helped but engender profound opinions and idle talk. I would like, in explaining the case, to dwell on one and the other.

Speaking of the facts that fell within the purview of the court, they are extremely sparse. The plot of the case itself is simple. In the spring of 1987, R. Abdullayeva was relieved of her post as secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan in connection with the "notifications" that were being received that compromised her. A commission was established which recognized the "notifications" as valid. Afterwards, T. Umarov, administrative supervisor of the Central Committee, against whom criminal charges were brought, testified: Abdullayeva received a bribe—R30,000. Others who were arrested gave similar testimonies.

On 29 October 1987, R. Abdullayeva was arrested. She categorically denied that she was guilty. However, she confessed within a month. And she started to give evidence: of receiving bribes from 16 persons and giving bribes to nine (all told it involved about R200,000). Among the first were the secretaries of obkoms [oblast party committees] and other managers on a like scale; among the second were employees of the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee and managers of republic rank: the first secretary of the Central Committee of the KPU [Communist Party of Uzbekistan], the chairman of the council of ministers, etc. Confiscated at Abdullayeva's residence during the arrest were bonds worth R30,000, jewelry worth approximately the same amount, and, with other property, a total amount of R99,000.

She admitted her guilt in interrogations, confrontations, and letters during two years of imprisonment. But in May 1989, when she began to be interrogated by other investigators, she announced that she was not guilty of anything, and that she implicated herself and others under the pressure of the investigation. Her "partners" also began to deny everything. Only M. Khudaybergen (former first secretary of the Khorezmskiy obkom) held to the accepted evidence longer than the others—to October 1989. The Office of the Public Prosecutor stopped the case in 15 of the 16 incidents for "lack of a criminal act," and the receipt of R5,000 from M. Khudaybergen was imputed to R. Abdullayeva. This, in fact, became the subject of the court trial.

In the trial, the accused and the "bribe-givers" did not admit guilt. The charge was not corroborated by anything else, the findings of the preliminary investigation did not convince the court, and the state prosecutor did not consider the inculpatory evidence to be proof. R. Abdullayeva, as is known, was acquitted.

These are the facts. And it would hardly be correct to restrict oneself to their verification because these facts give rise to many questions and they require certain conclusions.

Perhaps the first and primary question is about the confessions in the pretrial investigation and about the disavowal in the open court session. Much has been written about this, but this cannot be passed over.

A judicial examination is the most independent part of a criminal case, and it is not bound by the findings of the pretrial investigation; however, it is also not bound by a ban on the evaluation of the materials obtained during the investigation. That is, the court might accept defendant disavowals of a confession, or it might not. And we know that in the USSR Supreme Court, bribe-takers and bribe-givers who denied events were convicted, and that confessions in the pretrial investigation were admitted as valid. This was not admitted in the Abdullayeva case.

Is it possible on this basis to rebuke one or another court staff. I do not think so. Judges proceed from all materials of a case, being guided by the law, and also out of a sense of justice. And, still, when this kind of a disputable situation unfolds, doubts also arise. I was present at many similar trials. I heard how the defendants, denying their confessions, accused the investigators of illegality; some without providing any proof, and others, rather convincingly. But...I do not know a case where a court would at least try to explain what did happen in an investigation cell.

After the trial of Yu. Churbanov, I asked M. Marov, the chairman at that trial: Why were the investigators not called as witnesses, because almost all of the defendants spoke of illegalities.

"But what would this add," answered Mikhail Alekseyevich, "one would accuse and the other would deny: And that is all."

R. Abdullayeva gave testimony; that is, she related her prison epic for more than six hours. She devoted about 10 minutes to the accusation episode. A big part of her talk concerned threats, including threats to make short work of her daughter and son on the part of the investigators. I know that, most likely, the court would not have established anything valid, even if they had summoned the investigators, as was petitioned by the defendant and her lawyer. But the judges could have had some kind of an impression. And now...

Public prosecutor S. Golov put it this way:

"The defendant accused the investigators. I cannot say that she made it all up. But neither can I accept her

accusations. In the record of the interrogations, additions were always being made by Abdullayeva: 'I did not experience any kind of pressure, and no one blackmailed me.' Now we hear about pressure and blackmail. What happened? I do not know."

Lawyer Yu. Ivanov, with respect to Abdullayeva's handwritten additions, said: "It is laughable: The arrested party simply expresses love for her investigators, and she declares that she wants only these investigators and no others." In general, rather strange additions. But what do they prove?"

They prove only one thing: The entire pretrial criminal proceeding is in many ways faulty, it followed the traditions of the thirties, except for the extremes. Unfortunately, judicial practice has encouraged the tradition: Prosecution conclusions were copied into the verdicts, turning the judicial investigation into a fiction. And today, cases, initiated under former traditions, come to the courts which stand on legal legs. And, understandably, many cases collapse, as the accusation against R. Abdullayeva collapsed.

The USSR Supreme Soviet, it seems, broke the barrier of accusatory bias: The right to defense is guaranteed a suspect from the moment of his arrest. More accurately, it is proclaimed. The law has been in effect since December of 1989. But even the investigators are yelling in the press: Support this law, and give arrested persons lawyers. The law and the right of the accused to defense is under the threat of being compromised. Indeed, the consequences are difficult to foresee; for, if after 1 December an arrested drunkard hooligan is not given a lawyer immediately, it can be declared in court that his right to defense was violated. The court will have no choice but to drop the case. Or...go against the law.

Unfortunately, the Supreme Soviet, following the norm, did not concern itself with the mechanism for implementing it. This, alas, does not occur that infrequently. The Minyust [Ministry of Justice] and Minfin [Ministry of Finance] have to take urgent measures in order not to expose justice itself to a threat. For a dangerous criminal is not deprived of the right to defense. Well, then, do you free a murderer if there was no lawyer available immediately after his arrest? To set him free in a courtroom when "some sort of" letter of trial law is not observed? The matter comes down to this: If the production is to proceed according to strictly legal canons, he will have to be freed. For example, I get a perturbed feeling about the decision well-known to everyone, I think, of the Swedish court in the case of the murder of Olaf Palme, the prime minister of the country. There were some slight doubts: And the judges did not decide to convict. Did they free a criminal? Or are they protecting the laws of their citizens?

Justice is not "they gave a lot or little." Justice is first and foremost meticulous observation of trial standards in order not to give it inadvertently to the wrong person. Improper formulation of the order for arrest, illegal entry

into a home, and violation of the right to legal defense in the first place. [sentence as published] Jurors can convict a criminal even if trial standards are substantially violated. But it is hardly likely that the judge will permit the case to go to the jurors in the presence of such violations.

In the case of R. Abdullayeva, the court ran into such a problem. Before the beginning of the judicial investigation, the lawyer announced a solicitation: to evaluate the legality of instituting the proceeding itself and the arrest of the defendant.

At the time that the evidence on R. Abdullayeva became known, she was a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]. The deputy public prosecutor entered a petition for granting approval for her arrest. This approval was granted by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on 28 October 1987. There is a document on this in the court records—it is dated 28 November, but with a reference to the record of the sitting, which apparently took place on 28 October.

But the problem is that on 27-28 October 1987, a session of the Supreme Soviet of the republic was under way at which Deputy R. Abdullayeva was present. It would have been quite natural—which the defendant and her lawyer declared—to raise this question at the session. And not only "quite natural." I cite the Law on the Status of People's Deputies in the USSR, which was in effect at that time: Legal criminal proceedings cannot be brought against a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of a republic, and arrest cannot be made...without the consent of the Supreme Soviet of the union republic, and [begin bold]between sessions[end bold], without the consent of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Judging by the record of the proceedings submitted by the state prosecutor, a meeting of the Presidium was held on the day that the session was held, that is, when there was no "between." But, as it turned out, there was no meeting of the Presidium either.

The document submitted to the court states: "This resolution was approved by the method of polling members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek SSR. Head of the protocol-secret staff of the Secretariat of the PVS [Presidium of the Supreme Soviet] of the Uzbek SSR N. Basov." In general, I know, very likely, that I am committing a crime by publicizing this document. It has a "Secret" stamp. Why? What kind of secret? The defendant reasonably said: On the contrary, my questions should be raised openly at the session, and I should, as a last resort, be called to the Presidium, so that I could at least explain myself.

"Nevertheless, a secretary of the Central Committee is arrested, and would it really make no difference to the deputies for what and why?" asked R. Abdullayeva.

However, the "Secret" stamp then and there became understandable. The lawyer displayed three written testimonies of then members of the Presidium: A. Nasyrov, first secretary of the central committee of the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], E.

Aliyeva, foreman of an experimental farm, and B. Asrorova, a physician (Nasyrov and Aliyev are mentioned in the list of those present at the "meeting")—all of them attest that they had not heard anything about granting approval for the arrest of Abdullayeva.

The defendant's lawyer, and, indeed, she herself, petitioned, that the court evaluate this fact—the procedure for obtaining approval. As a matter of fact, the question was being raised about adjourning the case because of the gross violation of the status of a deputy. Personally, it seems to me that there is more than a forcible argument for making such a decision. The grounds should be any serious violation of legal standards and a citizen's rights.

But I imagine what it would be if the court acted precisely that way. That is, if before the beginning of the judicial investigation it came to the conclusion that the status of a deputy was grossly violated, and therefore the case should be dropped. Oh, if that had happened, it would have been worse for Rano Khabibovna, and public opinion would have been flooded with rumors. Assuredly this version would have come up: The bribe-taker is being shielded. What is to be done? For the time being public opinion will not accept the law, just as it rejects the market. One would like everything to be in abundance and everything in fairness, except without losses. We do not want to understand at all that the road to a common market lies through the Riga market, and the road to law, through these kinds of special cases.

Both colleagues and acquaintances ask me: But, nonetheless, was she on the take or not? And here we enter the sphere of conjecture.

And the judges, I think, asked themselves the same question. Chairwoman L. Chistyakova, who conducted the trial strictly, if not to say, sternly, evoked, with her questions, an uneven outburst from the defendant. The judge tried to clarify how real the threats of the investigators were, including the threat to make short shrift of Abdullayeva's children. That is, the judge wanted to understand the reasons for the false testimony. And now the question to those same judges is logical: Did they arrive at the truth? By the way, this kind of a question was also raised by the press, which persistently suggested and suggests that the court is obliged to find the truth. I admit that I read dozens of monographs where this very thing was required of the courts. And I repeated many times in my articles: The aim of justice is to reach the truth. Until I read a statement, literally the other day, by one an English judge: "The court should not have as its aim the establishment of the truth, this is hopeless; it is enough if its verdict will be based on the evidence in the case.."

This is difficult to accept. People want to know the truth about what happened. But it can never be known. It is known only by one person: The one who from the beginning said that "he did not take," later that "he took," and then once again that "he did not take." I

heard the statements of the defendant at the preliminary investigation, which were made public in court, and I believed them: In court, it seemed to me, these were the kind of details that could hardly be prompted by the investigators. But later I heard the defendant herself, who related how she was forced to give testimony, and I also believed. It is possible that the judges thought that way. But they were obliged to set a sentence on the evidence in the case.

But now the conjectures and the rumors were given another twist. I now hear conversations about the qualities of Rano Khabibovna, as a manager, and afterwards about her personal affairs also.

I myself was asked: "They say that she had certain relationships with Rashidov, is this true?" I would not dare print even this question, if this subject had not been broached in open court by Rano Khabibovna herself. But in the words of the lawyer, slanders of this nature against the client were carefully checked by the investigation, chauffeurs and agents checking up on Rashidov were questioned—he was never without surveillance either in Moscow or in Tashkent. The investigation proved to be unsuccessful, but apparently three volumes of documents exist. Or they existed. They, alas, were not found. However, as far as I knew, no attempt was made to find them.

One more rather essential point remained unexplained. R. Abdullayeva, explaining her self-incrimination and the incrimination of others, put forth a version that did not seem to me to be convincing. She declared that when they broke her down and forced her to admit to events that did not exist, she decided to play a kind of game with the investigators.

"I began to wonder," she said, "why are my colleagues, now arrested, giving false evidence against me? And I came to the conclusion: They forced them. At first, I wrote Procurator General Chebrikov, and I denied everything, but then I broke down. But I decided to understand their entire foul mechanics, in order to expose it here, in the court. Yes, I incriminated myself, and I wrongfully incriminated others, but I wrote a diary at the same time. I said what they wanted in interrogations, but I entered what I thought in the diary."

"Where is this diary?"

"I have it. I sent it to the procurator general, I asked him to study it, and it was returned to me. Here it is, 661 pages. I want them to include it in the file..."

It was included, and the judges familiarized themselves with it. Where is the truth here? What is in the diary? When were the entries made? Was there really a "game" for exposing the investigative methods? I repeat, the words of the defendant did not seem convincing. But it is a fact that the diary notebooks were transmitted to the judges.

In a judicial sitting, only that is investigated which is declared in the charges—in this case it was the single episode of the R5,000—"for patronage." The accusation was not proven, and the court acquitted R. Abdullayeva "for lack of criminal acts," as the saying goes, definitively even in the opinion of the average person. Why is this "opinion," nonetheless, doubted. And here we have to turn from conjecture to judicial solid ground. Still, people have the steadfast opinion—"they all take"—and not entirely without reason. But they do not involve "everyone," but specific persons, guilty or innocent. Who when? It is clear that if there is no evidence, there is no guilt. But how does one prove if the bribery is intimate? Marked bills are possible (I do not know the laws), if one of two people wants to expose the other. But if he wants to conceal it? If there is no direct evidence?

It is the job of lawyers to find ways and methods of evidence. There are none yet. At present, it is difficult in a strictly judicial way even to qualify graft in the sum of tens of thousands of rubles as bribery: Neither criminal activity nor criminal inactivity is tracked. Apparently there is a need for refining the articles of the code (this was written a long time ago). This is especially important for exposing organized crime and mafia bosses and chiefs.

The statistics on the reduction of bribery evokes not merely disbelief, but laughter. However, it is necessary to understand the position of the public prosecutors: They reasonably fear bringing a case to trial when, aside from the testimonies of the participants in a deal, there is no other evidence.

However, the participation of the defense in pretrial investigations also removes this question. If the person under investigation confers with a lawyer, then the value of his confession will be different. In law-governed states, as far as I know, a confession excludes even a jury trial: The judge immediately metes out the punishment. But he is confident that the confession is truly voluntary, and not forced.

In a word, the case of Rano Abdullayeva, which ended in acquittal, suggests many ideas. Facts and conjectures are tangled up in it in an interesting pattern. Inferences have to be made by the legislators, by the lawyers, and even by us who write about law and individual rights.

Sociologist Claims Continuing Dearth of NKAO Crisis Media Coverage

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[Article by L. Bagdasaryan, candidate of philological sciences, member of the Soviet Sociological Association: "A Sociologist's Notes; 'Special Region,' or the Information Blockade"]

[Text] On 12 July 1988 IZVESTIYA prefaced the item "Official Trip to Stepanakert" by a letter from V. Khromov, Odintsovskiy Rayon, Moscow Oblast: "Every day the newspapers publish communiques from Stepanakert. No one can understand anything from this information. The journalists simply paraphrase one another. What's the problem? Can't you go there yourself? Either because you are afraid, or you are not allowed to go there?... Because this problem is very troublesome to everyone. And yet, in effect, you are keeping us blind." This was followed by a comment: "Our reader's indignation is completely understandable. The letters to the editor contain a rather large number of letters like this. We shall state outright that our correspondents visit Stepanakert regularly. However, the situation there has become so complicated and the reaction to every word has become so acute that it is definitely no easy matter to write about these events."

Those words pertain to the situation that developed on 12 July 1988, but the central mass media [SMI] began to develop the topic "The Events In and Around NKAO" starting on 23 February. How did it happen that for more than five months the SMI at the central level were unable to analyze the situation to such an extent as not to "keep blind" their readers, and at the same time to avoid an "acute reaction to every word" in the region? We might recall that only six days remained to the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium...

In the first communique, "The Events in Nagornyy Karabakh" (23 February 1988), one consider to be informational in the literal sense of the word only the seven lines in which it was stated that in NKAO, Azerbaijan SSR, "there had occurred actions by a part of the Armenian population, making demands concerning the inclusion of Nagornyy Karabakh as part of Armenian SSR." The next sentence was: "As a result of the irresponsible appeals made by individual extremist persons, violations of the public order were provoked." The communique is characterized by negative value judgments and fails to cite any information concerning the oblast soviet session that was held in NKAO or the forms of the actions taken by "a part of the population." The events and the state of the problem were not presented clearly. Another such communique can serve as the basis for various conjectures and rumors concerning the specific manifestations of the violations of the public order that take place in the course of the actions. One can consider to be the basic propaganda method the discreditation of

the fact, which discreditation is based on the use of terms that have a negative emotional charge.

On 1 March, a report from Sumgait that was published in PRAVDA mentioned "disorders" that had occurred in the city and that had been "provoked by a group of hooligan elements." Subsequently, on 7 May, PRAVDA would qualify those disorders as "butchery and a pogrom."

In the first items published by the central newspapers there is a tendency to give the minimum amount of up-to-the-minute information concerning the events, but, instead, there is a forced attempt to present the topic of the friendship of peoples, the fraternal family, and internationalism. The impression is created that the mass media are attempting, within a short period of time, to correct all the shortcomings in ideological and political-educational work that were made during the past 70 years.

The text of the communique "Situation in Sumgait" (48 lines) was constructed (it is difficult to select another word) from blocks containing value judgments: "a group of hooligan elements," unstable, immature persons were drawn in, "disorders were provoked," "acts of violence and robberies were committed," and "31 persons perished." (Were these acts of violence or murders?) Then there is mention of "the persons guilty of the crimes" (were they crimes or disorders?). And also "the city's workers are showing restraint and displaying feelings of internationalism," but only a few lines previously there had been a report that 31 persons had perished—persons of various nationalities, including old men and women.

It is difficult to cram into 48 lines so much contradictory information. It is even more difficult to understand how it was possible in this situation for that thesis to be born—the thesis of the internationalism of the city's workers, a thesis that was subsequently seized upon by all the correspondents who wrote about the Sumgait tragedy.

And it was not until the report that was published in PRAVDA on 11 March, "Meeting at the CPSU Central Committee," that one finds an indirect indication that definite problems existed in NKAO. "Organize a thorough and complete study of the problems that have accumulated in the autonomous oblast... and the reasons for the aggravation of the interethnic relations." It would seem that in the materials that prefaced that article, the correspondents could have made an attempt to analyze the reasons for the events in NKAO, if only to isolate the group of problems whose resolution could have eased the tension.

In evaluating the events in Sumgait, the journalists repeat the published communiques, without adding any new information, but the rumors convey the nightmarish details of the events that had occurred, refugees from Sumgait had been placed in rest homes and boarding homes in Armenia, and everyone who wanted to do so could meet with them and talk to them. The journalists

cite examples of internationalism, but at the same time report on the mass disorders and excesses that had occurred in Sumgait, but no political evaluation is given to them. There are also statements to the effect that "perestroyka obliges every Communist to be imbued with a new way of thinking also in the area of national relations," and that "multinational spirit is not yet internationalism." "Those who doubt this can evaluate soberly the events in Sumgait, which for many years was considered to be a city of exemplary international friendship," are the words proclaimed on the pages of PRAVDA in the statement by E. Bagramov at the roundtable at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, under CPSU Central Committee (14 June 1988).

According to DRUZHBA NARODOV magazine (No. 3, 1989), the Sumgait tragedy began with rumors to the effect that "Azerbaijanis were being murdered in Nagornyy Karabakh... Then there had been a rally at the bus terminal at the intersection of Ulitsa Druzhby and Ulitsa Mira, where that rumor, with the aid of a megaphone, had been presented as a fact, to which was added another 'fact,' to the effect that a train with the corpses of the murdered Azerbaijanis had arrived at the Baladzhary station, and then a provocation appeal for vengeance was made"... What could have served as the basis for such rumors was the communique that had been transmitted by the Azerbaijan Telegraph Agency, and then by TASS, All-Union Radio, and TsT [Central Television], concerning the murder of two Azerbaijanis as a result of a conflict between the residents of Agdam and Askeran. V. Vasilenko, representative of the USSR Procuracy, and acting NKAO procurator, agreed with me that the report in the press about the murder of the two Azerbaijanis in the conflict between the residents of Agdam and Askeran, without any additional explanations, had been inappropriate in that explosive situation.

"Many people think that it was precisely that communique that had served as the match that had lit the powder keg that exploded in Sumgait" (A. Vasilevskiy, "The Truth of Pain", AVRORA magazine, No. 10, 1988). But "additional explanations" are neither more nor less than what a Leningrad journalist was told by a brother of one of the murdered Azerbaijanis, who had been a witness to the events: "An Azerbaijani militia man was shooting at Ali..." "There is no doubt at least," A. Vasilevskiy writes, that the murder of one of them, twenty-year-old Ali Gadzhiyev, milling machine operator at the Agdam Machine-Building Plant, has absolutely nothing to do with the Armenians of Nagornyy Karabakh."

The illumination in the central press of the Nagornyy Karabakh problem and the Sumgait tragedy gave rise to a large number of perplexed questions. Here are a few of them to which S. Baruzdin devoted attention a year after the events: "Why is it that it was not until the third day of the excesses that the militia and the troops began arresting the hoodlums? Does that mean that for the first two days someone had been covering up for them? Why, out of hundreds or thousands of blinded fanatics, had

only 90 youths and minors been arrested? We might recall that at the Moscow trial in the case of three murderers E. Dzhafarova, mother of the accused Dzhafarov, stated that the true organizers of the excesses in Sumgait had not been brought to responsibility and that her son had become a blind weapon in their hands. And finally... I myself (S. Baruzdin) had been genuinely alarmed by the endlessly repeated thesis that was directed at A. I. Akhmedov, Ya. G. Dzhafarov, and I. A. Ismailov, that they had acted 'from hooliganistic motives.' It seems to me that there is a difference between the concepts of hooliganism and sophisticated, well-planned banditry" (DRUZHBA NARODOV, No. 3, 1989).

Unfortunately, the tendency to use "hooliganistic motives" to explain the Sumgait tragedy is present in all the printed items that were considered by the central newspapers on this topic. Was it not a rejection of the party's well-principled position in evaluating the events occurring in Sumgait that led to the fact of the "conducting in Baku during the days of the Moscow trial of mass mobs with slogans 'Hail to the Sumgait heroes!'" (*Ibid.*).

A certain amount of light is cast upon this aspect of the Sumgait tragedy by A. Golovkov's essay, which was published in OGONEK. More than a year after the events, in April 1989, the correspondent reports, "The tragedy of the Karabakh movement, which resulted in unpredictable consequences, lies in the fact that no one had the courage to give a political evaluation of the Sumgait situation. It would seem that for this everyone—the relatives of the people who were killed, the people of Karabakh, of Yerevan, and even of Baku—must say a separate thank-you to Mamed-ogly Bagirov, who kept dashing madly between Stepanakert, Moscow, and Baku. And to his wise teacher, Geydar Aliyev. It was primarily they who did everything to present the Sumgait slaughter in the eyes of the Soviet public as ordinary 'hooliganism.'" (A. Golovkov, "Special Region," OGONEK, No. 18, 1989).

In the April 1988 issue (No. 6) of KOMMUNIST magazine, hot on the trail of the Sumgait events, there appeared the theme of the connection between the anti-perestroyka forces and the processes occurring in the trans-Caucasus. "It will be fitting to ask," I. Nastavshev wrote, "now, when their wasp nests are being energetically destroyed, and the keys to the golden 'treasure chests,' guarded by cobras, are being selected, on whose side these 'cursed militia men' are. Was it not their sly hand that directed the actions of the rampant hooligans in Sumgait? Was it not they who, in this manner, are subjecting to an endurance test the perestroyka that is so pernicious for these nouveaux riches, as well as the democratization and glasnost? With the power-seeking bureaucrats, the 'cursed militia men' always found a common language, but never with glasnost!"

Unfortunately, this theme did not find its elaboration in the mass media, and the forces that had been mentioned,

the forces that, covering themselves by the "perestroyka" phraseology, had led people from social dialogue to bloody pogroms, did not prove to be revealed.

From 1 March through 21 May 1988 the central newspapers that had been drawn into the analysis published 2826 lines of TASS text and 11,260 lines of their own materials, and yet, by July, the readers knew practically nothing about the problem. We might cite a few figures that can throw some kind of light on the situation that had developed. The measurement of the volume and specific gravity of the information from the point of view of its innovative nature indicates that only 6.5 percent of the published texts can be viewed as supporting with regard to various aspects of the problem. The reports dealing with the situation in Yerevan, Sumgait, Stepanakert, and Baku, which occupy 18 percent of the total information, fail to reveal the essence of the conflict that was occurring. Incidentally, up-to-the-minute information occupies only 8 percent of the total. The journalists devoted 16 percent of the text to commentaries that were replete with negative evaluations of the phenomena that were occurring and with an overall discussion of the NKAO problem; theoretical discussions of internationalism occupy 8.1 percent; the friendship of the peoples of the USSR, 4 percent; the national question in the country and the region, 5.7 percent; and the reasons for the demonstrations in NKAO, 0.7 percent of the total items published on the problem. Thus one sees the gradual appearance of the tendency not to delve deeply into the essence of the problem, but only to mention or recall it. There is an obvious tendency to give the minimum amount of event-related information also in the reports from Sumgait. The reports concerning the events that had occurred, and concerning the "disorders," occupy 0.4 percent of the total information published on the problem. The reports make use of euphemisms, expressions of the type "when what happened, happened" and "everyone knows what subsequently happened". SOBESEDNIK, No. 15, 1988: "In Sumgait the events took such a turn that it was necessary to bring in the troops." IZVESTIYA, 24 March 1988: "As was already reported, an investigation dealing with the excesses that occurred here is continuing." All these instances of incompetency, logical errors, and contradictory information created the situation that was reported by OGONEK reader Lushka (No. 22, 1988). In order to obtain information on the Karabakh problem, he had been forced to rely on foreign sources of radio information.

This makes even more important the role of the mass media and the journalists in the work of objectively orienting public opinion and revealing the truth. Correspondents assert that there exist in NKAO very painful problems which, at a meeting they had had with a group of party and soviet workers, journalists, and pedagogical institute instructors, people had "hotly and with conviction" shared with them. However, nothing is said about the essence of those problems. And yet it is precisely in those problems that one can discern the reasons for the

events that happened in NKAO. But no examples are given in the reports. Instead, generalized conclusions are made, such as "in the problems that were mentioned, there is much in common with the problems in any remote area—not only a national one" and then the admission is made: "the rights of the local oblast agencies are extremely limited" (IZVESTIYA, 24 March 1988).

A total of 15 lines were published about the infringement of the national rights of the citizens in NKAO and the violation of autonomy. And this is how the situation is characterized a year after the beginning of the events by V. Mishin, member of the Committee for Special Administration of NKAO:

"...Insults and counterinsults have been of long standing and are deep, but however deplorable they are, they do have foundation. Azerbaijan's previous leadership consistently conducted a policy of artificially isolating the Armenian population of NKAO from Armenia in the area of culture and language. In a kindergarten, for example, where all the children are only of Armenian nationality, absolutely all the methodological aids received were in the Azeri language; in a music school where nine out of ten of the students are Armenians, the curriculum stipulates a series of classes to study Azerbaijani folklore, but the art of the Armenian nation is practically unrepresented. One could easily continue this enumeration of awkward distortions that infringe upon the national dignity of people and operate at cross purposes with their natural spiritual needs. Therefore one cannot fail to take an understanding attitude toward the populist movement of the people of Nagornyy Karabakh for the restoration of justice, and toward the patriotic feelings of the Armenian population of NKAO" (OGONEK, No. 12, March 1989).

It is precisely this understanding of the essence of the problem, or the causes that led to the demonstrations in NKAO, that the central press failed to display. But the journalists from the central newspapers were able to enumerate in NKAO large number of "background" socioeconomic problems. But their silence and the lack of information concerning the question enabled G. A. Aliyev to assert at the next (April 1989) Central Committee Plenum that, during the period of its work in Azerbaijan, the situation in NKAO was normal and stable, and, with regard to indicators of socioeconomic development, NKAO has surpassed the average republic levels for Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Thus, the central information agencies left outside the limits of their attention a number of questions without the illumination of which the entire spectrum of problems that is arbitrarily called "the events in and around Nagornyy Karabakh" is becoming incomprehensible. The problems that were not deemed worthy of the fixed attention of the correspondents from the central newspapers include: the history of the question; the causes of the demonstrations in NKAO (including the national

problems); the socioeconomic problems; and information about the events in Sumgait. The items published by the central newspapers proved to have no space for any serious analysis of the problems of interethnic communication or of national relations. The national problem that was shamefully hushed up over a period of decades but that, as a result of the perestroika and glasnost, had taken the center of public attention, required new approaches and paths of resolution, but found not only the political structures of society, but also the mass media, to be unready. This is the only way that one can explain the month-long silence and then the attempt to push the problem into the customary channel of the previous developed schemes with ready-made stereotypes about "instigators who were linked with foreign centers," and "the organizational status of the masses" as a criminal with an "antisocialist tinge."

Doled-out one-sided information that completely precludes the possibility of any other view of the problem distinguishes all the items released by the central mass media. That is what gave grounds for Academician A. Sakharov, in his letter "I Actively Support Perestroika," which was published in *IZVESTIYA* on 7 February 1989, to state, "At the same time I cannot fail to notice a definite 'assymetry,' in the role of the Azerbaijani and Armenia side in the development of the conflict and what I consider to be the biased position taken by the central authorities—especially during the first months—and the central press."

The mass media proved to be unready to embody (at least in the problem of national relations) into concrete actions the basic principles of perestroika—democracy, glasnost, responsibility—which presuppose the discussion and comparison of various points of view and various approaches toward the problems that arise. The idea of compromise, an idea that was clearly and unambiguously stated at the session of the Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet and the central newspapers, was not even discussed. "Glasnost, as A. D. Sakharov justly noted, failed at exactly the time when it was most needed." It is precisely this, rather than the rabble-rousing actions of certain "dark forces," that forced the side that considered itself to be infringed upon to intensify the onslaught," Viktor Sheynis wrote in his article "Peace in the House," in bulletin XX VEK I MIR [Twentieth Century and Peace] (No. 10, 1988). The mass media did not see in the Karabakh crisis the chief factor—the need to develop the principles and methods for settling the disputed questions of national development within the country, which principles and methods were based on respect for the rights and expression of the will of the national minorities.

The CPSU platform dealing with the national question mentions the special role of the mass media in resolving the problems confronting the party and the nation in this sphere. "It is only the profound respect for the national feelings of each nation and at the same time the maximum adherence to principles in evaluating the events that are occurring that can promote the overcoming of

the contradictions that have arisen..."—the CPSU feels. It is precisely these qualities, in the course of the protracted Karabakh conflict, that, with rare exceptions, the journalists at the central information agencies were unable to display.

Uzbek CP Announces More Changes in Republic Periodicals

*90US0400A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
15 Dec 89 p 1*

[Unattributed report: "In the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee"; for information on other recently announced changes in Uzbek SSR periodicals, see pages 67-68 of the JPRS series, SOVIET UNION: POLITICAL AFFAIRS, JPRS-UPA-89-065, dated 7 December 1989.]

[Text] As has already been reported, in the plan of the realization of the CPSU Central Committee resolution "On Certain Issues of the Restructuring of the Central Party Press," the Uzbek CP Central Committee Buro thoroughly analyzed the activity of the republic's mass information media for the further deepening of democracy in the public, spiritual, and social spheres, and the progress of economic reform.

It was noted that the mass information media play an active role in the course conducted by the party for the renewal of Soviet society. In confirming glasnost and openness, they motivate people to conscious work in the spheres of socioeconomic and political life, forming an active, vital position among them. Simultaneously, at times they do not show enough consistency in advocating the party position. A lack of competence in illuminating individual complex and contradictory processes of life is perceived.

The adopted resolutions emphasize that the work of the mass information media must be conducted so that the entire dialectic of life be shown from the position of perestroika, assisting the advancement of all that is new and progressive. Vital human needs must leap to the foreground of the newspaper pages.

The republic press is obviously lacking a generalization of the experience of perestroika, of new forms of management; it still tells little of the innovators who are laboring on its leading edge, of those whom the times themselves are advancing. In analyzing the movements in the development of the national economy, the mass information media must show how people's attitude toward the cause, their psychology, is changing; how the new type of worker is being formed. During the course of the preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress and the 22nd Uzbek CP Congress, a profound analysis of the processes of party building and the generalization of the experience of utilizing the political work methods is also necessary.

The resolution defined number of concrete organizational measures for the purpose of restructuring the work

of the republic press. Thus, on the abolition of the duplicate publication in Russian of the newspapers KISHLOK KHAKIKATI—SELSKAYA PRAVDA, it was decided to form in 1990 a weekly newspaper of the Uzbek CP Central Committee ISHCHI OVOZI ("voice of the worker") in the Uzbek language and RAB-OCHEYE SLOVO in Russian, each in the 16 page folded PRAVDA format. These newspapers must broadly illuminate the life of the working class in the republic, show all sides of its leading role in modern Soviet society and the administration of state affairs, and openly and authoritatively express the opinion of the working class, which labors in industry, in construction, in transport, in communications, in scientific institutions, and in the administrative sphere. The task of the editorial boards of the new publications is to actively promote the indoctrination and training of the working class from among the indigenous population, to open to the broad readership the policy of the Communist Party in the area of economic, social, and cultural building in a reasoned, profound and convincing manner.

In 1990, monthly sociopolitical and artistic-publicistic journals of the Uzbek CP Central Committee will be created: MULOKOT in Uzbek and DIALOG in Russian will each come out in 10 publisher's sheets. At the same time, the magazines of the Uzbek CP Central Committee UZBEKISTON AGITATORI—AGITATOR UZBEKISTANA and KORRESPONDENT will be abolished, as will the publication of the newspaper SOVET UZBEKISTONI.

The aim of the magazines MULOKOT and DIALOG is to broadly illuminate the diversity of forms of political life, to actively formulate a constructive attitude toward perestroika, and to publish a critical analysis and constructive proposals, and alternative viewpoints on the most topical issues of the theory and practice of socialism, the activity of the party organizations, the soviets of people's deputies, and various public organizations. The magazines will open new facets of political, economic, social, legal, and moral problems in our society, and comment upon the most important events and facts. They are called upon to constantly reflect the dynamics of processes associated with the political and economic reforms, the development of democracy, interethnic relations, culture, with the recovery of the moral atmosphere in society.

The following proposals were adopted:

- Khorezm party obkom—on the renaming, effective January 1990, of the newspaper PAKHTAKORLAR OVOZI, Gurlenskiy Rayon, as GURLAN KHAETI ("life of Gurlen"), MUL KHOSIL UCHUN, Koshk-uyrskiy Rayon, as KHAET KUZGUSI ("mirror of life"), and SOVET PAKHTAKORI, Shavatskiy Rayon, as SHO VAT ISTIKBOLI ("the future of Shabata");
- Tashkent party obkom—on publishing one page of the Galabinskiy Rayon newspaper LENIN YULI in the Kazakh language;
- Bukhara and Surkhan-Darya party obkoms on printing one sheet of the oblast newspapers BUKHORO KHAKIKATI and LENIN BAYROGI in the Tajik language once per week, and on increasing the frequency of publishing the Navoi city newspaper ZNAMYA DRUZHBY—DUSTLIK BAYROGI to three times per week, with the duplication of four sheets in the Uzbek language;
- Samarkand party obkom—on the publication in 1990 of the oblast newspaper OVOZI SAMARKAND in the Tajik language, the publication of the Samarkand party obkom and oblast soviet of people's deputies, in the folded PRAVDA format in the size of four sheets, with a frequency of three issues per week; on the renaming of the expanded (by January 1990) Koshrabadskiy Rayon newspaper KOSHRABAD as ISTIBOL SARI (the Uzbek SSR State Committee for Publishing has been ordered to make corrections in the personnel roster of the indicated newspapers' editorial boards, and to establish the appropriate face value; Uzbek SSR Gosplan is to provide paper);
- the proposal of Uzbek SSR Gosplan;
- on the publication of the duplicate Russian and Uzbek magazine EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN—IKTISOD VA TURMUSH;
- of the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Health on the publication in 1990 of a popular medical-scientific illustrated magazine SIKHAT SALOMATLIK ("health") in the Uzbek language, with a frequency of 12 issues per year;
- of the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Automotive Transportation on the publication of the high-circulation newspaper UZBEKISTON AVTOMOBILCHISI—AVTOMOBILIST UZBEKISTANA in the Uzbek and Russian languages in a volume of four-sheet folded PRAVDA format with a once per week frequency;
- of the political department of the Uzbek board of civil aviation and the presidium of the republic committee of the aviation workers' trade union on the publication of a high-circulation newspaper UZBEKISTON KANOTLARI—KRYLYA UZBEKISTANA in Uzbek and Russian in a volume of four-sheet folded PRAVDA format with a one-week frequency;
- of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences on the publication of a high-circulation newspaper UZBEKISTON OLIMI—UZBEKISTANSKIY UCHENYY in Uzbek and Russian in a volume of four-sheet folded PRAVDA format twice per month;

—of the board of the Uzbek society for the blind to organize the publication starting in 1990 of a sociopolitical journal YANGI KHAET ("new life") in raised-dot [Braille] Uzbek, once per month, with a volume of three printer's sheets.

The resolution orders the Uzbek SSR State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade, the party obkoms, the republic's ministries, departments, and public organizations to introduce within 2 months proposals on the review of the structure

of their publications, and in the event of the need to reprofile the press organs, to take measures to improve their content, and to reduce publications' losses.

The Uzbek SSR Ministry of Communications orders that the appropriate changes be made in the Uzbek SSR catalogue of newspapers and magazines, that the population be informed, and that the supplemental subscription be organized for December of this year with consideration of the changes introduced by the given resolution.

Azerbaijani CC Ideology Commission Meets

90US0392A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian
15 Dec 89 p 2

[AZERINFORM report: "The Meeting of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee Ideological Commission"]

[Text] A regular session of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee Ideological Commission took place under the chairmanship of Azerbaijan CP Central Committee Secretary R.Ya. Zeynalov. Its participants heard the chair's information on the ideological situation in the republic.

The issue of creating a system for recognizing, training, and indoctrinating gifted children was discussed. In noting the work conducted in this direction by the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee together with representatives of the scientific and creative intelligentsia, the ASPS [Azerbaijani Council of Trade Unions] and the Komsomol Central Committee, the appropriate ministries and departments, the speakers expressed a number of proposals and comments for improving the development of a system for recognizing, selecting, educating, and indoctrinating talented children, and creating conditions for their all-around development from the preschool years.

The session participants considered the draft of the state program of study, teaching, and popularizing the history of Azerbaijan, which was discussed in detail at the republic's CP Central Committee Buro, which approved it on the whole, introducing a number of amendments and clarifications.

A decision was made on the issue under discussion, stipulating the creation under rayon (city) departments of education the formation of a psychological service to recognize gifted children, to organize creative summer schools under leading VUZs and secondary educational institutions, the opening of a type of lycee, gymnasium, and colleges of various profiles, and the creation under the republic's Academy of Sciences of the Malaya correspondence academy for those living permanently in village locations, and others. An organizational committee for the creation of the "Istedad" association was formed at the meeting.

The draft of a state program for the study, teaching, and popularizing the history of Azerbaijan, approved on the whole, was introduced for the repeat consideration of commission members, scientists, and specialists.

A lively exchange of opinions took place at the meeting on the issues of the restructuring of the republic party press in the light of the CPSU Central Committee resolution "On Certain Issues of the Restructuring of the Central Party Press." Are independent publications necessary for the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet, the ASPS, and the republic public organizations? What are the high-volume newspapers and the rayon press to be like under the conditions of perestroika? Will Sunday

supplements to republic daily newspapers be issued? Raising these questions and others, the meeting's participants proposed paths for improving the structure and activity of the republic's party press, including the oblast, rayon, and city newspapers, and spoke of the necessity of raising the efficacy and the militancy of the press speeches, their orientation toward the interests and demands of various population strata, and of the mass information media's more active participation in solving the problems of perestroika.

The following commission members participated in the discussion: D.A. Alibekov, G.G. Glushkov, I.A. Ibragimov, Polad Byul-Byulogly, R.I. Makhmudov; M.N. Nabiyeu, director of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee "Kommunist" publishing house; Yu.M. Ivanov, editor of the newspaper VYSHKA, and Sh.M. Shakhmamedov, editor of the newspaper BAKU.

The meeting's participants confirmed the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee Ideological Commission's work plan for 1990.

R.A. Aliyev, chief of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee Ideological Department, participated in the session.

UzSSR: Reasons for Spate of Party Resignations in Almalyk Explored

90US0396 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
5 Dec 89 p 2

[Article by R. Gaydarova: "'Drop-outs': A Communist Surrenders his Party Card. Why? A Correspondent of the Paper Contemplates This."]

[Text] How can one not be surprised at and, at the same time, not ponder the objective reasons behind coincidences such as the following: One the eve of the appearance of PRAVDA's article entitled "Let's Look the Truth in the Eye," I was setting out for Almalyk with the assignment of looking into the motives behind the departure of certain workers at the AGMK [Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Combine] from the ranks of the CPSU. This article emphasized that a sociological survey had confirmed the validity of the well-known view that, among other measures, the party can restore its prestige by cleansing its ranks of "passive members." This is already taking place—this cleansing of "passivists." Albeit, not on a particularly large scale: Of the more than 2000 Communist Party members at the combine, 24 persons this year, and 15 last year. But is it always the light-weights that are being cleaned out? It is worthwhile to take a look at and think about this...

BITTER SCORE

The walls of the solitary confinement cell had scarcely every heard such a reproach:

"Here, my son...is what you have brought me... Thanks: Because of you I split with the party..."

The younger Budkov had not even raised his head by the end of the meeting. For 20 years his father, Anatoliy Nesterovich Budkov, a machinery operator in the sulphate works at the Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Combine, had been a member of the party. And several months ago, one day following his shift, he had gone to see the secretary of the party bureau: "Here is my party card for you. And don't bother me any more..." It was if he were putting up a high fence. His injury had been great and has not disappeared to this day. His son, Anatoliy, had worked alongside him. But he drank and he had played truant, as his father himself acknowledged. The administration decided to fire him. Twice his father had gone to see the director of the combine: "Don't fire him from his job... This will finish him." And this is what happened. After he was fired from his job, he took the crooked path. As a consequence—three years in prison.

"And, indeed, I did ask, I did pray..." the father asserts. "And why didn't they take this into consideration: I have both a medal for excellent work and a certificate of honor. Is it really humane to fire him from his job?"

Everyone, of course, could see the father's grief. But, Anatoliy Nesterovich asserts, right up to the start of the bureau meeting at which Communist Budkov parted ways, the party committee secretary, T.N. Vityugov, had paid no interest to his situation.

My second conversation partner—Aleksandr Ivanovich Frolov, a metal worker in the sulfate works—poured out no less bitterness and resentment during our meeting together. The history of his "departure" from the party also involves personal matters in particular. A respected person within the collective, he was planning a tourist trip to Vietnam. But...they refused to let him go.

"And what reason do you think the combine's party committee cited at its meeting? We don't trust you. You were born in China." Aleksandr Ivanovich relates. "Yes, I was born there, into the family of a military serviceman. But came to the Kazakhstan virgin lands already way back in 1954. Then I served in the ranks of the Soviet Army. I have now lived in Almalyk for 19 years and have my family, my children, here. I have already gone gray while working at the combine...and have been in the party for ten years. And they don't trust me?!"

Did the primary party organization take up the fight on his behalf? By no means. They took him to task for not paying his dues. And they excluded him in accordance with paragraph 8 of the CPSU Statutes. The deputy secretary of the combine's party committee, V.V. Makoveychuk, spoke with him twice (he was absent from the meeting of the party committee) and indicated that "the primary party organization—is not the entire party..."

"Yes, not the entire party," countered A.I. Frolov again, this time in the presence of the correspondent. "But, for

me, the party both starts and ends precisely here. And if they do not trust me, then this means that I am not needed by the party..."

No, there was neither bad temper nor posturing in what he said. But only a deep and a bitter disappointment. I am convinced that the depth of what these people have lived through demands a deepness of analysis, to say nothing of attention. And if, on one hand, it is not possible to completely justify their actions, then it must also be recognized that each of these two had expected that they would receive support and an attentive attitude from their party comrades. Indeed, they had given to the party everything that had been required of them (it is another matter that not much was required).

The objection can be raised that not all the moral pretensions, of, for example, A.N. Budkov, can be accepted. Yes, not all of them. But who is the source his pain, who tried to persuade him of things that were false? Why did the communists of the sulfate works not help the father to educate of his son? Was the collective really incapable of such a thing? Alas, the primary party organization did not rise to the solution of this problem. And, in response, the "drop-outs," unable to rise to a political assessment of their own behavior, did not show up at the meeting of the party bureau. And so, is it one to one?

The score could be seen to favor the party bureau—which judged, convicted and got rid of "ballast," if... If, in the past, Frolov and Budkov had not been people who were respected within the collective and had not been far from passive as party members. And so, the bitter score is not in favor of perestroika. And here is the testimony of S.I. Berdyayev, a senior specialist and party member: "If even half the people in my shop were like Frolov, we would overturn mountains. I can understand his resentment. You can't treat people this way."

T.N. Vityugova, secretary of the party committee: "The primary party organization has reacted very casually to Frolov's departure from the party. He is an excellent worker. The primary organization had an opportunity to convince him to change his mind." O. Buryanova, secretary of the party bureau: "Budkov's announcement, his departure, was came as a complete surprise to us."

Fly in the Milk

The stories of Frolov and Budkov, with all their moral accents, are only a facet of the problem, one of many. Analysis conducted by the party committee at the combine has uncovered eight such "facets." And all of them are revealed in declarations by communists. "I joined the party unconsciously, during the period of stagnation, and now I have come to understand that I do not wish to be a member of the CPSU." "I wish to leave the ranks of the CPSU because of family circumstances," "...for reasons of health. Or here is another: "The party has no real authority. I get only reproach because I am a communist." And, on top of this, there is disagreement

with the policy of the party in the question of perestroika, dissatisfaction with its pace, a loss of faith in justice.

Such motivation was advanced, albeit not terribly correctly, by S. B. Rukavitsyn, a senior mechanic in the smelting and rolling shop at the copper-smelting plant: "I'm not going to go along with any recommendation. In general I don't agree with the policy of the party." How principled was his position? Communists in the primary party organization (as T.N. Vityugova has advised) noted: His attitude toward instructions has been bad, his presence in the party has been a burden to him. "Without regrets he took leave of the party; without regrets they also parted with him.

Emotions developed in just the same way in the case of O.V. Gritshchuk, a shift explosives expert at the Altyn-Topkap ore administration. The reason he gave for leaving—that "they did not permit me to work in peace until my retirement"—was assessed very specifically by the members of the primary organization: a consumerist attitude toward the party. This had also been manifested earlier, in a demand for unjustified extra benefits—for an apartment, out of turn. He ignored party meetings, did not pay his dues. And as the weightiest argument: "He stood apart from perestroika. Passive. Likes a quiet life."

Incidentally, the latter argument also incites passions. For a long time, it has not been news that perestroika is actively moving all of us to the front stage of political life. Some people are retreating further into the shadows, into the depths of purely personal interests and experiences. And people who in the past were simply "extras," required from time to time to add their voices to the "chorus," have stood tall and have moved right out front. For the sake of massivity, for increased ideological impact. But for both the one and the other, perestroika has provided what is essentially an invaluable opportunity—to be one's self. If you don't want to—then leave the ranks of the party without damaging your professional career. On the other hand: if you wish, remain within its ranks, but not for the sake of getting a high position. This is precisely how the political accents are being placed within the combine's party organization today, and this is a source of satisfaction.

"The opportunists leave, the convinced remain, the unselfish come..."—such are the conclusions of the combine's party committee, headed by Zh. Mirzaliyev, and the secretaries of the primary organizations.

And who have come to replace those who have gotten out at the sulphate works? As a candidate for membership in the party has come the 23-year old machine operator Narzulla Amarkulov, now a student, in the future a mining engineer, and before the army a worker in this same shop. "Does it confuse me that some are leaving the ranks of the party today?"—he repeats the question. "Not at all. These are opportunistic people."

Ismet Akhmedov, 24 years old, a machine operator: "Write that I want to participate actively in perestroika, in all public life. To participate and not just to be present."

The difficulties which the party is now going through are also not stopping those who have crossed the threshold of maturity (the number of people joining considerably exceeds the number who have been left and been excluded). R. Kalinina, 35 years old, a machine operator in the hydrometallurgical shop: "I am convinced that the convinced must come in a difficult time. The party has found within itself the strength to recognize its mistakes. I am with it." A. Malygin, 43 years, a metal worker in the gas enterprise: "I want to help the party in its hard times through my active participation. In my Komsomol years, many of my contemporaries entered the party for careerist reasons. Some are behind bars today. This means that a cleansing is taking place..."

And side by side with this is the position of the lathe operator in the zinc plant, S. V. Kirov, who does not want to pay his party dues any longer (for some this is a decent amount, as their earnings may reach 500-700 rubles). "It is better for my mother that I leave... I have seen enough of how old people are tormented in Siberia: a piece of soap for a coupon, a kilogram of sugar, and live as you wish... As a communist, I am ashamed to look them in the eye..."

Most likely, even after the next talk with him, this comrade will turn in his part card. The difficulties of life have a paralyzing effect on such people. Incidentally, sociologists who have published their conclusions in the pages of PRAVDA emphasize that: "A worsening in the quality of life strikes directly at the authority of the party, undermines trust in the party organizations. And this, unfortunately, is not always taken into consideration in practical work."

However, this "not always" does not relate to the city party committee. Its secretary, A. Abduvasikov, firmly takes the position that, with the existing social tension, problems of providing for the vital needs of the city remain political problems. Within the walls of the city committee we must solve the political side of economic problems...

And so, the principle has been proclaimed. And how is it being realized?

"During the past three years we have tripled the amount of new housing introduced. We are devoting paramount attention to opening social and cultural facilities. We have obtained supplementary deliveries of meat products to the city. After establishing a processing line for pasteurization and refrigeration of milk, additional tons of milk have been obtained for our residents. The furniture combine is now earmarking furniture valued at a million rubles for our city. The Almalyk household chemicals combine has begun to allocate up to 200 tons of washing substances to its own city. We are successfully carrying on negotiations at top official levels in Moscow

about the introduction of territorial cost accounting. Then we will be able to solve all our most pressing problems..."

One cannot but agree with Abdumannop Abduvasikovich that "when there is all of this, then this is an economic question; when there is not, then it is a political one..."

Has the city not felt these shifts? Possibly yes. Also possibly no. There are still great shortages. But strategy is strategy. It has long-term rather than immediate goals. Tactics—this is another matter.

They told me at the copper foundry and the zinc plant how the city party committee summoned its activists together at the beginning of September and called upon them to carry out an effective campaign to uncover violations in the distribution of sugar and washing substances. A bold and uncompromising group of people was gathered. They went simultaneously through all the stores and discovered more than a few shortcomings. And they were struck by the fact that many impermissible things are also being done in the industrial goods trade. They reported all this at a meeting of the city party committee. "It is not your affair to investigate industrial goods"—this is how they had their hands slapped in the city committee. The results of the campaign then had no effect on normalization of the situation. The same with the distribution of sugar. It would seem this was explained by a lack of self-discipline, by a lack of energy. And the reaction? Social tensions in the city became more complicated. And the story of how an AGMK initiative group was treated heated them by one more degree.

In an appeal to the party city committee, the workers demanded anew that the steps which the party committee would undertake for the purpose of introducing order in the food trade and in city transport be publicized in the city newspaper. This word "anew" does not incline one to be optimistic.

These may be isolated facts that will hardly damage the grand strategy. But, at the same time, they are like a fly in the milk. Even though it is little, this fly, you will nevertheless not drink the milk afterwards...

It will hardly likely that anyone will calculate how many party cards will be surrendered after this, how many

unflattering words will be addressed to the party... Most of all nonobjective, unjust words... But the complexity of the moment lies in the fact that it is impossible to neutralize this growing critical attitude by using old methods. But what kind are there—new ones?

There is no doubt but that they are thinking about this in the city party committee. But why not turn to the experience of rank-and-file communists, to their sharp political feel, to constructive possibilities?

I involuntarily asked myself this question when I was listening to the arguments of Rafil Garayev, a young specialist who had surrendered his party candidate's card. Even if you did not fully understand the meaning of his words, even then you would be struck by the tone of his monologue: indignation, hostility, accusation... Most of all he was indignant about a difficult, dramatic situation within the city, about the long years of inaction by city authorities who have not concerned themselves with freeing the city from suffocating harmful wastes. Even today, all the smokestacks in Almalyk are spewing tons of solid substances on the city. Even today acid rains are falling here. Yes, all this is true. Just as true as the fact that in recent years the party city committee has not considered ecological questions to be exceptional and urgent ones. By undertaking a system of measures in the future, it will bring relief to the city.

"I don't want to simply pay my dues, to carry a party card," says R. Garayev. "Indeed, today I can't change anything in the difficult ecological situation in the city. And in many other things. And who among the young people can? Has anybody really listened to us, the young people, up until now?... And who, tell me, will listen to me?..."

No, we could not convince him—neither I nor V. V. Makoveychuk who was taking part in the conversation—that his knowledge, his youthful fire and energy, were necessary to the cause, to that same ecological commission of the combine. Necessary to his party organization, which would be able to make the very best use of this energy and concern. But Garayev has little faith either in the possibilities of his primary party organization or that they would listen to him...

Yes, we were unable to change his mind. Next to us, appearing as a silent opponent in our debate, propping up the sky itself, stood the stack from a reverberatory furnace, constantly spewing poisonous acid over the city.

ArSSR: Spitak Raykom First Secretary on Quake Reconstruction Progress

90US0329 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Dec 89 p 3

[Interview with N. Muradyan, Spitak Raykom First Secretary, by Moscow PRAVDA correspondent Yu. Ursov: "If No Stoppages Occur"]

[Text] USSR People's Deputy, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Armenia Spitak Raykom Committee N. Muradyan recently returned from a trip to Mexico and the United States as part of a scientific delegation. The delegation's goal was to examine how consequences of earthquakes are being handled there. But it was not the only goal: A tile factory, heavy cargo helicopters, technological lines—thirty items in all which businessmen of Armenian industry in the United States promised to study in order to help the victims of the earthquake in Armenia at a later time. Without charge. Our conversation with N. Muradyan regarding his trip follows.

[Correspondent] Gratuitous assistance, unquestionably, is a good thing, something that can only be welcomed. But personally I have always wondered whether or not it could be possible that with all that, the resources and forces allocated to Armenia from the all-union reserves are inadequate.

[Muradyan] I agree, any aid given a republic after a tragedy must be accepted with gratitude. Of course, rebuilding from the ruins goes on first and foremost from the great flow of construction materials and equipment, and to the people who come here from thousands of kilometers away. There are, of course, both problems and "misalignments."

[Correspondent] But didn't the system of centralized planning, that is, the governmental decrees, bring instant results?

[Muradyan] By the end of this year, we should have received 354,000 square meters of living space. This is roughly 7,000 apartments, a third of all future housing space in Spitak. I would be very pleased if 80,000 square meters could be put into service. It is not only a matter of the traditional misfortunes that befall contractors, i.e., defects in design, unpredictable deliveries, and so forth. The builders have really put in a good day's work. Especially from Krasnodar, Penza, and Orenburg, and our nearly 5,000 Armenian builders are working quite satisfactorily. The major reason for the lag is something else altogether: Stoppages along the railroad. For nearly 4 months we have been unable to obtain railcars of cement, metalworks, or construction materials, even per our order. What we received were partially completed prefabricated houses. Moreover, Armenian SSR State Construction and the heads of the Estonian and Uzbekistan associations who were directing the rebuilding of Spitak did not always work efficiently. Understand me correctly. Reasons do exist. And they are quite substantial. By the way, I would like to add that in Moscow, I always

met with understanding at the highest governmental levels. Just a day or two ago, a USSR people's deputy met with N.I. Ryzhkov to discuss the allocation of automobiles for the disabled in Spitak. The outcome was positive. They support us in both Gossnab and in the USSR State Committee for Construction, and the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions.

[Correspondent] Can you use your status as People's Deputy to help?

[Muradyan] I try to use my authority as far as I can. But here is what I would like to say, having heard the debates on the position of People's Deputy. They are to a great extent concerned with the counterpart deputy in the highest administrative apparatus and also with the local organs. But there is another, in my opinion more significant side to the deputy's activities: his role in direct contact with the voters, in uniting the people in some kind of goal. In Spitak, as it happened, the people came together because of a tragedy. And with several dozens of people coming into our raykom trailer every day, we talk with literally each one about how to quickly eliminate the consequences of the catastrophe. What are we going to do? In winter, conserve strength, create reserves of construction materials, equipment, and fuel, so that in spring we can charge ahead with construction. If, of course, no stoppages occur along the railroad...

High Central Asian Infant Mortality Rate Examined

90US0389 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 10 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by M. Ripinskaya, in response to a letter by M. Raskina: "Deficit Children"]

[Text] We have long gotten used to the stock phrase "Children are the only privileged class in our country." This idea was drummed into us from the very first moment we began to understand something. Now that I have brought up two children and become a grandmother I have come to understand how far removed from life these words are, how sacrilegious they are when contrasted with reality. When the state-bureaucratic machine slights a person and his spiritual and social needs this is frightening in and of itself. It is doubly so when children are at issue. The residual principle makes them socially (and frequently also physically) retarded from the very first days of life. Is this not the reason why orphanages, corrections facilities for juvenile criminals, and special schools for the retarded and the crippled are overflowing? What is such a society to become in the future?

[signed] M. Raskina, engineer, Moscow

1. Grass Does Not Grow in Winter

Unfortunately, there are many similar letters in the editorial mailbag. A depressing picture of the situation of

little citizens in our society, where everything is done "in the name of and for the benefit of man," emerges from individual cases.

Demographers are concerned: The birth rate in our country is declining. One marriage in three is dissolved. In the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], 13.2 million parents have... 11.8 million children. Families with many children in the republics of Central Asia "help out." However, even now our society needs families with three children for the regular replacement of generations.

At the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences, they showed me frightening diagrams: Abortions remain... the main "method" of family planning due to our medical illiteracy and a shortage of contraceptives. On this score, our country ranks among the first in the world (more than 100 abortions per 1,000 women; in the United States—27.5).

Thank God, there are still children born in our country, 5 million a year on the average, despite considerable expenditures exceeding family income, despite a shortage of hollow pacifiers, baby food, nurseries, day-care centers, and housing. Still, the declining birth rate is one of the signs of our socio-economic troubles. I dare say that it is a sign of ethical troubles as well.

Certainly, we cannot say that the state does not care to protect mothers and children. Many resolutions have been adopted. However, there is a problem: For quite a few of them, the funds needed have not been allocated. The residual principle is still in effect. Judge for yourselves: Instead of 40 percent of the capital expenditures for health care the children "garner" a far smaller share. During the 12th 5-year plan, only 29 percent of beds for children in hospitals and 22 percent in outpatient clinics were commissioned. Plans for the construction of maternity wards and children's polyclinics in the RSFSR, Kazakhstan, and Moldavia were not fulfilled. In Uzbekistan and Turkmenia, protracted construction projects are a burden. A square meter of an establishment for children is worth less... than a square meter of an equipped pigsty.

Given this "care," the hand of a sensitive barometer of infant mortality is inexorably moving up. It is them, infants, our delicate citizens, that our neglect is literally killing first of all.

I recall a woman with premature wrinkles around her eyes. Within 3 years, two infants born one after the other died in a maternity ward of infections contracted inside the hospital. I stroked her shoulder, and looked into her aloof, foggy eyes. I am certain that she will not be up to a third ordeal.

For a long time, we did not release infant mortality statistics. It was believed that there is no problem as long as there are no statistics. There is a problem. In Turkmenia, 56 children out of 1,000 born die before the age of 1, in Tajikistan—49, and in Uzbekistan—46. In

Moscow, 20 children die on the average out of 1,000 born. For comparison, in Tokyo nine infants do. As little as several years ago, these depressing statistics actually shocked our society. It appears that by now we have become used and accustomed to them.

In Orphanage No 10, they showed me the youngest ones, under 1 year of age. Pale creatures lay in neat little beds. Their hands were affected by cyanosis, and their leg joints were disfigured by a horrible disease. They stared nonsensically at one point. It was a dysfunction of the central nervous system. They will never become able-bodied people now.

For a long time, and also at present, we have been blaming everything on the parents whose way of life is, supposedly, wrong. However, this is but one reason and by far not the decisive one.

Doctor I. Khorokhorina told me: "Thirty percent of such toddlers come to us from quite healthy, non-drinking parents. Apparently, improper development of the fetus in the womb is a factor."

There also is another opinion: Such children are brought into the world because they conduct resuscitation in the maternity wards for impermissibly long periods of time (much longer than the prescribed 20 minutes).

Many ordinary maternity wards do not have neonatologists (doctors handling the problems of newborn babies between the 1st and 28th days of their lives). There are no resuscitation specialists or equipment which makes it possible to monitor the functions of the brain and the entire organism. So, an obstetrician does resuscitation himself, at his own risk.

Only in a nightmare can one visualize the torment of the parents of a retarded child, an idiot. Hundreds of rubles are spent in the course of a search for a miracle doctor; no end of funds is needed for the state in order to maintain such children in special boarding schools.

Should we, perhaps, ban the resuscitation of newborn babies? So, he is not breathing, and this means that he was not meant to live? This is not a way out. Clear guidelines by the Ministry of Health are necessary on how to proceed in this or that case. After all, it all depends. In some cases, an infant starts breathing well, and an able-bodied man comes out. Special equipment and monitors which track the condition of all systems of a newborn baby and a still unborn fetus provide the main way out. This is how the risk of mentally retarded children with a dysfunction of the central nervous system being born could be reduced to nothing. Alas, such devices are not produced in our country. Apparently, the Ministry of the Medical Industry is not equal to the task, or else it has other, more significant tasks. Never mind the monitors. You won't find even the smallest piece of equipment manufactured here in any perinatal diagnostic center (diagnostics of the newborns). To be sure, there is one, the breathing device for the newborn "Vita." However, as the medics themselves

admit, it just "rips" the lungs of the child because, unlike Western devices, it includes neither a humidifier nor an air heater.

There is a vicious circle: We invest in building special boarding schools for the mentally retarded and fight for additional preferences for children who are handicapped in their childhood years. Meanwhile, we ourselves multiply their number, knowingly or not. For example, in the city of Berezniki in Perm Oblast the number of students in schools for the mentally retarded increased by a factor of 8 between 1972 and 1988.

Being humane—does it only include keeping them warm and fed? What about letting them experience life, a full-value life of a full-value man? It has become fashionable: We collect funds at charity fairs, and give benefit concerts. Could it be that we should also raise a cry in this matter and go around hat in hand?

This, however, is not a way out. Would it not be better to find their own sponsors for each maternity ward, children's hospital, and polyclinic—major worker's collectives which finally have come into money. The Ministry of Finance, for its part, should not collect taxes on the funds an enterprise spends for children's institutions.

I was naive to believe that there would not be that many problems at one of the best children's hospitals of Moscow. So, there I was, at Hospital No 7 of Tushinskiy Rayon. It was a huge, brightly lit structure consisting of seven buildings with "a set" of all kinds of [medical department] chairs, formidable diagnostic and consultative facilities. It is designed for 1,100 beds out of which... 200 are empty. It turns out that there is a shortage of doctors. Only half the positions are filled. Together with Chief Physician Yu. Pavlov we headed for the holy of holies, the newborn disease ward. This is where the little patients were who had already experienced the consequences of inept assistance at delivery or had already managed to "catch" an infection or pneumonia in the maternity ward...

Yuriy Mikhaylovich told us: "Nothing has been thought through. The design of our hospital was developed in 1974, and it was commissioned in 1985. At times, there is nowhere to plug the equipment into. There are no ramps, footways. There are no provisions for plugs. When we moved in sewage was flowing... from the faucet in the infections ward. The hospital lacks much-needed drugs. There are no disposable syringes. There are no medicines."

They were tired of repeating "there are no" for me. However, now I know for sure that there is something else, something not associated with medical care but still painfully affecting our children. If there is ice the surgeons roll up their sleeves and go out to scrape off the ice on the access drive leading to the emergency surgery building. This is the situation which the hospital is facing thanks to the Tushinskiy Rayon Executive Committee: Supposedly, this your compound, so you take care of it. In addition to this, the chief physician does not sleep

well: At night, nobody guards the hospital. On occasion, local "hippies" spend their time merrily in dark basements and night walkways. Meanwhile, there are 40 infants per one nurse, a young girl. Anything can happen. They have written everywhere! He went all the way to Petrovka. Apparently, nobody cares for this "trifle." Now that we are talking about the full power of the Soviets and their financial independence let us hold them fully accountable as well.

To tell you the truth, I kept waiting for someone to come up to the speaker's stand at the Congress of People's Deputies and cry about our national woes rather than just talk (we do talk a lot). The 2d Congress came to a favorable end. There is silence again.

There are difficulties with food for the babies. From among all the children born annually, 800,000 are on "artificial nourishment" from day one on. Another 1.2 million receive mixed nourishment. How are these 2 million infants to be fed? There are no imported substitutes available in the stores. The Malyshev and Malysheva formulas are not for every baby. Industry turns out one-tenth of the amount of liquid and paste dairy products needed.

Formula-mixing centers help out as they used to in the old times. Their capacity is small. At times, there may not be enough yogurt or mix for a sluggish mother. Even in Moscow the Lianozovo Experimental Plant of Dairy Products for Children is barely coping with the extreme load: 100 tons of milk a day. God forbid if one line breaks down; the equipment has been purchased for hard currency, and the children will go hungry.

I have already heard the expression "the children of a shortage" somewhere. In the USSR Ministry of Health, they do not deny this. However, the first signs of "a way out of this situation" are apparent. Within the framework of conversion, joint production of incubators for newborn babies with a Swiss company has already begun in Moscow. Forty special cars for the transportation of newborn babies have been purchased, as well as 40 Austrian systems for diagnosing the diseases of the nervous system in the youngest patients. At the ministry, they admit that there are not enough funds for everything. At present, 15 times more hard-currency rubles are needed for equipment purchases alone than are available. Is it, perhaps, worthwhile for the USSR Ministry of Health and the State Planning Committee to consider target-oriented funding for the priority sphere of motherhood and childhood, so that the funds allocated for our children pay for meeting their needs and are not siphoned away as other expenditures for the needs of the adults? So that finally medical and genetic consultation facilities and perinatal centers appear not in major cities only? So that each future mother knows firmly: Her child will be born healthy. This is what the draft law "On the Protection of Motherhood and Childhood" developed by the USSR Ministry of Health specifies. It covers everything, and everything codifies the legal defense of the interests of our children and care for

their health prior to their birth. This is a good and necessary law. However, we will be the ones to implement it, because saving a drowning man is... All of us are drowning, and we still fail to understand that there is nothing more important than motherhood and childhood. A healthy progeny is the strength of a nation. Flowers do not grow on the snow, on the snow of our indifference.

Significance Of Baku Religious School for Azeri Muslims Outlined

18310042A Baku ADABIYYAT VA INJASANAT in Azeri 20 Oct 89 p 7

[Interview with Hajy Sabir Hasanov, deputy chairman of Spiritual Administration for Transcaucasian Muslims: "On The Path Of Right"]

[Text][Editorial Introduction] Recently justifiable dissatisfaction about the religious representatives in our republic has been raised. This dissatisfaction was connected with the reduction in number of the clergy and the gradual disappearance of religious centers. If this was caused, on the one hand, by the bureaucratic and administrative command system's desire to dispossess the mosques by any means, to put them under pressure and eliminate them, and to persecute religious believers, on the other hand there was also no specialized religious school. This also struck serious blows at the republic's Muslim circles in the true meaning of the word.

The commencement of activity of the first madrasa in Azerbaijan for many years must be evaluated as a significant event in this context. Now, entrance examinations behind them, the students have begun their first courses. In this connection our correspondent was at the madrasa, met with Hajy Sabir Hasanov, deputy chairman of the Spiritual Administration for Transcaucasian Muslims, and talked with him.

Below we have given the the text of the interview.

[Correspondent] Hajy Sabir, for years there have been no centers for training the clergy in Azerbaijan. The existing difficulties which arose in this sector undoubtedly caused a scarcity of literate clergy and, as a result, gave a broader scope to the less knowledgeable ones. I presume that a number of important measures will be implemented in connection with the opening of the madrasa.

[Hasanov] For long years Islam, like other religions, was subjected to serious losses in the true meaning of the word. Madrasas were closed, mosques were destroyed, and the clergy and the ulema were subjected to oppression. This persecution took on a more intense character at the end of the 1920s and during the years of repression and, as a result, the clergy were shot in the same way as the innocent intellectuals, or exiled, or thrown into prison.

After the war, the relationship to religion and the clergy was not good. Look at the mosques and religious shrines.

The majority of these buildings, centuries-old historical-architectural monuments, were destroyed due to neglect or were not used. These monuments and the liquidated religious personalities, however, could have played an important role in the formation of the historical, cultural, and spiritual life of our people and put them on a healthier path of development. We feel the pain of what we have lost to this day. Was there truly any need to write about and destroy certain people as enemies of the new structure when they did not understand the new structure, and then later to exile peoples en masse from the lands of their forefathers? Certainly not!

Historically it has always been the case that before a certain innovation finds its place adherents appear who comprehend its goals and positive sides; only later do others who join it. From this point of view it is by no means possible to justify the policy of merciless mass persecution conducted against religions, especially Islam.

Perestroyka has brought a new relationship to the religious belief (as it has to other sectors of life) of the peoples who live in our country. This relationship has directed public attention to destroying a great inertia and indifference. As an example we would note the new law being prepared on religion. The project for this law, "On Freedom Of Conscience", is being prepared by order of the USSR Supreme Soviet and will soon be turned over to the people for discussion. One of the significant events for us is that one of the two clergy belonging to the commission which is preparing this law is USSR People's Deputy and chairman of the Spiritual Administration for Transcaucasian Muslims, Sheykhulislam Allahshukur Pashazade. I would add that the preparation of the new law is extremely necessary because the stipulations of the 1929 "Law On Religious Cults" were completely unjust. Just imagine that until recently there were only eighteen mosques for seven million people. Its madrasa and other religious training centers have been buried in the darkness of history. We had to be satisfied by sending one or two people a year to Uzbekistan for training.

Thanks to perestroyka and democratization another nineteen mosques were restored and returned to service last year. We believe that there will be a turning point.

[Correspondent] You mean perestroyka will turn into a tradition in our religion in the true meaning of the word.

[Hasanov] Yes. Thanks to the opening of more and more mosques our need for clergy has increased even more. In this context, the opening of the madrasa as a training system for the first time in seventy years was as necessary as air and water.

[Correspondent] From what we have heard, along with the general education schools in the city of Tabriz, there are also close to fifty madrasas in operation. In your opinion, isn't just one madrasa for a population of more than seven million too few? And we are not talking about the other Muslims living in the Caucasus. What kind of work are you doing in this direction?

[Hasanov] They say not to be ashamed of what you have. No doubt the opening of a madrasa, like the opening of mosques, will be done according to the desires and needs of our people. If in the future the religious believing masses of our people have such a wish and if life places such a need before us and if no difficulties which are not dependent on us arise, then we will try to open a second madrasa with pleasure.

[Correspondent] Our readers would be interested in what you could tell us about admissions to the madrasa and the curriculum.

[Hasanov] According to the existing law, non-party youth who are eighteen years old, who can read the Koran and have a good level of knowledge of secular sciences will be accepted into the madrasa. At admissions time the spiritual qualities of the youths are also taken into consideration.

[Correspondent] What do you mean by "good level of knowledge?"

[Hasanov] This includes questions on Azeri history and literature, USSR history and the general laws of geography, astronomy and even physics. Applicants are tested on the basis of a complete secondary education in these sciences. During the examination period wide-ranging questions are asked on the relationship of the applicants to contemporary events as well as to the important changes taking place in our country. The first admissions examination was very fair and we also considered the needs of rayons lacking clergy during the competition.

[Correspondent] How many applications did you receive and how many students did you accept?

[Hasanov] More than three hundred applications for entrance into the madrasa were received. We were only able to accept twenty one people. Among them are not only Azeris, but also Adjars and Ingilois.

Lectures will be conducted in one sequence. The students' food, lodging, clothing, and expenses will be provided for by the madrasa over a five year period. I am sure that this is possible thanks to the generosity of our people. I would note that soon the madrasa will open its own account at the state bank. The material and spiritual care of the madrasa students studying in the name of the future progress of our nation is in the hands of our people.

[Correspondent] Will women be accepted into the madrasa?

[Hasanov] Yes! We are thinking about organizing Koran courses under the aegis of the madrasa for our women in the future. I would say openly that many of our women who wish a religious education have applied to the religious administration.

[Correspondent] It is known that military service is required for all able-bodied Soviet citizens. There are

many things forbidden to Muslims during military service. There is much about this in the 175th verse of the "Baqara" chapter of the Koran. In this verse it is stated that pork, carrion, blood and wine are forbidden to the Muslim. What happens when madrasa students are drafted into military service? Could it not be that students would be exempted from military service, like other higher school students?

[Hasanov] Up till now no law has been considered for this. We are accepting applicants into the madrasa who have already done their military service. Here they will be taught the Koran, the Tafsir, Hadith, Fiqh, Islamic history and calligraphy from the religious subjects as well as secular sciences. Arabic, Persian, English and Russian will be taught to our students along with Azeri. Our best students will be sent to higher religious schools in foreign Muslim countries to perfect their third or fourth year course work.

[Correspondent] How have sectarian issues been resolved in the teaching process at the madrasa?

[Hasanov] No sectarianism will be permitted in either the admissions or the study period at the madrasa. Thus, students from the Sunni Hanafi and Shafi'i sects are studying alongside Shi'i students. In the final analysis, this sectarianism is forbidden by Allah himself. Look, there is a verse in the Koran's "Ali Imran" chapter: "Be on the path of truth with all and do not permit factionalism." Unfortunately, these factions have always existed in the history of Islam and sectarian fanaticism has often turned into hostility and open enmity; this has led to the waste of the material and spiritual resources gained by Islam over the course of centuries. The bloody wars which occurred in the Middle Ages prove what we have said historically. However, the situation is better now because our people have distanced themselves from such harmful sectarianism under the present conditions in Azerbaijan, and representatives of both sects now pray at the same time in many mosques—in Baku's Ezhderbey mosque, and in mosques in Guba, Shaki, Goychay, and other cities.

[Correspondent] Recently the idea has circulated among the wider public that the anti-Muslim militant activity of reactionary forces has increased in the international arena. What do you think about this?

[Hasanov] In fact, the influence of Islam on the international level has grown in recent years. How can one explain this? First, by the growth of the international influence of the Arab countries and other countries where Islam dominates and by the fact that territories administered by Muslim countries have turned into arenas of conflict. Second, one can explain it by the contemporaneity of Islam's own content, its ability to respond to all demands of the time and man's greater need for its spiritual world, and the feeling of jealousy against this new religion by a world opposed to it.

[Correspondent] Are you confronting any difficulties in the work of the madrasa?

[Hasanov] We have many material difficulties. One of the reasons for the belated opening of our madrasa, when religious academies in neighboring republics have been operating for a long time, was because of the bureaucratic and conservative administrative principles of the years of stagnation. Another reason was our shortage of funds. In order to eliminate the fund shortage and to take care of our mosques, which need repair and construction, we decided to print the Koran in Arabic and Azeri and organize its sale through subscription at a high cost.

[Correspondent] In your opinion, will the youths who graduate from the madrasa be able to represent Islam in a worthy manner?

[Hasanov] Undoubtedly. I wish to assure all readers through the pages of your newspaper that every graduate of the madrasa will raise the name of this educational center to the heights in the formation of public opinion and in the worthy continuation of the spiritual heritage remaining to us from our ancestors both inside our country and over its borders through their deep knowledge and competence.

Interview with Ratbek-Khadzhi, Qadi of Kazakhstan

90US0291A Moscow TRUD in Russian 7 Dec 89 p 6

[Interview with Ratbek-Khadzhi in Alma-Ata by TRUD correspondent O. Kvyatkovskiy: "Soul and Faith: Interesting Interlocutor"]

[Text] A delicate parchment of birch tree leaves falls down on a house yard. It is long past midnight, but the window is lit up in the house of qadi, the supreme judge for all the Islamic believers in Kazakhstan. The room is filled with the rustle of pages, as the dry leaves of ancient books are followed by the pages of the most current newspapers...Qadi loves these moments when, in his own words, the thirst for knowledge and inner perfection that he developed as a village child long ago, is being "nourished." This man has an enviably solid and broad-based education...A TRUD correspondent met him to talk about good and mercy and about how the Kazakh believers are reacting to the changes taking place today.

Together with other religious leaders of the Kazakh SSR, Ratbek-Khadzhi was recently received by the first secretary of the republic Communist Party's Central Committee, Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev. What did they talk about? It addressed the importance of continuing to restore the Leninist principles governing attitude towards religion that began in the country; the feelings of the believers, the majority of whom supported perestroika; what ministers of religion can do to spread the supreme humanistic moral postulates of mercy, friendship and goodness...

[Correspondent] Esteemed qadi, will you evaluate the nature of changes that have taken place in the lives of the Kazakh Moslem believers?

[Qadi] People's spiritual needs and their most full satisfaction are the things that concern us most of all now. The state has noticeably gone half-way to accommodate us, and this is gratifying.

[Correspondent] About 200 mosques have been opened within only one year, but this represents the entire country. How about us in Kazakhstan?

[Qadi] There were 25 operating mosques in the entire republic when I became a qadi exactly ten years ago. Now we have 57. New ones have been built in Zhetysai, Abai, Urdzhar, Panfilovo, Chu, Kaskelen...We are restoring the buildings turned over to us and are planning to build new ones. Our teaching makes it compulsory to engage in joint prayers. Besides, any mosque can become a center of moral education.

[Correspondent] I know that a new mosque is to be built in Alma-Ata.

[Qadi] Yes, its dimensions have been decided upon. It will have a 23-m high cupola and a 40-m high minaret. The city executive committee has allocated us a plot of land. A very reliable contractor, one of the units of the Kazakh main village protection administration, has been found.

[Correspondent] What about money?

[Qadi] We have it. Let me put it this way, as a fully self-financing organization, we transfer 200 thousand rubles every year to the Spiritual Administration in Tashkent alone.

[Correspondent] Esteemed qadi, how many Muslim believers are there in Kazakhstan then?

[Qadi] This is a tough question. Nobody can give you the answer. Until recently the Moslems practicing rituals were in for serious trouble. We take into account the fact that the Kazakh SSR has the Turkic-speaking population of up to ten million people. In the Alma-Ata mosque, for example, people of 23 nationalities listen to the sermons delivered by me or by the local imams. Many people, of course, have not finalized their attitude to religion. This is not surprising, since it was only recently that artificial barriers were removed to enable them to do so.

[Correspondent] But those vested with power in the Kazakh hinterland occasionally try to look "holier than the Pope." Their iron-clad slogan is "we need no religion..."

[Qadi] I am aware of such instances. What can I say? These people are ignorant of Lenin's postulates on this score, or of the respective laws passed by our state, whose strict implementation is monitored now more closely than ever before.

[Correspondent] Still one hears people talking sometimes about "Islam's particular aggressiveness." The events in the Fergana Valley have poured oil onto the fire...

[Qadi] I think this is nothing but rubbish, bordering on an overt provocation...

[Correspondent] According to eye witnesses, the mob really shouted to the clergymen: "Go away, there is no Allah..."

[Qadi] Here we go. Did the believers shout this? I think that it is the other way round - aggressiveness and anger were fired by the oblivion of the principles of our teaching and by a moral vacuum.

[Correspondent] One can admit now that the southern parts of the Kazakh SSR went through the days of trouble too at that time.

[Qadi] It is not just the flood of Uzbek refugees. Calls for vengeance were heard. I brought together the most authoritative Mesquitian Turks who live with us in Kazakhstan. I reminded them of all the appropriate ayats and commandments. That conversation was very involved and not an easy one, but we did restrain people.

[Correspondent] You have had some experience...

[Qadi] You mean the events in December 1986? This is probably true. Talking to many people at that time, I realized with bitterness how little they knew about real Islam...I am convinced that had clergymen been present in Novyy Uzen during those sad events, it would have been easier and faster to calm people down.

[Correspondent] Ratbak-aga, when did you become a qadi?

[Qadi] Eleven years ago.

[Correspondent] Let me ask you then about the rest of your biography.

[Qadi] I was born in the Chimkent Oblast 49 years ago. My father and my mother were simple collective farmers, but devout believers. My mother could read the Koran easily. I cannot explain it, but my soul did not accept any atheistic teachings even when I was a schoolboy. Then I faced a competition of 12 people per vacancy in the Bukhara madrase. I finished a nine-year course in six years. I studied at a local teachers' training college at the same time.

[Correspondent] Why a madrase and a teachers' training college at the same time?

[Qadi] I wanted to have a decent secular education. I am finishing my post-graduate studies in this area by the way. You asked me why? So, I would have a broader and a more profound knowledge, so I could compare and take what is the best for myself. I studied at Lebanon University for six years after that. I graduated from the department of shariat and law at Beira. Less than half of the people who originally enrolled with me received their graduation licenses. "We cannot deceive Allah," the Egyptian theology professors used to say, when they dismissed someone. I was offered to continue my post

graduate studies in Saudi Arabia. I refused since I already missed my country, my parents and my family.

[Correspondent] What does a qadi's family look like?

[Qadi] My father, my mother and my wife, five children and my daughter-in-law. My elder son will become a student of Arabic language and literature. My daughters study at the physics department and at the Chemical and Technological Institute. Two younger ones still go to school. My salary of 400 rubles is paid by the Spiritual Board. I bought this house with my own money.

...Qadi does not glance at his watch, but I have a feeling that the interview time is running out. A pile of pages filled with dashed handwriting is waiting for him. Qadi is translating the Koran into Kazakh, which is to be published by the Zhazushy publishing house in an edition of 500 thousand copies.

I am bidding good-bye, thinking that as usual qadi's new day will start with a prayer and a call for mercy. He will remind himself and other people of the great power of love for everything living in the world. This is what the old teaching of his dictates him to do.

Today we all badly need such calls for nobleness, tolerance and moral purity. This is irrespective of the year we are living in - the fifth year of restructuring, 1989, or the 1411 year of khijra.

Turkmen Self-Immolation Victims Include Supreme Soviet Deputy

*90US0404A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian
No 1, 1-7 Jan 90 p 18*

[Article by Yelena Prikhodko and Yuriy Tokarenko: "Case No 101"]

[Text] In 1989 there were 73 instances of self-immolation by women of Turkmenistan. Among them were a deputy of the republic Supreme Soviet and a fifth-grade girl. What is it that to this day incites Turkmen women to an excruciating death by fire?

The magnetic tape crackles, as if unwinding the tangle of her life, which ended after 20 agonizing days in a hospital bed. Dousing herself with kerosene, Dursun, apparently in order to die, tied herself to a post on which sheep are hung for butchering in Turkmen courtyards... And only then did she strike a match. And then... With burns over 85 percent of her body, she made her deposition, interrupted with moans and cries from her failing body, resurrecting the details the inhuman life which drove her to the fire. Here are fragments from the tape, filed under Criminal Case No 101.

"...Aman and I became acquainted in Ashgabat. He was studying at the Physical Culture Department of the university (Later he worked as a teacher-trainer—author's note), and I was studying at the Agricultural Department of the Agricultural Institute. We

were friends for nearly five months. Then we got married. Aman began to beat me up, when I was still pregnant. On 12 January 1976 a son was born. The child suffered from septicaemia. Within two weeks of his birth Aman was already beating the baby. Four or five times he beat him, just as if he were grown. The baby's mouth and nose became blue and swollen. I cried, why beat him—beat me. My husband then answered: 'If he dies, you can have another one...'

"...My older son, when he was six or seven months old, began to cry. I gave him my breast. And my husband shouted, why was I feeding the baby without his permission. He ran over to beat me. He chased me out into the street without my clothes, barefoot... He beat me up right in front of people. 'Let everyone see,' he says, 'that you're stupid, that you're not worth a cent...'

"When I lose consciousness, he kicks me, says that I'm pretending, that I'm faking; he kicks me with his shoes on. No matter how much I clean the house, he walks through the room with his shoes on, and shows no respect. And then he says the house is dirty... And then when the blood flowed, he says, 'Go wash up, or I'll beat you some more...' He kicks me and yells, 'Who gave you permission to go to town?' And when I have to go to his brother's wife, I must ask his permission. When he says 'Go,' you go, and if 'No,' then you go nowhere..."

"We used an oven which burned kerosene. There was an entire can in storage. I say to my son, 'Dear little son, I'm going to die now; I can't bear any more.' He, just a child, knew that I was tired of the blows. I poured the kerosene from my left shoulder... And that's how I went out. Aman stood aside, five or six steps away. He says, 'Look, children, your mother is going to burn herself.' That's what he said, and then the fire flared up... Oy, just before that he said that there was lumber for a new house right alongside. 'Don't burn the lumber,' he says, 'Move away,' he says, 'further away from it...'

Week after week the writer Turkish Dzhumageldyyev pored over the magnetic tape with Dursun's deposition. The well-known prosaist, a laureate of the Turkmen SSR State Prize imeni Makhtumrayment racked his brains over the fate of the Turkmen women. His last novel, "Probeg" [The Race] was about them, and his new story as well, which is based on a shorthand report from Case No 101.

"The incident took place in just about the same place where I was raised," says the author. "I remember, in the hamlet of Karybat, right next to the road there was a grave, all by itself, and no one paid it any respect. When I was just a kid, a herdsboy, I used to ride my donkey along that road every day. Once they explained to me that the woman buried there burned herself to death, and that there was no place for her in the general cemetery. And then our neighbor burned herself to death... In the war years and post-war years there were quite a few such incidents: receiving their husbands' death notice, and seeing no sense in living further, the women in a fit of

grief would condemn themselves to torment. And the most horrible burden, it would seem, was behind. But the number of tragedies is increasing every year. The sting of remorse is terrible—how much younger the victims of self-immolation have become.

In the office of Counselor of Justice Yu. Kulmukhambekov, deputy chief of the investigative directorate at the republic procuracy, we leaf through a booklet in which self-immolations are registered. The heart-rendering register lists young women and even girls—school-girls, and women, born between 1914 and 1979—who, unlike Dursun, will never tell what drove them to burst into flames as a living torch. But then are these motives all that hidden from those around them?..

This story, which the judicial process brought to a close in June 1989, took place in Sakar-Chagainskiy Rayon.

Zuleykha Yevshanova's father, when he learned that his 20-year-old daughter had decided to get married to a lad with whom she had been friends for a long time and who was just about to return from the army, was really upset. That completely spoiled his plan to acquire a bridegroom more profitably. And for Zuleykha, the most difficult days in her short life began.

Zuleykha, seeing that her father would not relent, goes to her friend for advice, and in despair shares her intention to drink vinegar. Her friend talks her out of it and raises her hopes...

On 31 March 1989, when Zuleykha was a guest at a wedding, her father came after her and ordered her to go home and meet the matchmakers. The girl refused them and the matchmakers went home empty-handed. At 7:00 PM on April 2nd, her father drove up to the house in a tractor and shoved his daughter into the cab. He stopped in a desolate area out in the desert. Picking up a shovel, Yevshanov led his daughter over to the nearest sand dune. There he gave her his ultimatum: either she submits, or he will bury her alive.

Thus he forced her to consent.

The next day at 10:00 AM Zuleykha burned herself.

For five months, to the best of her ability, she had fought for her happiness. A lot of people, everyone in his own way, could have helped the young woman; and that means they could have forestalled the tragedy too. Overcoming her timidity, she went to see the party raykom first secretary. The village Soviet also knew of her situation. Openly, as in the palm of one's hand, everything happened in plain sight of her fellow-villagers. She wrote to her beloved of her confusion and of the threats. Pushed to the limit, Zuleykha decided on the final act of shame, in the local conception, for a young woman: she herself asked the parents of her chosen one to send matchmakers...

Every woman who perished in the fire was unhappy in her own way. But, delving into their fate, one senses acutely that they all had one thing in common—the

indifference of those around them. After all, indifference played its role in Dursun's fate too. She, a party member, was described at work as bold, decisive, and principled. But they could see, and they did see how she used her kerchief to conceal her bruises and abrasions. And everyone knew what was happening at her house.

"This was not just indifference, this was a position of non-resistance to an age-old dogmatic psychology: a wife must be submissive, and a daughter has no right to go against her father, even if he buries her alive in the earth. In my practice there have been many court cases on self-immolation, and in every case a kind of invisible spirit of silent approval of these unfortunate women pervaded the hall," said Bakhar Annalyeva, who had been a people's judge for many years. We found her in the Proletarskiy Rayon People's Court in Ashkhabad after she had transferred her cases to a colleague. Voluntarily giving up one's authority is an unusual, even extraordinary step for a judge. "That's enough. I've seen all I can stand," she bluntly spat out in explanation, in which with all her decisiveness there was a sense of hopelessness about changing anything.

"I can trace the path which leads Turkmen women to the fatal step," says Bakhar Annaklychevna. "It begins in the family, which quite often lives under a tyrannical domestic regime. In such families a woman lives a life of isolation at the hearth, is limited in her freedom of movement and in choosing her friends, and is fettered with other restrictions as well. Here's just one example. The Council of Elders at the 'USSR 40th Birthday' Kolkhoz, which is just a stone's throw from the capital, delivered an ultimatum: should there be music and dances at the celebration, let them not come among the honored guests, the graybeards, whose presence is prescribed by custom. From childhood, a girl is imbued with a passion for things, and is schooled in the thought that she must be sold dearly for bride-money [kalym]."

T. Dzhumageldyyev, already familiar to the reader, has made a list of everything that is offered, as a minimum, as the redemption price for a marriageable girl: "Fourteen thousand in cash and 2,000 rubles for gold rings, brooches and earrings; one cow with calf and six large sheep; four carpets; a piece of dressmaking cloth with a market price of 400 rubles..." On and on it goes—four pages of fine print, where almost 30 kinds of fabrics and 10 kinds of dresses are listed, along with trunks and nickel-plated teapots, sacks of rice and flour, boxes of candy and pastries.

As many have told us, for that heap of expensive rags and breast decorations lies—not generosity of the soul, but a business deal, after which the purchaser becomes the absolute sovereign, who has paid for the right to insult, revile and mock...

Unable to bear the beatings and desecration by her husband, 35-year-old O. Orazmuradova from Karabekaulskiy Rayon doused herself with diesel fuel and perished. A. Karliyeva too found no other way out. Her

husband Adzhal was twice prosecuted for torturing his wife, but he did not stop until he drove the mother of six children to depart this life.

At the procuracy where we became familiar with these dramas, condensed here in these few lines, a new subdivision was established not long ago, where cases associated exclusively with self-immolation and law-breaking on the soil of domestic experience are placed under the jurisdiction of skilled jurists. For self-immolation, says procuracy official Yu. Kulmukhambekov with conviction, is inextricably associated with kalym, with forcing women to enter a marriage against their will, and preventing marriage; with entry into actual marriage relationships with a person who has not yet reached marriageable age; and with abduction of women...

The degree of their stability in the public consciousness can be seen from the example of a story in which both participants—the criminal and the victim—were teachers. Together with three accomplices, Ya. Akchev, a teacher at School No 1 in Iolotanskiy Rayon, deceived and abducted G.N., a woman teacher from another school, carried her off to a neighboring settlement, and raped her. On the 13th day of forced cohabitation, the dishonored young woman doused herself with kerosene.

Analyzing the legal aspects of the problem, Yu. Kulmukhambekov shared his observations: It is not unusual for the guilty party in the tragedy (and the "cost" of violating Article 112 of the Turkmen SSR Criminal Code, driving a person to suicide, is from two to five years incarceration), to receive a purely symbolic, arbitrary sentence, and to consider himself all but a hero.

Such cases are frequently examined in a superficial manner, and the rare traveling court sessions are conducted perfunctorily, merely for the record, and without the necessary publicity. This, by the way, has been stressed at numerous plenums of the Turkmen SSR Supreme Court. The tacit response is, do not interfere with the fixed world of ancient customs. For example, for the year, only 21 criminal cases were brought in the entire republic on matters of giving and receiving kalym (as a rule, upon complaints of the parties, if the family broke up, and it became necessary to demand return of the goods). Incidentally, everyone admits that kalym is spreading ever wider in the republic, and is becoming more perverted and monstrous. Any neighbor knows in which house they are counting bride money after the sun goes down.

"Until there is a change in public attitudes toward local vestiges, it will be hard to expect a turning point in the criminological situation," our interlocutor believes. And opinion, strange as it may seem, sometimes takes the side of the torturer. On the Lenin Yeli Kholkhov in Sakar-Chaginskiy Rayon, where the story of Zuleykha took place, instead of handing over the public defendant Yevshanov, they interceded to place him on probation.

"I must admit, we at the procuracy did not expect to hear the opinion that religion could play a large role in, so to

speak, prophylaxis of self-immolation, since religious positions in the spiritual and moral spheres are traditionally strong in the East. Yes, even dabblers in atheism at times sprinkle their child with water. And you see, the Koran condemns self-immolation. It would not be inappropriate, they say to us, to broadcast sermons by religious figures via television. As long as the vestiges are not condemned by public opinion, severe punishment is unlikely to help."

Until recently, self-immolation, just as other manifestations of social pathology, had been a closed subject for scientists. It was only recently that they began research on law-breaking on the soil of local customs which, as they hope, will not only help to improve existing criminal legislation, but will also clarify the state of public morals, which are inseparable from the peculiarities of national psychology, the entire path of moral gains and losses, which the people trod in the years of the recent and distant past.

Candidate of Philosophical Sciences O. Mukhammedberdiyev is convinced that "the republic needs a center for study of public opinion. Only in-depth, purposeful study with the participation of sociologists, psychologists, economists, and physicians, and not separate, one-time actions, will help us to see the picture of the real state of mass consciousness..."

The average life-span of Turkmen women is today the very shortest in the country. And infant mortality is the very highest: 54 out of every 1,000 newborn children die, and 60 percent of the children under one year old suffer from a shortage of protein in their diet. During a comprehensive research project conducted on a certain kolkhoz by the Scientific Research Institute for the Protection of Motherhood and Childhood, out of 248 women only 12 were found to be healthy; and out of 365 children, only one-fourth. The ecological situation is such that pesticides have been found in the mother's milk. The socio-cultural infrastructure is in an embryonic state. A Turkmen woman often cannot discover herself as an individual: about half the women of the native nationality do not take part in social production, which is largely the fault of a shortage of workplaces. In the southernmost republic, where the marriage age was just lowered, instruction in the ethics and psychology of family life is very primitive. The medical knowledge of the populace is low, and sometimes even the physicians are illiterate. All of this creates an atmosphere of psychological defenselessness, which as a result incites women to take the irremediable step.

"The tragedy of self-immolation is not a tragedy of individuals, as some people find it advantageous and convenient to think. This is a tragedy of society, and is merely the visible part of the iceberg of social problems," Turkish Dzhumageldyyev believes—who by the way, receives an enormous amount of mail with the bitter confessions of his fellow countrymen—that "the mistake lies in the fact that until now these incidents have been examined in isolation from the social milieu. A girl has

dreams; she wants to study, and live 'as they do on television.' But she is forced from dawn to dark to bend her back in the cotton fields, where defoliants destroy her ability to bear children long before she is married. Lack of social experience, limited contacts, and lack of a world-view do not allow her soul to escape her dead-end condition, nor is there anyone there to give her advice. In order to understand why she decides to take the step, one must comprehend the world of a Turkmen woman—unusually injurious, fragile, hemmed-in, and at the same time impulsive. I was told about a certain 25-year old woman, who was very fearful of remaining an 'old maid,' that—like getting married to a widower, still summons oblique looks from the natives. And here, as if out of spite, one of the juveniles, without a second thought as they say, started calling her 'dayza'—'auntie' (a form of address for matronly women). What's more, by coincidence, the next day there was a wedding at the neighbors'... Alas, we cannot always understand the pain of another person; it seems capricious to us, the escapade of an unbalanced, or even a psychologically-ill person. Were it otherwise, we would have established a network of services for psychological assistance, like we need in the republic."

From just 11 incidents of self-immolation out of 73 criminal cases, and 17 names of women and girls in that booklet which we paged through, the red pencil marks show what psychological illness means. Without contending for anything and not asserting anything, we can say that a writer who has thoroughly studied this problem has the right to his own point of view, which differs from the official one. He explains the depth of social protest by the cruelty of the environment and the effectiveness of the method of departing this life.

They say that this is an echo of Zoroasterism, of fire-worship: that one who offers himself to the flames can expect paradise, and a woman turns into a peri—a fabulous beauty. It is more likely that our contemporaries, who on the threshold of the 20th century voluntarily go to execution by fire, do not even suspect this.

Burning all their bridges, they free themselves from others, and themselves—from themselves.

Turkmen Regional-Studies Association Revived

90UN0617A Ashkhabad KOMSOMOLETS
TURKMENISTANA in Russian 12 Dec 89 p 1

[Article by A. Yennik: "Such a Revival Is Necessary"]

[Text] On 8-9 December the Constituent Congress of this republic's regional-studies specialists was held; it resulted in the founding of the Turkmen Regional-Studies Association (TKO). It will operate under the guidance of the Turkmen Cultural Fund's Board, which also initiated the founding of this new association.

"Ashkhabad is a young city. It is slightly more than 100 years old"—that is what airline passengers are told upon

landing at our capital's airport. And they become witnesses to a "legitimized" deceit: in fact, this city is more than 2000 years old! Does anyone know about this? Not only do they know, but they also write about it: scholars write books and monographs, while history buffs write letters to newspapers. The deceit, however, still remains in effect. Who was the "chief deceiver"? There is probably no sense in seeking him out now; it has become overly fashionable in our own times to look for the guilty parties. It is a much more essential matter to restore historical fairness. And it looks like it will be restored: very powerful forces have united in a single organization, which has set itself the task of solving an enormous number of problems.

It should be said right away that the TKO is not a new organization: the Turkmen Regional-Studies Association existed during the 1920's and 1930's. It was abolished during the time of the repressions, and the leading regional-studies specialists—members of the editorial collegium of the journal *TURKMENOVEDENIYE* such as Boriyev, Karpov, Perengliyev, Karpych, and others—were repressed. Nowadays, when the foremost specialists are working to compile a genuine history of our republic, issues of *TURKMENOVEDENIYE* dating from those years are literally priceless! By the way, mention was made at the TKO Congress of reviving the journal *TURKMENOVEDENIYE*, and it was discussed as one of the most important tasks. But prior to the Congress....

"Regional studies are being revived very actively throughout the entire country," says Lyudmila Sokolova, senior expert at the Turkmen Cultural Fund and head secretary of the Congress's Organizational Committee, "and our cultural fund has also taken part in this work. The most difficult thing to do has been to seek out and find enthusiasts throughout the republic. Whereas in Ashkhabad everyone is, so to speak, right in front of you, in the rayons you literally have to 'track them down.' But, of course, there are many enthusiasts—those persons in the local schools who organize regional-studies museums, who are interested in the traditions of the olden times, who yearn to preserve Turkmenia's historic sites and monuments."

Many persons made speeches at the Congress. They spoke about the fact that the Ashkhabad Gorispolkom has established a commission on naming streets, squares, and parks, about restoring some of the city's original geographic names. And about how we need to set up a similar commission at the republic-wide level. Ye. Atagarryev, a doctor of historical sciences and head of the Archaeology Section of the History Institute imeni Sh. Batyrov under the Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences, talked about the work being conducted in Turkmenia with regard to preserving monuments.

"But if I am asked what the specific state of affairs regarding the preservation of monuments is, I would say—catastrophic! Despite the fact that this matter has been examined in our republic's Council of Ministers and Supreme Soviet, the Law on the preservation of

monuments is virtually not in effect," Ye. Atagarryev declared. He also posed the question of Ashkhabad's historical age.

Centers for regional studies should be organized in all oblasts and possibly even in certain rayons. This was discussed at the Congress, and it is a fact. The city of Nebit-Dag was cited as an example. An entire series of unique fresh-water lakes is located 100 kilometers from the city, in the East, on saline lands. The ruins of the historical settlement of Meshkhed-Miorian are not far from Nebit-Dag. Until quite recently walls up to 10 meters high encircled the ancient city, but now they are no longer there. On the other hand, quite a few structures built of "historical" bricks have sprung up in the rayon center. There is enormous interest in the Large and Small Balkhan mountain ranges, the unique nature of nearby Kazandzhik, and the unique, spa-type resort of Molla-Kara; the Caspian beaches are attracting more and more vacationers from all over the Soviet Union. And we must see to it that all this is preserved.

The principal work with regard to regional studies must be taken on by young people. The Congress proposed that a young persons' regional-studies camp be established at the base of the Kunya-Urgench Historical-Architectural Preserve and a young persons' labor and rest camp be set up at the base of the Ogurchinsk Regional Studies Museum.

A. Azimov, director of the Ancient Merv Preserve, spoke about the fact that, along with regional-studies specialists, this work should be engaged in by the republic-level Society for the Preservation of Monuments, which nowadays seems to be concerned merely with collecting dues. And he made the following specific proposal to the Turkmen Cultural Fund:

"Kunya-Urgench has been proclaimed a preserve, but it does not possess its own land. Therefore, de jure the Kunya-Urgench Preserve, like a number of others, is not the master of its own territory. So let's act together to 'stir up' the government, which seems to have forgotten about the monuments, and let's begin to win back the lands for our preserves!"

And so the Turkmen Regional-Studies Association has been founded, or, to put it more correctly, revived. Within the framework of the republic-level cultural fund a "regional-studies" account will be opened, and the fund's staff associates will inform the public as to the needs and how much money has been spent.

I would like to conclude this article as follows. Among other things, the TKO Program states: "We must organize permanent rubrics in the mass media...." KOMSO-MOLETS *TURKMENISTANA* can take pride in the fact that "Nisa"—a rubric which corresponds to the goals and tasks of the Turkmen Regional-Studies Association—has already been in use since the beginning of 1989.

'Informal' Groups: Role of Komsomol in Military

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Russian 21 Nov 89 First Edition p 2

[Article by Captain 3rd Rank P. Ishchenko: "And The Applause Subsided... Then the Question Arose About the Results of an Unofficial Meeting of Komsomol Workers in Arkhangelsk"]

[Text] Today no one is surprised by informal groups and organizations. But "informalists" in military uniform and the majority of them officers, warrant officers, and naval warrant officers.... All of this is somehow unusual... And now a group of Northern Fleet and Leningrad Military District Komsomol workers are advocating a proposal to conduct informal meetings of Army and Navy Komsomol activists to discuss problems which have accumulated in their work. The idea, as they say, has been set in motion. The "Arkhangelsk Meeting"—this is the name it has acquired—has taken place.

Fourteen people participated in it, although the organizers thought that it would be more representative. But we will neither be ironic nor will we discuss the failure. We agree that the very fact that such a meeting occurred says that youthful initiative is being given a range in Army and Navy Komsomol organizations, each is able to express his opinion on some problem, and each can participate in these perestroika processes with which the Armed Forces Komsomol lives today. It is another matter if this is always of a constructive nature. And it is from that point of view that we will also look at the work of the "Arkhangelsk Meeting" participants.

It is time to present the "rabble-rousers of Komsomol tranquility"—the members of the initiative group. They are Komsomol activists and staff Komsomol workers of lower and "slightly higher" elements: Chief Petty Officer J. Zernov, Senior Naval Warrant Officer V. Shamshin, Senior Lieutenant V. Mostovenko, and Captains M. Oleynik, A. Shemyanin, and S. Semenov.

Let us turn to the meeting's agenda. It's main points are: Assessment of the situation that has taken shape within Armed Forces Komsomol organizations, the attitude toward the meeting of Army and Navy Komsomol activists that recently occurred in Moscow, on the advisability of establishing an independent union of young people of the Armed Forces with its own program and charter, and on cooperation of Komsomol organizations with commanders, political organs, and party organizations.

Members of the initiative group stated that Army and Navy Komsomol members are entirely capable of not only being a "VLKSM [All-Union Komsomol] combat detachment" as they are often called, but can also have an independent organization with its own program and charter, and with its specific nature that a "civilian Komsomol" does not have.

And really is the idea so Utopian of the establishment of an independent (in the organizational sense) "Komsomol in shoulder boards"? It cannot be denied that it sounds attractive.

And there seems to be a basis for it. A Komsomol organization has essentially already been formed in the Army and Navy that exists not only in accordance with the laws of the VLKSM but also in accordance with principles that are only customary in the Armed Forces. It is already one thing that practical work here is being based on instructions to the Soviet Army and Navy VLKSM organizations, on directives from the USSR Ministry of Defense and the Chief of the Main Political Directorate, and in a certain sense places the Army and Naval Komsomol in a special position within the framework of the VLKSM. And the initiative group of the "Arkhangelsk Meeting" proposed "bringing form in line with content."

How? The meeting's participants had no single opinion.

A heated discussion broke out. It is only too bad that common sense often vanished during the course of it. And the experience that they already have. It is true that the meeting's participants nevertheless need to more deeply and more attentively study the decisions of the Army and Navy Komsomol activists' conference at which, in my opinion, a comprehensive, constructive concept was developed for structural perestroika of the Armed Forces Komsomol organization.

But the impression was created that certain of the meeting participants simply had the goal of absolutely refuting it and of finding a "worthy alternative" to it at any costs.

This is not an altogether creative approach.

Captain 2nd Rank A. Pyatygin, senior instructor of the Komsomol Affairs Department of the Main Political Directorate, Lieutenant Colonel A. Kasyanov, Professor of the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin, Captain-Lieutenant I. Shulgin, USSR People's Deputy, and G. Shvetov, a VLKSM Central Committee worker asked to say a few words.

It was hard to refute their observation that the meeting's participants, who were opposed to formalism in the life of Komsomol organizations, were they themselves at the same time attracted to the formal side of the issue. The opinions and arguments are interesting, they are outwardly attractive, but they do not have sufficient depth or basis. Well good, the Armed Forces Komsomol will become a completely independent unit. In that case what can we do about a Border Guards Komsomol? Internal Forces? Do they create their own unions of young people, too? According to this logic, why not? But the process of delimitation can go even further. Voices are ringing out to create Komsomol organizations within the Armed Forces on a nationality basis ...

What will we arrive at? What do we want?

These questions are far from trite.

And they need to be answered.

Views and positions have begun to come together. This process was not easy. And nevertheless in the end voting was unanimous for the resolution "On Paths Toward Democratization of the USSR Armed Forces Komsomol." It is true that those gathered nevertheless stipulated that they had "made concessions" on some point or other. These were concessions to common sense:

"We support the decision of the meeting of the Army and Navy Komsomol activists which occurred during September of this year in Moscow on establishment of a Komsomol organ election system from below to above in the form of soviets of Komsomol organizations... However, we consider this only the first step on the path toward democratization of Army and Navy Komsomol... While participating in the deepening of democratization of social life in the Armed Forces of the USSR, Komsomol organizations promote the consolidation of yedinonachaliye [sole responsibility of the commander for both political and military matters]. Political organs run Komsomol organizations by political methods while excluding administrative bureaucracy and petty stewardship. Party organizations carry out their influence through communists working in Komsomol organizations and consider the opinion of the Komsomol while arriving at their own decisions and cooperate with it in practical work. We arrived at the conclusion on the need for including the chapter on "The Commander (Head) and Social Organizations" in the Internal Service Charter of the USSR Supreme Soviet. "These are priority tasks for the Komsomol of the Armed Forces: 1) providing VLKSM leadership in a youthful environment; 2) increasing the specific contribution of VLKSM members to insure qualitative parameters of combat readiness; and, 3) establishing an effective mechanism for expressing the interests and defending the rights of young people...."

Besides the resolution, they also adopted two documents on a model of the Armed Forces Komsomol organization.

Why two? All of the meetings participants' views are still different. Some have adhered to the opinion that the Army needs a Union that is independent in everything... Others—that [it needs] an Armed Forces' VLKSM organization that nevertheless has equal rights with republic unions of young people. Let us point out that the meeting of Army and Navy Komsomol activists made just such a decision. But something else is important: The meeting's participants stated that on this issue we should let the Komsomol members themselves discuss it and let them make the final selection.

"We consider the main result of the "Arkhangelsk Meeting" to be the very fact that it was conducted," stated members of the initiative group. "The stereotype that everything interesting and valuable must only come from above will be overcome."

Incidentally, that very "above," the Komsomol Affairs Department of the Main Political Directorate did not interfere in "overcoming" that "stereotype" either.

Yes, the stereotype was overcome. One more time. But in another way if you look deeper. The stereotype in public opinion about Army and Navy Komsomol is as an organization that is completely closed to living young people's business, bursts [of emotion], and transformations. Organizations in which any "democratic 'license'" is impermissible, that do not dare to have their own opinions, "and that only wait for the next orders and the next directives from the political organs and commander.

I think that it was clear to people that it was not so.

The "Arkhangelsk Meeting" is yet one more confirmation.

But it also confirmed something else. Good bursts [of emotion] and projects in and of themselves still will have not produced real results if deep knowledge of some problem does not stand behind them, if all of its complications are not considered, or if there is no grounded development of ways to solve the problem.

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59

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